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This thesis studies hybrid fiction to identify characteristics of contemporary American 
literature in the twenty-first century. Hybrid fiction represents the role of affect in the 
constitution of human subjectivities. Affect presupposes an interconnection between 
humans and nonhumans and challenges the distinction between the subject and the object. 
Hybrid fiction thus portrays humans as relational entities with the potential to affect and 
be affected by humans and nonhuman others. Moreover, it emphasizes the influence of 
affect in the relationship between the text and the reader. It uses certain forms, structures, 
and writing styles are used in hybrid fiction to make the reader an active participant in 
meaning production. Accordingly, hybrid fiction is committed to hybrid and affective 
thinking both at the levels of form and content. 
 The thesis considers the juxtaposition between affect and subjectivity in three 
aspects: authenticity, literacy, and critique. The first chapter examines narrative 
subjectivities as a site in which affect reconceptualizes self-authenticity as a form of 
accountability. The second chapter explores affective forms of literacy in the experience 
of urban subjects. Lastly, the third chapter explores the connection between forms and the 
post-critical practice in network subjectivities. By examining the representation of these 
three subjectivities in connection with authenticity, literacy, and critique, it is possible to 
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The narrator and unnamed female protagonist of Ottessa Moshfegh’s My Year of Rest and 
Relaxation (2018) finds that being awake and having sensory experiences are unbearable. 
A simple activity like walking down the street makes her ‘cringe’; ‘the air hurt, the light 
hurt, the details of the world seemed garish and hostile.’1 Her solution is to sleep as much 
as possible, to go into ‘hibernation,’ as she calls it. She meets with a psychologist who 
prescribes a cocktail of hypnotic drugs that will help her sleep and, hopefully, transform 
her. The narrator’s hibernation starts in January 2000 and ends on 1 June 2001 when she 
wakes up in a position that recalls the seated Buddha in the enlightened state. It appears 
that she too achieves enlightenment of her own: 
I came to in a cross-legged seated position on the living room floor. Sunlight was 
needling through the blinds, illuminating crisscrossed planes of yellow dust that 
blurred and waned as I squinted. I heard a bird chirp.  
I was alive.2 
The narrator’s description of her surroundings emphasizes the interconnection of things 
and herself as a part of them. As the sun shines through, illuminating the dust that appears 
in a crisscrossed pattern when filtered through the blinds, the illuminated dust also blurs 
and wanes in response to the movement of her eyes that squint in reaction to the sunlight. 
She feels alive as she realizes that her presence influences the quality and movement of 
other things that, in turn, shape her experience of them. In other words, the narrator wakes 
 
1 Ottessa Moshfegh, My Year of Rest and Relaxation (London: Vintage, 2018), Kindle ebook, p. 4. 




up to a revelation about her immanent existence and to an awareness of the affective force 
among entities whose interconnection mutually contributes to their respective changes. 
 I begin with Moshfegh’s novel to illustrate a primary motif that characterizes a 
group of contemporary novels that I call hybrid fiction. I argue that hybrid fiction focuses 
on affect in textual practices to explore the consequences and possibilities that an affective 
interconnection may bring to human subjectivities, especially how they can be represented 
in the text and constituted through textual encounters. When entities encounter and 
connect, affect emerges as a force that has a transformative effect on all entities in the 
interaction. Affect is thus generally understood as ‘the capacities to act and be acted upon’.3 
I choose the term ‘hybrid’ to describe this group of novels because I contend that hybridity 
is the operative logic of the affective process. During an affective process, an entity is both 
a subject and an object. It is simultaneously acting and being acted upon during an 
encounter. When Moshfegh’s narrator wakes up, she becomes aware of such an affective 
process. She perceives the interrelation among things around her and realizes that she is 
also a part of it. Her sense of self — the feeling of being alive — is constituted by her 
presence among these things that can affect and be affected by her.  
 In this thesis, I will use the concept of hybridity to describe the role of affect in the 
notions of self-authenticity, literacy, and critique. I will explore the operation of affect in 
these three areas by examining the representation of narrative, urban, and network 
subjectivities in hybrid fiction. Through the selected novels, I will argue that hybrid fiction 
uses these subjectivities to demonstrate the influence of affect in an attempt to 
 
3 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, in The Affect Theory Reader, 




reconceptualize self-authenticity, imagine a form of affective literacy, and develop a post-
critical sensibility. Moreover, I will discuss how hybrid fiction represents these 
subjectivities by seeking to forge an affective connection with the reader through a reading 
mode that emphasizes affective capacity of literary texts. In other words, hybrid fiction 
encourages a reading practice that regards textual meaning as a product of a mutually 
affective collaboration between the text and the reader. 
 My argument about hybrid fiction is part of an ongoing effort to note and describe 
the characteristics of contemporary American literature produced in the literary climate 
loosely defined as post-postmodern. Here I also choose the term hybrid to suggest that a 
decisive periodization cannot characterize these novels. In one regard, I contend that hybrid 
fiction reflects the affective turn in literary studies today. Moreover, I want to demonstrate, 
being part of the affective turn, these novels also problematize the use of genres, categories, 
or periods to describe them. According to Patricia T. Clough, the affective turn indicates ‘a 
shift in thought’ in which the notion of affect leads to a reassessment of a wide range of 
concepts, including subjectivity, representation, embodiment, information, media, and 
technology.4  In literary studies, the affective turn entails a rethinking of the significance of 
textual forms in the process of interpretation and meaning production. However, the focus 
on textual forms also reveals the continued influence of certain forms and techniques across 
different periods and categories. For example, Rachel Greenwald Smith argues that the 
affective turn indicates how postmodernist aesthetics are used in contemporary literature to 
produce ‘impersonal feelings’ to undermine the ‘affective hypothesis’.5 According to 
 
4 Patricia Ticineto Clough, ‘Introduction’, in The Affective Turn, ed. by Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean 
Halley (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 1-33 (p.2). 
5 Rachel Greenwald Smith, ‘Postmodernism and the Affective Turn’, Twentieth Century Literature, 57 




Smith, the affective hypothesis presupposes the act of reading as a kind of emotional 
investment that expects a return in the form of emotional fulfillment. As a result, literature 
is often expected to represent or convey personal emotions and to be able to provoke 
empathy and the feeling of interpersonal connection.6 Moreover, the affective hypothesis 
could lead to a disregard of other forms of textual feelings that are inherent in the text but 
unable to reciprocate personal feelings. However, Smith argues that some contemporary 
novels foreground these impersonal feelings to challenge assumptions about textual 
meanings, feelings, and subjectivities implied in the affective hypothesis. According to 
Smith:  
These works explicitly aim to undermine the personalization of the aesthetic 
experience by withdrawing from typical ways of producing emotional responses 
in readers. […] They are interested in feelings that are unsettling insofar as they 
fall outside existing socio-political codes for what a feeling is understood to be. 
These impersonal feelings […] are potentially destabilizing insofar as their 
presence defies the prevailing notion that feelings only exist insofar as they are the 
property of the individual.7 
In her argument, Smith locates the production of feelings in the middle space between the 
text and the reader and characterizes feelings as impersonal and interrelational. Literary 
works emphasizing impersonal feelings reflect a recommitment to the text as an entity with 
specific formal, aesthetic, and thematic qualities. These textual qualities can be encountered 
 
6 Rachel Greenwald Smith, Affect and American Literature in the Age of Neoliberalism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.1. 




and capable of producing feelings and being affected by the reader in a manner that 
challenges the affective hypothesis. 
Smith’s argument also demonstrates that literary works that focus on textual forms 
and affect cannot be decisively characterized as modernist, postmodernist, or post-
postmodernist. She contends that postmodernist aesthetics persists in the so-called post-
postmodern era, but their function differs from how postmodernist writers would use these 
techniques in their works. Likewise, I will demonstrate that hybrid fiction as part of the 
affective turn adopts and combines modernists and postmodernist aesthetics and 
assumptions for a different end. I will highlight that these works reflect the influences of 
modernism’s commitment to forms and postmodernism’s problematization of textual 
representations. The combined influences allow these texts to explore new possibilities 
about how we may know, represent, and connect with other things if we are willing to 
rethink our position as human subjects and consider the contribution of nonhuman entities 
in our knowledge and experience. That is, hybrid fiction is situated between modernist and 
postmodernist traditions to reclaim the ability of literature to represent and connect with the 
reader and the social world in a meaningful and constructive way. 
 In discussing literature after postmodernism, Andrew Hoberek also highlights the 
problem of periodization that tends to privilege sociological aspects of literature over its 
form. He contends that announcing the death of postmodernism might be premature 
because ‘postmodern techniques – even if they no longer play quite the dominant role they 
once did – have hardly disappeared from contemporary fiction’.8 Hoberek’s observation is 
 
8 Andrew Hoberek, ‘Introduction: After Postmodernism’, Twentieth Century Literature, 53 (2007), 233-247 




echoed in Smith’s argument about how postmodernist aesthetics are still relevant as a way 
to reassess the nature of textual encounter and meaning production. Moreover, both 
Hoberek and Smith emphasize the significance and persistence of form in their arguments. 
They describe how certain forms and aesthetics remain relevant because formal qualities 
reflect the change in our understanding of the relationship between the text and the reader. 
In Jane Gallop’s defense of close reading, she also emphasizes the text and reader relation. 
Specifically, she criticizes how literary studies risk turning into an immature cultural history 
study by focusing on periodization and historicization. She argues that close reading and 
attention to the text itself may be a solution that will safeguard the continued relevance of 
literary studies as a discipline. However, she sees that close reading does not necessarily 
reinforce the ahistorical approach. Instead, it can maintain the historical significance of 
literature without depending too much on socio-cultural and historical practices. As Gallop 
writes: 
Let us recall that literary studies embraced historicism as part of a rejection of 
timeless universals. […] It is precisely my opposition to timeless universals that 
makes me value close reading. I would argue that close reading poses an ongoing 
threat to easy, reductive generalization, that it is a method for resisting and calling 
into question our inevitable tendency to bring things together in smug, overarching 
conclusions. I would argue that close reading may in fact be the best antidote we 
have to the timeless and the universal.9 
My discussion of hybrid fiction belongs in this strand of criticism that seeks to sidestep the 
historical approach through the attention to the text itself. As Gallop also points out, the 
 
9 Jane Gallop, ‘The Historicization of Literary Studies and the Fate of Close Reading’, Professions, 1 




renewed emphasis on textual forms also inevitably reaffirms the significance of close 
reading as a critical factor that makes literary studies a valuable discipline. In this vein, I 
also see that hybrid fiction encourages a form of close reading to defend the ability of 
literature to represent and connect with the reader and the world. It is a reading practice that 
acknowledges the text as an entity that belongs in the world with the reader and whose 
formal and aesthetic qualities the reader can directly encounter and react.  
 However, I will extend my argument further by considering how attention to affect 
also leads us to rethink subjectivity in conjunction with textual encounters and meaning 
production. My focus on hybridity and subject constitution aims to highlight this crucial 
implication. Not long after the narrator of My Year wakes up, she describes her encounter 
with a painting. Her description captures how an affective encounter constitutes the subject 
and places it on a flat ontology mutually inhabited by the subject and the object. 
Accordingly, this scene challenges the traditional assumption about human subjectivity and 
meaning production: 
I put my hand out. I touched the frame of the painting. And then I placed my whole 
palm on the dry, rumbling surface of the canvas, simply to prove to myself that 
there was no God stalking my soul. Time was not immemorial. Things were just 
things. (emphasis in original)10 
Upon touching the painting, the narrator’s earlier epiphany about her immanent existence 
with other things is reaffirmed. She claims that ‘[t]here was no God stalking my soul’ 
because the textural sensation allows her to perceive the material reality of the object that 
exists outside of her subjective experience and outside its cultural value. However, her 
 




encounter with the painting also leads the narrator to proclaim, ‘That was it. I was free.’11 
What she refers to is the freedom from the burden of having subjective consciousness. She 
can let things be ‘just things’ without performing the task of a subject and finding meanings 
behind other objects. Therefore, when the narrator becomes aware of the painting as a thing 
in itself, she also realizes that her subjectivity is not a prerequisite for meaning and 
knowledge production. She realizes that she too exists on the same ontological ground with 
other things. Thus, the scene describes the hybrid nature of affectation as simultaneously a 
process of individuation and interrelation. Affect is, therefore, a hybrid and ambiguous 
force in that it confirms the separation among entities precisely when it reinforces their 
interconnection. 
 Sarah Ahmed uses the term ‘affective economies’ to describe such a process by 
which an affective encounter simultaneously creates and dissolves boundaries among 
individual bodies and between bodies and the world. According to Ahmed, ‘emotions are 
not simply something “I” or “we” have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond 
to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the “I” and the “we” are shaped 
by, and even take the shape of, contact with others.’12 Marielle Macé and Marlon Jones also 
argue that when reading experiences are understood as an affective encounter, it becomes 
aesthetic conduct or behavior instead of simply a deciphering activity. According to Macé 
and Jones: ‘Reading is, first of all, an “opportunity” for individuation: encountering books 
leads us constantly to recognize ourselves, to “refigure” ourselves, that is, to constitute 
ourselves as subjects and reappropriate our relationship to ourselves through negotiation 
 
11 Ibid. 




with other forms’ (emphasis in original).13   Similarly, Richard Kearney’s concept of ‘carnal 
hermeneutics’ proposes an alternative mode of textual interpretation through sensation. He 
argues that this form of hermeneutics can mediate the sense of otherness between self and 
others on the flesh and surface level. It is ‘a method of reading between gaps, and 
discriminating, distinguishing, and differentiating between selves and others – and others 
in ourselves’.14 Following these arguments, it becomes clear how reading is a process of 
individuation in which subjectivities are constituted. 
 My interest in subjectivities in hybrid fiction through the lens of affect is informed 
by these insights about how close attention to the textual forms, affect, and surface 
encounters may contribute to our understanding of subjectivities. Moreover, the focus on 
affect and form suggests a possibility for an even richer aesthetic experience in textual 
encounter and meaning production. In Against Interpretation, Susan Sontag also argues for 
such a value in the direct sensory experience of art that should not be impoverished or 
stifled by our interpretation or criticism. As Sontag writes, transparence or the mode of 
‘experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are’ should 
be reserved as ‘the highest most liberating value in art and in criticism today’.15 However, 
as I hope to demonstrate, the transparence of art also helps to constitute subjectivities. With 
the concept of hybridity, I hope to shed light on how such a constitutive process takes place 
in our engagement with the text’s transparence. 
 
13 Marielle Macé and Marlon Jones, ‘Ways of Reading, Modes of Being’, New Literary History, 44 (2013), 
213-229 <DOI: 10.1353/nlh.2013.0017>, pp. 218-19. 
14 Richard Kearney, ‘What is Carnal Hermeneutics?’, New Literary History, 46 (2015), 99-124 < DOI: 
10.1353/nlh.2015.0009 >, p. 101. 




 For example, apart from its thematic focus on affect and encounter, My Year also 
formally highlights its transparence. The story is told from the point of view of an unnamed, 
first-person narrator who is also the story’s protagonist. Narrative unreliability becomes 
apparent by this formal decision and thematically reinforced by the narrator’s mental 
condition at the center of the plot. However, as unreliability becomes a formal and thematic 
focus of the novel, it also frees the reader from being cautious or suspicious of the text. The 
reader can fully inhabit the consciousness of the narrator/protagonist and navigate the story-
world with an understanding that, at any moment, there could be surprises. The unreliability 
is made evident because it is not intended for the reader to be careful of and brace for 
unexpected twists but to be ready and willing to experience them when they finally come 
across those moments.  
 To put it another way, narrative unreliability in Moshfegh’s novel invites the reader 
to respond to the text on the surface, to read it ‘with the grain’ as Timothy Bewes calls it, 
and experience the freedom from being fully immersed in the text. Reading with the grain, 
according to Bewes, requires that the text is treated as an intentionless singularity so that 
its comprehensibility comes from ‘our own reading and our moment that speaks to us from 
the text’.16 In their argument about ‘surface reading’, Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus 
similarly argue that the willingness to ‘accept things as they are’ can lead to textual 
immersion as a kind of ‘a true openness to all the potentials made available by texts’.17  
Narrative unreliability in My Year is emphasized on both formal and thematic levels to 
 
16 Timothy Bewes, ‘Reading with the Grain: A New World in Literary Criticism’, Differences: A Journal of 
Feminist Cultural Studies, 21 (2010), 1-33 <DOI:10.1215/10407391-2010-007>, p. 28. 
17 Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, ‘Surface Reading: An Introduction’, Representations, 108 (2009), 1-21 




encourage reading from the surface or with the grain. The reader is made fully aware that 
the text is unreliable and probably full of pleasant and unpleasant surprises. However, if the 
reader adopts what Bewes calls the ‘generous approach’ of reading by giving ‘sustained 
attentiveness to the “singularity” of the text, referring the text not to anything outside the 
text, but to itself’,18 they might experience a similar feeling described in the painting scene. 
The reader might discover freedom from being able to have a meaningful encounter with 
the text without the burden of demystification or meaning production typically imposed on 
the subject. 
 The narrator of Moshfegh’s novel explains the merit of a surface engagement right 
from the beginning when she defends her use of hypnotic drugs: ‘I thought life would be 
more tolerable if my brain were slower to condemn the world around me.’19 Similarly, I 
will demonstrate that hybrid fiction also prompts the reader to have a slower but more 
sensitive and more constructive relationship with the text instead of being alert, suspicious, 
or constantly looking for hidden textual meanings. Without the need to condemn, to debunk, 
or to be right, the reading experience may yield an enriched understanding of the world and 
one’s place in it. The reader can follow the narrative, and they will eventually discover that 
what the text has to say is inextricable from their personal experience of it. Their ability to 
perceive the meaning of the text is contingent on their acceptance of--and willingness to 
experience--the text for what it is. 
 In the remainder of this introduction, I will elaborate on the significance of hybridity 
in these two aspects:  the affective interconnection in the production of meaning in hybrid 
 
18 Bewes, p. 25. 




fiction and how hybrid fiction and the affective turn contribute to the current conversation 
about contemporary American literature. The concepts of hybridity and affect can reflect 
the characteristics of contemporary literature and the enduring legacies of modernism and 
postmodernism in literary studies today. Hybrid fiction and its attention to affect illuminate 
the middle space in which the modernist commitment to the importance of forms is still 
upheld while the postmodernist disillusionment about the limit of representation propels a 
reassessment of what textual forms can do to make literature relevant in the social world 
again. Accordingly, my focus on hybrid fiction is essentially an effort to defend literature’s 
ability to represent the world and speak to us about who we are, as long as we recognize 
that its representational capacity is contingent on the condition of its belonging in the world 
with us. 
Hybridity, Affect, and Subject-Object Relations  
The term ‘hybrid’ was first widely used in the nineteenth century to address issues of race 
and miscegenation.20 As a hybrid cross between two species is infertile, it was assumed 
then that the hybrid offspring from an interracial union could determine whether humans 
of different races belong to different species. Even though the first widespread usage of the 
term was in biology, its invocation was heavily charged with racial and cultural prejudices. 
It was not until the twentieth century that postcolonialists began to use the term hybridity 
in a more positive and subversive manner. One prominent example is Homi Bhabha’s 
usage of the concept to theorize a possible form of resistance against colonial authority. 
 





Bhabha argues that the exercise of colonial power through discrimination and domination 
also facilitates the production of hybrids as a form of resistance that: 
is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, nor is it the simple 
negation or exclusion of the ‘content’ of another culture, as a difference once 
perceived. It is the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of 
recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate the signs of cultural 
difference and reimplicate them within the deferential relations of colonial power 
– hierarchy, normalization, marginalization and so forth.21 
For Bhabha, the process of hybridization makes possible a mode of resistance beyond the 
politics of opposition. Hybrids do not reject the alien and dominant force but embrace it as 
the source of its ambivalence that can turn back to undermine the dominating power. The 
subversiveness of hybridity thus comes from its liminality and ambiguity. Hybrids do not 
defy or negate but negotiate antagonistic and contradictory elements to produce ‘something 
else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both’ (emphasis in original).22 
 Bhabha’s interpretation of hybridity as ‘the principle of political negotiation’23 calls 
to mind the mode of thinking propagated by a school of sociology known as the actor-
network theory or ANT. In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour also uses the 
concept of hybridity to explain the modern paradox:  
The word ‘modern’ designates two sets of entirely different practices. […] The 
first set of practices, by ‘translation’, creates mixtures between entirely new types 
of beings, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification’, creates two 
 
21 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 157-158. 





entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of 
nonhumans on the others.24 
The paradox of the modern rests in the commitment to purification even though it facilitates 
the production of hybrids. To be modern is to insist that purification and hybridization are 
separated processes despite their interrelation. To understand the social world, Latour 
suggests, we must abandon modern thinking and consider the population of hybrids that 
the modern paradigm simultaneously rejects and proliferates. In other words, Latour 
considers the social to be made up of shifting connections among hybrid entities that he 
calls ‘actors’. These actors are a hybrid because they act as mediators that can transform 
both themselves and others through interrelations. The image of the illuminated, 
crisscrossed panes of dust particles in My Year also captures the nature of actors as 
mediators. The dust particles are illuminated by the sun shining through the blinds, 
rendering the illumination in a crisscrossed pattern. The dust blurs and wanes in response 
to the narrator squinting her eyes and reacting to the brightness of the sunlight. The quality 
of the dust that the narrator describes results from interactions among various actors 
affected and transformed through their encounters with one another. Like how the narrator 
of My Year learns to do after her awakening, approaching the social in a nonmodern manner 
is to trace and describe relations of actor-mediators. The mediation process can reveal that 
both human and nonhuman entities are equally able to make a difference in the world and 
themselves through their interconnection. The concept of hybridity in Latour’s ‘sociology 
 
24 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans.by Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University 




of association’25 thus carries twofold meanings. On the one hand, it characterizes mediation 
in the social world. On the other hand, it designates the collapse of the distinction between 
humans and nonhumans into a hybrid actor.  
 Viewing ANT through the lens of hybridity also reveals its affinity with the theory 
of affect, especially in mediation which can be understood as an affective process. Affect 
refers to the intensity in the body when it encounters other bodies or entities. The intensity 
is first registered precognitively before being processed into a cognitive emotion. This is 
the reason affect is regarded as a type of potential or capacity. Before affect is captured by 
the mind and actualized into a cognitive experience, it is unowned, full of tendencies, and 
always pointing to future possibilities. Brian Massumi thus characterizes affect as 
autonomous, incipient, and belonging in the realm of the virtual. Precisely, Massumi locates 
the virtual realm in the body in the present moment when bodily sensation is still 
unqualified intensity:  
This requires a reworking of how we think about the body. Something that happens 
too quickly to have happened, actually, is virtual. The body is as immediately 
virtual as it is actual. The virtual, the pressing crowd of incipiencies and 
tendencies, is a realm of potential. […] For out of the pressing crowd an individual 
action or expression will emerge and be registered consciously. One “wills” it to 
emerge, to be qualified, to take on sociolinguistic meaning, to enter linear action-
 
25 This is the term Latour calls the actor-network theory for the sake of precision although he acknowledges 
that the original moniker should also be preserved: ‘Alas, the historical name is ‘actor-network-theory’, a 
name that is so awkward, so confusing, so meaningless that it deserves to be kept. If the author, for 
instance, of a travel guide is free to propose new comments on the land he has chosen to present, he is 
certainly not free to change its most common name since the easiest signpost is the best.’ See Bruno 
Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 




reaction circuits, to become a content of one’s life – by dint of inhibition.  
(emphasis in original)26 
The autonomy of affect in the virtual state of the body suggests that subjective 
consciousness is belatedly constituted by the perception of affect in the body. Affect theory 
thus makes a significant claim about the process of subject constitution. Not only that it 
collapses the subject and object distinction by claiming that affect is autonomous and not 
produced by any entity in particular, but it also reverses the surface/depth model of 
subjectivity. In affect theory, the subject is not the producer of their emotions and 
experiences from within. Instead, affect theory suggests that those experiences are drawn 
from the outside and constitute the subject.  
 In her theorization of affect, Eve Sedgwick uses textural perception to illustrate how 
an affective encounter negates the importance of the subject in the production of meaning 
and experience. According to Sedgwick, to perceive texture is to first hypothesize about the 
affordances of its properties, which indicate that there exists something before the subject. 
The process of textural perception can then be used to explore the possibilities of non-
dualistic thinking in which the notions of agency and passivity or the subject and the object 
are not mutually exclusive. Specifically, Sedgwick characterizes the perception of texture 
as an event that produces affect as ‘a particular intimacy [that] seems to subsist between 
textures and emotions’.27 Affect does not belong to the subject or the object but remains 
autonomous in the place that is ‘beside’ both.28 Similar to Massumi’s argument about the 
 
26 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), pp. 30-31. 
27 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003), p. 17. 




virtual, Sedgwick uses the preposition beside to locate affect between the texture and 
subjective emotion, in the excluded middle that is full of possible hypotheses and potentials.  
 For both Massumi and Sedgwick, affect is helpful to the extent that it develops a 
non-dualistic and constructive approach to engaging with the social world. The theory of 
affect reinstates the significance of process and movement in which affect becomes 
actualized and qualified into emotion, or happenings become a discursive event. It is the 
attention to such a transition and movement that allows us to see linkages and connections 
behind the construction of meaning. As Massumi writes, ‘Their passing into actuality is the 
key. […] It is the edge of virtual, where it leaks into actual, that counts.’29 
 Sedgwick’s notion of ‘reparative reading’ is an example of an approach that focuses 
on the movement between the virtual and the actual realms, in the in-between space where 
there could be unknown and unexpected connections that could enrich our understanding 
about the world and our part in it. In counter to the suspicious impulse of paranoid reading, 
the reparative mode hopes for and embraces possibilities during the moment of the 
encounter with the text:  
[T]o read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, […] to experience 
surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good 
ones. Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the 
energies by which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments 
and part-objects she encounters or creates.30  
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Both Bewes’s model of reading with the grain and Best and Marcus’s notion of surface 
reading can be characterized as a reparative mode of reading that Sedgwick proposes here. 
My Year also encourages such a reading practice through its overt narrative unreliability. 
With the full acceptance of the text’s unreliability, the reader’s subjective experience of the 
text becomes the primary source of meaning in the novel. Therefore, affect theory is also 
invaluable because, despite being rooted in flat ontology and non-dualism, it still provides 
crucial insights into human subjectivities and experiences. Affect, Massumi writes, put 
humans back ‘in the process, to articulate what is unique to their own capacities’.31 This 
process, for Sedgwick, can then nurture the reparative impulse that ‘wants to assemble and 
confer plentitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self’.32 
In other words, the attention to the vital role of an object can offer what is needed to 
constitute subjectivities. Affect theory becomes a crucial concept in humanities and social 
studies precisely because it enhances our understanding of what makes us human, the 
process that constitutes our sense of self, and, ultimately, what we can achieve through our 
capacities as humans. Rei Terada also writes about the surge of interest in emotion and 
feeling in academia. For Terada, the phenomenon suggests that ‘the idea of emotion has 
been activated to reinforce notions of subjectivity that could use the help’.33 The attention 
to affect as a form of impersonal sensation can provide valuable insights about 
subjectivities. However, they are the insights that are paradoxically developed from the 
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acceptance that the subject, at least in the dualist model, has never existed. As Terada writes, 
‘we would have no emotions if we were subjects.’ (emphasis in original)34 
 The destabilization of the subject in Latour’s ANT sociology and affect theory also 
makes these schools of thought foundational to the revival of realism as seen in the 
emergence of speculative realism. 35 Speculative realism is a recent philosophical theory 
concerned with flat ontology and the significance of affect and mediation in the production 
of the real. Specifically, speculative realism rejects the correlationist assumption that 
reality outside of the human mind is inaccessible. According to Quentin Meillasseux, 
correlationism presupposes that it is impossible to think of the subject and the object 
separately: 
Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the 
realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another. Not only does 
it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object ‘in itself’, in isolation 
from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we 
can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an object.36 
In refuting the correlationist argument, speculative realism emphasizes ‘a robust 
ontological realism’37 that is not already formulated as human knowledge. This renewed 
focus on the non-correlated reality inevitably leads to a surge of interest in the active role 
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of objects in the production of human knowledge and experience. Graham Harman’s 
Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) is an example of a speculative-realist theory developed 
in recognition of the primacy of objects. Harman explains that there are two types of 
objects: the real and the sensual. On the one hand, real objects exist in themselves and 
might or might not make a difference in the world. Sensual objects, on the other hand, 
only exist in relation to others. That humans only have access to sensual objects does not 
negate the autonomy of the real objects: 
OOO defends the idea that objects – whether real, fictional, natural, artificial, 
human or non- human – are mutually autonomous and enter into relation only in 
special cases that need to be explained rather than assumed.38 
OOO is thus interested in the object when they are still a ‘tool-being’ that exists in its own 
‘dark subterranean reality’ before it enters human awareness.39 Harman’s argument shares 
a similarity with ANT in its focus on flat ontology and on the importance of the relations 
among human and nonhuman objects as a site in which knowledge and experience about 
the real may be produced. However, OOO significantly breaks with ANT in that it rejects 
the assumption that all entities are constituted by their relations. Instead, OOO insists on 
the pre-relational autonomy of both human and nonhuman entities.  
 The disagreement on the notion of autonomy leads Harman to claim that ANT 
‘loses all sight of the difference between what a thing is and what it does’.40  While Latour 
contends that all entities are contingent on the relations they form with other entities, 
Harman maintains an essence of objects beyond relations. However, when the 
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disagreement is considered through the lens of hybridity, there appears to be a third position 
that combines insights from both perspectives. With hybridity, it is possible to see that 
relations among entities, whether or not they exist in a pre-relation form, still produce 
change, movement, and transformation in the world. However, despite the importance of 
relations, the individual autonomy of these entities still needs to be recognized in order to 
trace their passage and connection. In other words, even though entities only matter when 
they connect and interact, we cannot overlook their pre-relation existence if we are to 
appreciate the significance of their movement and encounter.   
 To put it another way, the concept of hybridity provides a third perspective that 
considers the implication of both sides of the argument. The potential of hybridity lies in 
its ability to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable positions. This aspect of hybridity is 
notably discussed in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin who uses the term hybrid to describe the 
quality of language in which a single utterance may contain a mixture of meanings: 
It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong simultaneously 
to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid construction-and 
consequently, the word has two contradictory meanings, two accents.41 
For Bakhtin, the hybrid quality of language contains a subversive potential in that it can 
undermine the dominance of one discourse over another. An utterance may have a fusion 
of two contrasting social languages, indicating that no single discourse is pure and singular. 
All discourses are vulnerable to influences from other discourses. Bakhtin thus emphasizes 
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hybridity’s creative and provocative energy that inheres in the act of fusion at the moment 
in which the boundaries are breached yet still endure.  
 To put it differently, the paradox of hybridity is helpful in that it paves the way for 
a new kind of criticism that takes advantage of its ambivalence. Edward Soja 
conceptualizes this critical strategy as ‘third-as-Othering’: 
In this critical thirding, the original binary choice is not dismissed entirely but is 
subjected to a creative process of restructuring that draws selectively and 
strategically from these two opposing categories to open new alternatives.42 
I invoke the term hybrid in my discussion of contemporary fiction and subjectivity 
because it does not seek to transcend the subject and object division or eliminate the 
significance of the subject. The concept of hybridity allows me to discuss the dissolution 
of the subject and object binary without undermining my focus on subjectivities. Instead, 
it helps me draw insights about the subject and object distinction by exploring the moment 
that they cross paths and become hybridized.  
    Through insights from the concept of hybridity, affect theory, and subject/object 
relations, it is possible to characterize hybrid fiction as a group of writings that thematically 
and formally highlight the ambiguity of texts as both a representation of the world and an 
object in the world. Hybrid fiction operates in the middle ground where texts remain a 
representation but whose meaning and value are contingent on their relations with other 
entities such as the reader and other texts. In claiming that hybrid fiction highlights the 
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capacity of literary texts as a representation of the world and an object in the world, I am 
arguing that texts simultaneously occupy subjective and objective positions. Hybrid fiction 
draws attention to how human and nonhuman entities are both a subject and an object. It 
reflects how the new understanding fundamentally changes the relation between the text 
and the reader. Moreover, as I previously asserted, I also invoke the concept of hybridity to 
describe this group of contemporary novels because I want to maintain the division between 
the subject and the object. My goal is to demonstrate that attention to things through affect 
theory does not necessarily diminish the role of human subjects. Instead, it adds to our 
understanding of the subjectivities that simultaneously occupy both subjective and 
objective positions.  
 This is also the point of departure for my discussion of hybrid fiction in the context 
of contemporary American literature. The next section will discuss how literature today 
reflects a commitment to flat ontology and new realism. Contemporary works such as 
hybrid fiction reflect the situation in which, as Steven Shaviro succinctly puts it, ‘all 
entities of the world are deeply interrelated and mutually dependent even in their 
separation from one another, and how nonhuman agents, no less than human ones, 
perform actions and express needs and values.’43 With this notion of the real in mind, I 
will also illustrate why we should refrain from conceptualizing contemporary literary 
works by positing a sharp break between modernism, postmodernism, and what comes 
after. Instead, a ‘thirding’ approach is needed to describe contemporary literature such as 
 




hybrid fiction, whose representation of the world also reaffirms their status as being in the 
world. 
Hybridity and Post-Postmodernism 
In this section, I will demonstrate that the concept of hybridity can characterize 
contemporary American novels that may appear to reflect a departure from postmodernism. 
However, to give a clearer picture of how the logic of hybridity asserts itself in the discourse 
of American literary history, I will begin by revisiting some of the accounts about how 
modernism had given way to postmodernism. In one of the most influential writings on the 
topic, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson argues 
that postmodernism does not indicate the emergence of a new social order but a systemic 
modification of the old one.44 Postmodernism is a repositioning of modernism along the 
line of the progressive development of capitalism that has now arrived at its ‘late’ stage, 
where modernization was complete and became pervasive. Therefore, the difference 
between modernism and postmodernism for Jameson is only a matter of a change in 
historical progress in economic development. Modernism is preoccupied with accounting 
for the changes and transformations from the early twentieth century when technological 
and economic developments took place. Modernists are looking for a unified, coherent form 
of logic or representation that can capture the experience of disruption and alienation. On 
the contrary, postmodernism emerges when such changes and transformations have already 
taken place and become solidified. It is more concerned with looking for a way to represent 
the change that has happened, ‘the telltale instant after which it is no longer the same’.45 
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Consequently, postmodernism is predominantly and reflexively occupied with the present 
and with itself as such a telltale sign. This assumption leads Jameson to famously claim that 
postmodernism is ‘an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten 
how to think historically in the first place’.46 
 In Postmodernist Fiction, Brian McHale uses the logic of ‘historical 
consequentiality’47 to describe and distinguish between modernist and postmodernist texts. 
Modernist texts focus on the epistemological aspect of modernity, as seen in their attempt 
to obtain or produce knowledge about the changes brought about by modernization. 
Postmodernist texts, however, shift the emphasis from the epistemological to the 
ontological implications of modernity. These texts are more interested in exploring the 
ontological condition of both the world and themselves as a text and a form of 
representation. McHale thus explains the transition from modernism to postmodernism as 
a change in the literary-historical momentum. He describes it as a shift in dominants: 
‘different dominants emerge depending on which questions we ask of the text, and the 
position from which we interrogate it’.48 Accordingly, it is possible to interrogate the exact 
text from either an epistemological or ontological perspective. However, he compares the 
difference between these two views as a change in a pendulum swing. As McHale explains: 
Push epistemological questions far enough and they “tip over” into ontological 
questions. By the same token, push ontological questions far enough and they tip 
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over into epistemological questions – the sequence is not linear and unidirectional, 
but bidirectional and reversible.49  
The historical consequentiality that McHale describes is thus a consequence of being 
preoccupied with one position over another over some time. Postmodernism is a 
consequence of the exhaustion of epistemological inquiry. Even though McHale’s account 
differs from Jameson’s in emphasizing the notion of dominant and consequentiality, the 
two accounts share a similar assumption. They agree that modernism and postmodernism 
have more or less the same textual qualities and could be distinguished through a 
historicizing or contextualizing process. Moreover, both McHale and Jameson draw a 
similar conclusion that postmodernism is concerned with the problem of being in the 
present, which explains its reflexivity. Postmodernist texts consider themselves evidence 
of the impossibility to develop historical consciousness or historical knowledge that could 
make sense of or grant meaning to the present condition.  
 David Harvey takes a slightly different approach by characterizing the shift from 
modernism to postmodernism as a transition from reactive to affirmative attitudes. 
Modernism registers the changes and disruptions of modernity. Yet, it reacts by being even 
more committed to finding or formulating an underlying metanarrative that compensates 
for the sense of uncertainty and alienation brought about by modern conditions. 
Postmodernism, on the contrary, fully embraces modernity. As Harvey writes,  
It does not try to transcend it, counteract it, or even define the “eternal and 
immutable” elements that might lie within it. Postmodernism swims, even 
 




wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there 
is.50  
Harvey similarly points to postmodernism’s occupation with ontology with the emphasis 
on ‘that is all there is’. His explanation nonetheless suggests that, through the act of 
affirmation, there could still be, although he does not clarify how, a potentially positive or 
constructive way to engage with the present even though it may appear to be only a pastiche 
of meaningless historical fragments.  
 Linda Hutcheon’s characterization of postmodernism as a mode of ‘complicitous 
critique’ points to how postmodernist affirmation can be utilized as a form of critical 
engagement with the world. Unlike the previous accounts of postmodernism, Hutcheon’s 
argument reflects a more constructive aspect of postmodernism, not from a historical 
perspective but by directly considering its forms. For example, through historiographic 
metafiction, Hutcheon identifies the use of metafictional forms in postmodernist texts to 
combine the fictional with the historical and the textual with the worldly. Historiographic 
metafiction uses postmodernist reflexivity to contest the notion of historical truth. 
Moreover, by intersecting narrative representation with history, postmodernism also 
questions the transparency of representation intricately rooted in and even produced by 
worldly conditions such as ideologies, histories, and cultures. As Hutcheon writes, ‘from 
this perspective what we call “culture” is seen as the effect of representations, not their 
source’.51 
 
50 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), p. 44. 




 Hutcheon further contends that postmodernism is a form of complicitous critique 
that is aware of itself as part of the conditions it seeks to question. Yet, it can use those 
conditions for a critical end: ‘Postmodern art openly investigates the critical possibilities 
open to art without denying that its critique is inevitably in the name of its own 
contradictory ideology.’52 What postmodernism can achieve through its complicitous 
critique is a form of representation that can be ‘metafictionally self-reflexive and yet 
speaking to us powerfully about real political and historical realities’.53 Postmodern 
representation is thus more than just a blank pastiche symptomatic of the weakening of 
historical consciousness. On the contrary, it has a historical impulse that is not simply 
nostalgic but deeply critical of the past. For Hutcheon, postmodernism reveals the 
constructed nature of the system of meaning production. Yet, its attention to 
constructedness does not aim to negate but demonstrate the condition of truth: 
What it does say is that there are all kinds of orders and systems in our world—
and that we create them all. That is their justification and their limitation. They do 
not exist “out there”, fixed, given, universal, eternal; they are human constructs in 
history. This does not make them any the less necessary or desirable. It does, 
however, as we have seen, condition their “truth” value. […] The point is not 
exactly that the world is meaningless […] but that any meaning that exists is of our 
own creation.54 
The logic thus informs Hutcheon's account of the transition from modernism to 
postmodernism of complicitous critique. It regards modernism and postmodernism as 
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existing in a ‘both-neither’ relation with each other.55 Postmodernism is critical of 
modernist assumptions such as the autonomy of art and its separation from culture. 
Nonetheless, postmodernism performs such a critique by acknowledging and adopting its 
tie to modernist traditions. As Hutcheon writes, ‘On the one hand, the postmodern 
obviously was made possible by the self-referentiality, irony, ambiguity, and parody that 
characterize much of the art of modernism, […] on the other hand, postmodern fiction has 
come to contest the modernist ideology of artistic autonomy, individual expression, and the 
deliberate separation of art from mass culture and everyday life.’56 Accordingly, Hutcheon’s 
story of the emergence of postmodernism contains a new angle that sets it apart from other 
accounts that either historicize it as an outcome of cultural and economic development or 
recognize it as a historical pendulum effect. For Hutcheon, postmodernism has a historical 
tie to modernism, in its very name, and emerges from the capitalist culture that 
unquestionably influences it. However, postmodernism accepts and seeks to ‘question’ 
these conditions that constitute it. In other words, Hutcheon’s account of postmodernism is 
essentially a story of the ‘critical’ aftermath of modernism that is critical of but also 
appropriates modernist techniques as the tools for criticism.  
 Hutcheon’s view of postmodernism as complicitous critique already implies the 
hybrid sensibility that will become the underlying logic of post-postmodernism. 
Postmodernism for Hutcheon is valuable for its critical potential. Nonetheless, this is also 
where the limit of postmodernism lies, and the concept of hybridity becomes fundamental 
in the development of post-postmodernism. For one thing, the critical potential of 
postmodernism relies on the notion of ‘intent’, which implies the existence of an intending 
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subject. When Hutcheon writes that ‘postmodernism is both interrogative in mode and “de-
doxifying” in intent’57, the question that arises is whose intent it is? Where does the critical 
impulse reside? Is it inherent in the qualities of the representation, in the writer’s intention, 
or the reader’s interpretation? The primacy of the subject in the act of critique risks 
undermining the overall argument about the power of representation and its critical function 
in the world. Moreover, as Hutcheon herself writes, postmodernism ‘merely questions’.58 
The shortcoming that begets the so-called ‘post-postmodern discontent’59 is in this kind of 
unproductivity. Postmodernism provokes, questions, satirizes, and rethinks the past by 
situating it in a ‘critical’ relation with the present, but to what end?  
 The discontent in the purposelessness of postmodernism eventually leads to the 
emergence of a countermovement such as the postirony that expresses dissatisfaction with 
postmodernism’s empty irony, cynicism, and self-reflexivity. Such discontent is notably 
expressed in David Foster Wallace’s argument about the postmodern naivete that regards 
irony as both a form of diagnosis and a cure: ‘This is because irony, entertaining as it is, 
serves an exclusively negative function. It’s critical and destructive, a ground-clearing. […] 
But irony’s singularly unuseful when it comes to constructing anything to replace the 
hypocrisies it debunks.’60 Moreover, the nature of irony makes it an unproductive tool, and 
the fact that mainstream media have co-opted it also renders it critically ineffective. 
Accordingly, contemporary writers find that they have to move past irony in order to 
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produce something more constructive and meaningful. As Wallace writes, they might have 
to risk producing works with a sincere ‘agenda of the consciousness behind the text’.61  
 However, Wallace’s advice for contemporary American novelists is not a simple 
return to a pre-irony era. These writers cannot escape the fact that they are producing work 
in a time that irony is part of mass culture. To be sincere in the way that Wallace suggests 
requires the reconceptualization of the notion of sincerity itself. New Sincerity thus emerges 
as an attempt to reintroduce a new form of sincerity that remains vulnerable to the 
accusation of having a manipulative motive. However, Adam Kelly points out this is the 
very condition that makes a new form of sincerity possible: ‘That sincerity can always be 
taken for manipulation shows us that sincerity depends not on purity but on trust and 
faith.’62 Kelly illustrates that the undecidability of the sincerity of intention is the writer's 
burden as much as the reader’s. The writers themselves are unsure of their sincerity. Lee 
Konstantinou thus argues that New Sincerity also requires a commitment to ‘the ethos of 
belief in and of itself’.63 Both the writer and the reader have to become a believer in the 
sense that they are both ‘a tragic victim of postmodernity, someone who desperately seeks 
grounds for belief while fearing that no such grounds exist’.64 Post-ironist fiction is 
produced by the writer who believes that he or she can create fiction that ‘foster[s] the 
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reader’s capacity to believe’ in the writer's sincerity.65 However, only the reader can decide 
whether the writer’s intention is sincere. New Sincerity texts, Kelly writes, are thus ‘defined 
by their undecidability and the affective response they invite and provoke in their readers, 
with questions of sincerity embedded, on a number of levels, into the reader’s contingent 
experience of the text’.66 
 Kelly’s definition of New Sincerity as contingent upon ‘a highly affective process’67 
also suggests a new kind of critical value that rests in the reader’s response to the text. His 
conclusion echoes Wallace’s observation that serious art and literary theory alike tend to 
forget the fact that it is impossible to separate the subject from the object and that: 
Fiction likes to ignore this fact’s implications. We still think in terms of a story 
“changing” the reader’s emotions, celebrations, maybe even her life. We’re not 
keen on the idea of the story sharing its valence with the reader. But the reader’s 
own life “outside” the story changes the story. You could argue that it affects only 
“her reaction to the story” or “her take on the story.” But these things “are” the 
story. […] Once I’m done with the thing, I’m basically dead, and probably the 
text’s dead; it becomes simply language, and language lives not just in but 
“through” the reader.68 
It thus appears that the role of the reader is fully reenergized in the movement that seeks to 
respond to postmodernism’s limitation. As Kelly sums up, New Sincerity ‘cannot fully lie 
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in representation’. Instead, it depends on ‘what happens off the page, outside representation, 
depends upon the invocation and response of another’.69  
New Sincerity or the post-ironic movement may address the reader as the savior 
who can rescue the value of literature from postmodernism’s ironic abyss. However, it 
appears that the role of the text itself may be overlooked and somehow eclipsed by the issue 
of authorial intention. For example, the use of metafictional techniques in post-ironist 
fiction is only emphasized as the intentional choice of the writer that aims to elicit particular 
affective responses from the reader. However, how such forms and strategies produce affect 
and, in return, are granted meanings and values through the reader’s affective responses, do 
not appear to be a primary concern of the post-ironist. In the process in which sincerity may 
be possible again, both the author and the text are proclaimed dead, leaving the reader to 
make sense of the text on their own. As Wallace writes: ‘Once I’m done with the thing, I’m 
basically dead, and probably the text’s dead; it becomes simply language and language lives 
not just in her “through” the reader.’70 However, in this thesis, I aim to demonstrate that it 
does not have to be the case, that the reader is not interacting with a dead object when they 
are reading a text. I intend to develop from the New Sincerity argument by moving away 
from the problems of the author’s intent or anxiety that characterizes the impossibility of 
sincerity. I want to propose that there is another way to tell the story of post-postmodernism 
that is more committed to finding a solution, to developing a more constructive approach 
that is reinforced by the affective force and hybridity in the subject and object relation – the 
relation that is often forgotten, as Wallace himself observes, in the world of art and 
literature.     
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 At this point, it is possible to describe the connection between modernism, 
postmodernism, and the post-irony branch of post-postmodernism in terms of the 
relationship between the text and the writer in which textual forms function as the tool that 
expresses authorial intention. The modern condition is characterized by change and 
instability. Modernist writers register this condition through formal inventions. They 
manipulate and experiment with forms to find a way to represent or uncover the unified, 
underlying reality beneath the flux and chaos of modernity. Similarly, postmodernist 
writers use textual forms as their tools even though the goal is now to object to the 
possibility that an underlying logic or unified reality can be accessed, represented, or even 
exist. Despite the difference in objectives, the assumption about the relationship between 
textual forms and writers remains unchanged from modernism and postmodernism. There 
is still an artist as an intentional subject who uses forms for specific agendas, whether it is 
to reinforce or destabilize the notion of accessible and unified knowledge about truth and 
reality. 
 Post-postmodern movements such as New Sincerity acknowledge that formal 
innovations such as metafictional reflexivity and irony may be unproductive as a critical 
tool. Yet, the assumption about forms and writers persists. In this strand of post-
postmodernism, the emphasis on the constructed nature of representation is projected as 
something detrimental to the writer, who is now left helpless and insecure about their ability 
to produce writing that can communicate something meaningful. Thus, the post-irony 
movement focuses on the writer’s struggle to connect with the reader in the absence of a 
reliable tool to ensure the sincerity of their intention. The assumption that art is a form of 




left to communicate. Yet, for the post-ironist, it is beside the point. The primary purpose of 
post-ironist or New Sincerity texts is to ensure the insecure writers that they can still 
connect to and convince the reader to ‘believe’ in the possibility of sincerity. The whole 
enterprise, it appears, becomes a secular form of belief without contents. Formal 
innovations that are proven to be unproductive as critical tools are now used in the service 
of faith even though it is a form of belief that is an empty gesture. As Konstantinou writes:  
Metafiction removes the foundations for belief in realism. By contrast, postironists 
attempt to use metafictional form as a way of reconnecting form and content, as a 
way of strengthening belief. What is paradoxical about this attempt is the 
emptiness of the proposed “postironic belief.” Postironists don’t advocate a stance 
of belief toward some aspect of the world but rather the ethos of belief in and of 
itself.71 
Therefore, it seems that the post-irony version of post-postmodernism may not fully 
succeed in restoring the potential for art to engage with the world constructively even when 
its practitioners contend that it is still worth keeping faith in art because, as Wallace states, 
‘we as human beings still have the capacity for joy, charity, genuine connections’.72 While 
the postironists may remind us of and encourage that capacity in us, there is an affective 
strand of post-postmodernism that seeks to deploy such capacity for a more constructive 
purpose. This account of post-postmodernism is committed to the importance of textual 
forms that are decoupled from the artist as an intentional subject. The narrator of 
Moshfegh’s novel is also an art history student and works in an art gallery. Part of the 
discontent that drives her into hibernation comes from the sense of pointlessness, 
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undecidability, and even triviality in the excessive preoccupation with artistic intention, 
authenticity, and sincerity in the art world. Before she decides to touch the painting, she 
already tries to connect with it from the artist’s perspective. However, in doing so, she finds 
herself stuck in a loop of unanswerable questions and unprovable hypotheses:  
I got the feeling that if I moved the frames to the side, I’d see the artists watching 
me […] wondering what I was wondering about them, if I saw their brilliance, or 
if their lives had been pointless. […] Maybe they lived as real artists knowing all 
along that there were no pearly gates. Neither creation nor sacrifice could lead a 
person to heaven. Or maybe not. Maybe, in the morning they were aloof and happy 
to distract themselves with their brushes and oils, to mix their colors and smoke 
their pipes and go back to their fresh still life without having to swat away any 
more flies.73 
Maybe, or maybe not. However, as the end of the paragraph suggests, the narrator’s 
rumination about the artist eventually leads to a realization that the artist also interacts with 
objects when they create art. From getting to use brushes and oils to mix colors, the pleasure 
from this interaction might be the point of any artistic creation after all. It may or may not 
be true. Yet, the narrator takes from this assumption the possibility that she too may try to 
interact directly with the artwork as an object and give up the effort to understand the art 
from the perspective of the artist’s life and intention. Hence, she reaches out and touches 
the painting before discovering that art in its ontological existence, separated from its 
creator, can still be meaningful and fulfilling when she comes into contact with it.  
 




 This is the kind of assumption behind the strand of post-postmodernism that remains 
committed to the constructive and even critical potential of textual forms. This strand is still 
rooted in the modernist preoccupation with uncovering knowledge, yet it maintains the 
postmodernist disillusionment that such knowledge may not exist outside subjective 
experiences. Therefore, it seeks to trace relations between the subject and the object on the 
ontological level. It could then be said that this version of post-postmodernism does not 
necessarily come after but emerges in the middle space between modernism and 
postmodernism. This is the story of post-postmodernism that recommits to textual forms 
and approaches the text as an object. It removes the issue of the intentional artist from the 
picture to fully explore how the direct encounter between art and its audience, or the reader 
and the text, may produce a new kind of criticism, knowledge, and meaning. 
 In a way, this branch of post-postmodernism is not that different from Hutcheon’s 
claim about how historiographic metafiction uses textual forms to help us rethink the issue 
of truth, authenticity, and transparency in both historical and fictional narratives. It also 
reflects Hutcheon’s observation that the conditions of textuality and worldliness in the 
twenty-first century have changed and called for a new type of representation that can 
critically respond to it. The postironists may succeed in moving away from 
postmodernism’s unproductive disillusion, but they appear to be left with nothing except 
faith and belief as a gesture. Contemporary writings such as hybrid fiction see art and 
representation as something that is deeply entangled in the real world. These writings use 
forms to reflect on their entanglement in the changes in the social, economic, and cultural 
conditions that influence their ability to critique and represent the world. That is, the 




Hutcheon observes. That change requires that we rethink the relation between the subject 
and the object, and words and world, and recognize that we can acquire knowledge and 
meaning only through our ontological perception and subjective consciousness. 
 Jason Gladstone and Daniel Worden point out that the ‘return to form’ in literary 
studies and criticism is a common feature that appears in both sides of the argument about 
contemporary fiction. Either viewing it as evidence of the enduring legacy of modernism 
or the continuing influence of postmodernism, ‘Both of these approaches hinge upon 
competing accounts of literary form and its connection to the social world.’74 On the one 
hand, scholars and critics such as the Post●45 contend that literature today is still in the 
postwar period of ‘long modernism’. Amy Hungerford is among the Post●45 scholars who 
see in contemporary literature ‘not a departure from modernism’s aesthetic but its triumph 
in the institution of the university and in the literary culture more generally’.75 Hungerford 
points to the overlap between the experimental postmodernist fiction and the writing of 
minority groups as evidence of the enduring influence of the ‘high-culture modernism and 
its assumptions about reading and about literature’ that combines these two sides of 
postmodernism. 76  In The Program Era, Mark McGurl also provides a detailed account of 
the universities’ role, especially the creative writing programs, in institutionalizing 
modernist traditions that continue to influence literary practices until today. In those writing 
programs, literature is the product of the systematic process of creative writing called ‘the 
autopoetics’ that combines the notions of experience, creativity, and literature as a craft or 
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a form of techne.77 The ethos of modernism is affirmed in the process of autopoetics that 
maintains that literature is an artistic expression and literary forms have the ‘show, don’t 
tell’ or an exhibiting function for the writer. Consequently, McGurl sees the creative writing 
programs make the modernist cannon of literary practices such as ‘a demand for self-
conscious attention to technique’ and the ‘autopoetic thematization of authorship’ still 
persist and continue to define postwar literary fiction today.78 
 On the other hand, literary scholars such as Mary K. Holland consider the emphasis 
on literary forms and techniques in literature today as proof of the ‘belated success’ of 
postmodernism. For Holland, the experimental impulse and penchant for formal innovation 
associated with postmodernism have transitioned from being the sign of a problem to the 
evidence of success. According to Holland, ‘this innovative portion of postmodern fiction 
absorbs poststructuralist assumptions about language, wrestles with the problems inherent 
in those assumptions, and proposes methods of solving those problems from within 
poststructuralism itself.’79 That is, she sees the experiment with forms in contemporary 
fiction not as an attempt to register the problem but as a form of success in finding ‘new 
avenues toward meaning and meaningful human connection through signification and 
mediation themselves’.80 Holland’s argument also echoes Madhu Dubey’s claim about the 
need to retain the postmodern problematics about the function of form despite the failure 
of postmodern self-reflexivity to connect to the social world. For Dubey, the recent return 
to the genre of realism as seen in recent works of some contemporary novelists is not 
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enough to indicate that literature has finally reclaimed its representational and critical 
function. Specifically, she does not see how the shift from postmodernism can happen at 
the level of form or by simply returning to realism: ‘the problem that postmodernism posed 
for the social novel […] cannot be solved on formal grounds, by reviving narrative 
realism.’81 That is, textual form and representation will not cease to be problematic in the 
way that the revival of the realist genre seems to suggest. Therefore, until a truly new mode 
of literary representation and critique emerges, the postmodern use of formal reflexivity 
and innovation remains relevant and crucial, especially for the ethnic novelists who rely on 
‘the generative aesthetic potential of the postmodern politics of difference’ as the source of 
aesthetic possibility.82 In her monograph Signs and Cities: Black Literary Postmodernism, 
Dubey further elaborates on the ‘salience of a periodizing concept of postmodernism for 
African-American literary and cultural studies’83 because it can illustrate how aesthetic 
forms and innovations are often viewed as a militant and subversive tool against racial 
essentialism even though ‘disruptive aesthetic strategies may actually render the romance 
of race more palatable in postmodern times’.84 Dubey thus proposes that the challenge 
today, especially for African-American literature, is to keep the problem of form and 
referentiality problematic in its representation but avoid the tendency to veer towards 
‘aesthetic solipsism’85 that merges politics with aesthetics to the point that we may lose 
sight of the real.   
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 Whether it is proof of long modernism, success of postmodernism, or reflection of 
the need to keep the problematics of postmodern representation in sight, until a valid 
alternative is possible, the return to form remains a crucial characteristic that describes 
contemporary literature. Moreover, the emphasis on form problematizes the attempt to use 
the term post-postmodernism to designate what comes after postmodernism when it seems 
impossible to settle the dispute over the legacies of modernism and postmodernism. 
However, contemporary fiction that I characterize as hybrid belongs in the camp that does 
not view the commitment to forms as the site of contestation and competition between 
modernism and postmodernism but seeks to reassess the nature of text and reader relations 
on formal grounds. For the hybrid strand of post-postmodernism, the reassessment of the 
importance and function of form is necessary due to the changes in the conditions of 
textuality and worldliness that Hutcheon points out. In other words, the changes brought 
about by technological, socio-cultural, and economic conditions of the twenty-first century 
demand that we rethink the relationship between texts and readers in our commitment to 
the importance of forms so that literature can maintain its representational and critical 
values. 
 Alan Kirby’s digimodernism is an example of the hybrid strand of post-
postmodernism. Digimodernism describes a new cultural paradigm of the twenty-first 
century in which digital technologies and textuality converge and bring forth ‘the 
computerization of text’ that allows the reader ‘to intervene textually, physically to make 
text, to add visible content or tangibly shape narrative development’.86 Advanced 
technologies reconfigure the nature of the text and its relationship with the reader. 
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Nonetheless, Kirby still maintains that this phenomenon is a phase in the historical 
development of modernity, ‘a shift from one phase of its history into another’.87 In 
Postmodernism in Pieces, Matthew Mullins also highlights the ontological co-dependency 
between humans and nonhumans in his reconceptualization of postmodernism. Mullins’s 
‘neomaterialist’ approach shares a similarity with Kirby’s digimodernism in that it views 
textual practices as a collaborative effort, a gathering, of human and nonhuman actors. 
However, Mullins’s argument departs significantly from Kirby’s in that he sees the 
materialist and relational aspect of contemporary literature as a reflection of a postmodern 
feature: ‘what makes literature postmodern is its preoccupation with the material things and 
interactions that constitute those seemingly ready-made social categories. The great insight 
of postmodernism, then, is not that our social categories are somehow artificial or 
inauthentic, but that they are continuously the products of material processes.’88 Despite 
their contradiction in identifying contemporary literature as part of the modernist or 
postmodernist tradition, Kirby and Mullins nonetheless share a commitment in the 
‘constructedness’ and the ‘process’ in which human readers and nonhuman texts produce 
textual meanings and values as mutual collaborators. 
 In After Critique, Mitchum Huehls adopts the term ‘exomodern’ to describe 
contemporary fiction that foregrounds such processes and, in effect, becomes a subject and 
object hybrid that functions simultaneously as a sign and a thing. The term exomodern is 
invoked to reflect the ‘sensitivity to human insignificance’ that the original usage of the 
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term by Mark McGurl indicates.89 What exomodernism alludes to is the demystification of 
the primacy of human subjects and the emphasis on the ontological conditions of texts. For 
Huehls, the flat ontology in these texts allows them to engage more productively with the 
logic of neoliberalism that is able to exploit both subjective and objective positions and 
exacerbates the postmodern division between experimentalism and multiculturalism. 
Exomodern texts succeed in transcending the neoliberal impasse by focusing on the ‘more 
ontological literary forms comfortable with subject-object doubleness’90 that may prevent 
them from being fully co-opted and exploited by neoliberalism. As such, it is possible to 
discern how these texts may come close to representing a real shift that Dubey calls for. It 
does not seek to recuperate the representational and critical function of literature on the 
formal ground but aims to change our understanding of those formal grounds upon which 
the text and the reader interact.  
 Metamodernism is an example of a post-postmodern account that situates between 
modernism and postmodernism, oscillating between the two poles as it ‘upcycles’ the 
styles, conventions, and techniques from the past to produce something new that is neither 
modern or postmodern, and both at the same time. Robin van den Akker and Timotheus 
Vermeulen define metamodernism as the structure of feeling that dominates Western 
capitalist society since the beginning of the 2000s that is characterized by the shift towards 
the Web 2.0 technologies, the proliferation of immaterial and creative labor in network 
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culture, and the prevalence of neoliberal logic.91 In other words, metamodernism is the 
cultural logic of the neoliberal society. In making such a claim, Akker and Vermeulen echo 
both Kirby and Huehls’s arguments and characterize metamodern literature as a response 
to the prevalence of digital technologies and a new possibility that literary texts may 
represent and critically engage with the conditions of neoliberalism. The key characteristics 
of metamodernism include a recommitment to history, affect, and depth, all of which have 
been destabilized to a certain degree by postmodern theories. However, as the prefix ‘meta’ 
suggests, this recommitment is not a return to the premodern but a reconfiguration of how 
we may develop a new kind of historical awareness, affective intensity, and a profound and 
meaningful engagement from the surface encounter. I contend that hybrid fiction is mostly 
aligned with metamodernism both in its commitment to the generative force of the middle 
ground and in its intention to rethink the way literary practices may remain a relevant and 
helpful enterprise through which we learn to situate ourselves in the world historically, 
ontologically, and affectively. That is, despite the focus on flat ontology or human and 
nonhuman interrelation, hybrid fiction still maintains that, in Wallace’s words, fiction 
should still be about humans and explore ‘what it means to be human today’.92 I set out to 
investigate the constitution of subjectivity in hybrid fiction because I see that the 
reconfiguration of textual practices informed by the notion of flat ontology, affect, or the 
primacy of objects all strengthen the belief that fiction is something that is still deeply 
human.  
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Thesis Structure and Chapters  
Hybrid fiction foregrounds the role of affect in textual representations and in the production 
of meanings to rethink subjectivities and how they are constituted through textual 
encounters. My argument in this thesis is structured according to the emphasis on narrative, 
urban, and network subjectivities, all of which are represented in the selected novels in the 
context of an affective encounter to highlight the problems and possibilities that ensue from 
considering subjectivities through the lens of hybridity and affect. In the first chapter, I will 
examine narrative subjectivities as a product of an encounter between oneself and the other. 
I will emphasize how the notion of self as a type of narrative presupposes interpersonal 
communication. I will argue that narrative subjectivities problematize the idea of self-
authenticity and objective truth. At the same time, it puts forward a possibility of a new 
form of authenticity and sincerity in narrative construction. In this chapter, I will be reading 
Jennifer Egan’s Look at Me (2001) and Dana Spiotta’s Innocents and Others (2016) as 
novels that characterize the construction of self as an interpersonal encounter through 
mediated narratives. The novels foreground the notion of self-narrative and also complicate 
the issue by emphasizing that a narrative is always interpersonal and mediated. However, 
both Egan and Spiotta also use the intersection between narrative and media technologies 
to consider self-narrative as an affective encounter and imagine a possibility of an authentic 
self and sincere communication in the production of self-narratives. My analysis of the two 
novels will incorporate Alfred N. Whitehead’s concept of ‘proposition’, Paul Ricœur’s 
notion of narrative identity, and Judith Butler’s argument about providing an account of 
oneself.  I hope to use these notions to reflect on how Look at Me and Innocents and Others 
respectively rethink the concepts of authenticity and sincerity through the recent 




of self-authenticity that is developed from the framework of New Sincerity can be defined 
as a form of accountability. Moreover, I will pay attention to how the novels are set in two 
specific historical moments in media and information technology development. I will 
demonstrate that the historical positionings are a strategic decision to facilitate affective 
transmission between the reader and the text that can produce textual meaning. The novels 
rely on the reader’s historical knowledge and immersive experience in media technologies 
to make sense of the textual representation of narrative subjectivities as they are mediated 
through other mediums that exist beyond the representational power of the text.  
 In the second chapter, I will discuss urban subjectivities that are constituted through 
an affective encounter with and within city space. I will be reading Colson Whitehead’s 
The Intuitionist (1999) and Jonathan Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude (2003) as novels 
that use the concept of affect to explore the possibility of a new form of literacy for urban 
life. I propose that The Intuitionist and Fortress imagine a mode of signification that can be 
called ‘affective literacy’ and ‘affective gutter’. Both models of literacy are contingent on 
the intersection between language, space, and materiality. They are an alternative textual 
practice that is not detached from the conditions of material reality and belonging but 
derives the power of signification from it. Moreover, both novels place the problem of 
textual signification and literacy in the context of race and urbanity to explore how the 
process of racialization is tied to the subject’s ability to produce and read the urban space 
as a type of text. The urban subjects in the two novels learn to write and read texts on the 
surface and through a direct encounter with the urban space. They create a new model of 
signification by turning the limitation of their racial and material reality into an opportunity 




signify with other texts and conventions to represent the experience of urban subjects as 
they explore and experiment with alternative textual practices. Elements from the genres 
such as comic books, Afrofuturism, magical realism, and detective fiction are incorporated 
in the novels. However, in using these genres, the novels also rely on the reader’s prior 
knowledge about genre conventions to engage with the texts. Both The Intuitionist and 
Fortress thus formally replicate the same process of affective textual signification that they 
represent on the pages in the reader's reading experience.  
 In the final chapter, I will examine the post-critical turn in hybrid fiction through 
network subjectivities that are constituted with a new critical consciousness informed by 
one’s relationality and embeddedness in the network of affective connections. I will be 
reading Gary Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story (2011) and Dave Eggers’ s The 
Circle (2013) as novels that use formal affordances, especially that of the network form, to 
reassess the utopian genre as a critical discourse.  My analysis of the novels will incorporate 
the insights from the conjunction between form and critique in the work of post-critical 
thinkers such as Bruno Latour and Rita Felski. I will also adopt the notion of oppositional 
agency from Tom Moylan’s distinction between critical dystopia and anti-utopia to 
investigate how the novels characterize network subjectivities in the tradition of these two 
genres. Moreover, I will look at how Super Sad and The Circle incorporate the affordance 
of the network form in using the conventions from critical dystopia and anti-utopia. In 
doing so, the two novels invite the reader to adopt a new mode of criticism that is 
thematically suggested in the text in the way they read and grasp the meaning of the text 




 Each of the six novels that I will be reading is interconnected in its commitment to 
exploring a new way to know and engage with the world. As such, the theory of affect 
provides a valuable theoretical foundation for my examination of these novels. The concept 
of hybridity is also instrumental in investigating the process in which subjectivities are 
constituted and represented in these texts as a product of an affective encounter. That is, 
during an encounter, the entities become both an active subject and a passive object and 
capable of affecting and being affected by one another. The subject is constituted precisely 
at the moment that their common ontology with other objects is reaffirmed. Moreover, the 
concept of hybridity is vital in my discussion about contemporary literature after 
postmodernism and how hybrid fiction fits into the current development of literature today. 
I want to suggest through hybrid fiction that affect and hybridity can describe a version of 
post-postmodernism that is committed to the primacy of literary forms and the process in 
which texts and readers become a collaborator in producing affect that can be mobilized to 
produce meaning and value of texts.  
 To conclude, I hope that my reading of hybrid fiction can demonstrate that the 
attention to affect and flat ontology does not necessarily result in the ‘death of the subject’93 
whose consciousness was once believed to be the only source of knowledge about reality 
as we know it. After recognizing human finitude, to echo the title of Meillassoux’s seminal 
text on speculative realism, it is possible to see that human subjectivity is more vibrant than 
what we could have learned solely from an anthropocentric perspective. The finitude of 
humans paradoxically places humans in the realm of the boundlessness in which they can 
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be constituted and reconstituted through movements and encounters with other entities in 
the world. What separates hybrid fiction from other contemporary novels is the 
commitment to illustrating such richness of human lives and experiences. The commitment 
is reflected both on the pages and in the way hybrid fiction formally builds an affective 
connection with the reader. Hybrid fiction may be written to explore the limitations and 
potentials of humans from the recognition of the equal importance of objects. However, 
the term hybrid also reminds us that it is in the middle space inhabited by the subject and 
object hybrids that our subjectivities are constituted as an assemblage of various entities 







Narrative Subjectivities in Jennifer Egan’s Look at Me  
and Dana Spiotta’s Innocents and Others 
In Process and Reality, Alfred North Whitehead introduces the concept of ‘proposition’ to 
illustrate the process by which the subject experiences and formulates knowledge about the 
world. A proposition is a speculation or a ‘theory’ that the subject has about the target 
entity.1 The subject apprehends the target entity’s physical data through direct contact with 
it. The physical data will then be combined with the conceptual data about the target entity 
that the subject develops from experiences. The conceptual data functions as a broad 
framework that anticipates the nature of the entity. A proposition is generated from a 
combination of such physical and conceptual data about the target entity. Even though the 
physical data that is obtained directly from the target entity makes it possible to determine 
whether a proposition is true or false, Whitehead emphasizes that the main function of a 
proposition is to be a ‘lure for feeling’ for the apprehending subject to entertain a possibility 
about the target entity. Therefore, a proposition should not be judged for its truthfulness or 
falsehood. Instead, as a lure for feeling, a proposition should be interesting for the subject 
to want to entertain its possibility. As Whitehead writes, ‘But in the real world it is more 
important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true.’2 Moreover, Whitehead sees 
that even a false proposition still has an important function in that it introduces new 
potentialities into the world. That is, the primary role of propositions is to appeal to the 
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subject to conceive new ideas and possibilities, to ‘pave the way along which the world 
advances into novelty. Error is the price which we pay for progress.’3 In the concept of the 
proposition, an error, a misjudgment, or even a lie could play a crucial part in producing 
new knowledge about the world.  
 This chapter will argue that the concept of the proposition can describe the model 
of authenticity suggested in the representation of narrative subjectivities in Jennifer Egan’s 
Look at Me (2001) and Dana Spiotta’s Innocents and Others (2016). Both novels explore 
the connection between narration and subjectivity to problematize the ideal of authenticity 
that presupposes the existence of a true and immutable self at the core of a person. The 
emphasis on narration reveals the ambiguity and relationality in the process of self-
formation. Such ambiguity destabilizes the notion of a true self and calls for a reassessment 
of the ideal of self-authenticity. I will use Paul Ricœur’s notion of narrative identity, 
Adriana Cavarero’s concept of the necessary other, and Judith Butler’s argument about the 
scene of address to discuss how Egan and Spiotta question the viability of the ideal of 
authenticity in the self that is figured through narrative mediation. Both authors suggest a 
new mode of authenticity that is not contingent on the true self but grounded in one’s 
interconnection and embeddedness in the social world.  I will propose that in the two 
novels, the model of New Sincerity is used as a foundation for self-authenticity that 
acknowledges the ambiguity and relationality of the self and embraces those conditions for 
its possibility. The kind of authenticity developed from the New Sincerity model, I argue, 
can be understood through the concept of the proposition. It refers to the potentiality of a 
person that requires an intersubjective collaboration to achieve its actuality. Specifically, 
 




it is a mode of authenticity that relies on the other’s presence and contribution in the form 
of trust in one’s potential to be a certain kind of self. Self-authenticity in this model can be 
realized through one’s ability to be accountable to the other by fulfilling the expectation 
that the other trustfully has in them. In other words, it is a form of authenticity based on 
trust and accountability. In the final section, I will discuss how both texts also adopt the 
propositional model of authenticity into their own narrative. Through what I characterize 
as propositional narrative, I will demonstrate that the reader’s engagement with the novels 
can be understood as an encounter in which the text functions as a proposition that attracts 
the reader to apprehend and contribute to the construction of its meaning. In other words, 
my reading of Look at Me and Innocents and Others proposes that the novels suggest a 
relational model of authenticity in both the practice of the self and literary engagement. 
Self, Narration, and the Problems of Authenticity 
Authenticity in the practice of the self refers to the ability to realize and express the true 
essence of one’s self. According to Somogy Varga, an authentic person ‘acts on impulses 
and ideals that are not only hers (as bearing her authorship), but that are also expressions 
of who she really is’.4 Implicit in the ideal of authenticity is an assumption that the self has 
an inner core separated from the outer layer and that the inner self represents the true 
essence of a person. In contrast, the outer self lacks depth and meaning on its own. With 
this assumption, Charles Guigon contends that authenticity requires a two-step process of 
self-reflection and self-expression:  
The project of becoming authentic asks us to get in touch with the real self we have 
within, a task that is achieved primarily through introspection, self-reflection or 
 




meditation. […] Second, this idea calls on us to express that unique constellation 
of inner traits in our actions in the external world. […] The assumption is that it is 
only by expressing our true selves that we can achieve self-realization and self-
fulfillment as authentic human beings.5  
As an ethical ideal, authenticity demands that one knows one’s true inner self and that the 
public self must be expressed in a manner that does not violate the integrity of the true self 
inside. For this reason, Lionel Trilling regards authenticity as ‘a strenuous moral 
experience, […] a more exigent conception of the self and of what being true to it consists 
in, […] and a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances of life’.6 In 
Trilling’s view, authenticity reinforces the insular model of the self by prioritizing the need 
to look inward for self-knowledge while rejecting external factors that may play a part in 
self-formation. 
 Look at Me and Innocents and Others problematize such an ideal of authenticity by 
foregrounding how both the processes of self-reflection and self-expression rely on the 
mechanics of narrative figuration in which factual and imaginative elements are blended 
together to create narrative coherence and unity. With narrative figuration being a vital tool 
to construct and express the self, the novels point to the impossibility of the core self that 
contains an absolute truth about the person. Instead, it is suggested in both novels that the 
self is as much a product of creative imagination as it is comprised of historical facts about 
the person. Consequently, the ideal of authenticity that is predicated on the idea of the true 
self might be impossible to fulfill. The representation of narrative subjectivities in the 
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novels thus questions the viability of the concept of self-authenticity. Here I will suggest 
narrative subjectivities that question self-authenticity can be understood through the notion 
of narrative identity that Ricœur proposes.  
 In his argument about narrative identity, Ricœur uses the process of narrative 
figuration to explain how the self is formulated as an answer to the question ‘who’. For 
Ricœur, such a question characterizes the self as an active agent. The self that performs an 
action is inevitably entangled in variable factors that could affect the self, including the 
reason, result, and consequence of the action. Therefore, Ricœur argues that the identity of 
the subject that answers the question ‘who’ has to use the mechanics of narrative 
emplotment to mediate those variables into a coherent, consistent, and meaningful story of 
the self. However, he also emphasizes that narrative emplotment is a process that 
necessarily combines fact and fiction -  with the fictional elements being used to create 
self-knowledge that fits into one’s ‘self-constancy’ or an uninterrupted sense of self over 
time. As Ricœur writes, ‘the story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful or 
fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself. This refiguration makes this life itself 
a cloth woven of stories told.’7 That is, to answer the question ‘who’ requires a practice of 
narration that brings together disparate elements into a narrative unity. By combining fact 
and fiction, a narrative identity can achieve a sense of consistency and continuity that 
corresponds to the sense of self that one has developed throughout one’s lifetime.  
 Ricœur’s notion of narrative identity contradicts the idea of the true self in several 
aspects. His argument reveals that self-knowledge does not necessarily contain absolute 
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truth about the person. Instead, it is formulated through a combination of imaginative and 
fictional elements required to mediate changes and interruptions into a unified and 
continuous narrative about one’s life. Moreover, the mechanics of narrative emplotment 
itself presupposes a temporal progression. By definition, a narratively mediated self cannot 
be an immutable but a dynamic entity that shifts and changes over time. In short, the notion 
of narrative identity fundamentally rejects the assumption of the self as having an absolute 
core and questions the viability of authenticity as an ethical model for the practice of the 
self. 
 In this section, I will discuss how Look at Me and Innocents and Others 
thematically highlight the implications of narrative identity for the concept of self-
authenticity in different ways. In the characterization of Charlotte Swenson, the protagonist 
of Look at Me, Egan portrays the impossibility of self-authenticity through a split between 
the inner and outer selves that becomes so vast that the surface/depth model of the self is 
no longer applicable. Through Charlotte, Egan introduces an inverted model of the self in 
which narrative figuration becomes an indispensable tool to constitute a sense of self. 
Through the character Jelly in Innocents and Others, Spiotta similarly pays attention to the 
unbridgeable division of the self that relies on narrative figuration to formulate and express 
a self. At the same time, Spiotta also uses the novel’s protagonist, Meadow Mori, to reflect 
on how the blending of fact and fiction becomes a way to obtain self-knowledge as a form 
of narrative figuration. Moreover, Spiotta also considers the role of mediums in the 
production and reception of self-narratives in these two characters, which further highlights 




Inverted Surface/Depth Model in Look at Me 
In Look at Me, Egan imagines the scenario in which the surface/depth model of the self as 
the foundation of self-authenticity becomes unattainable and suggests that narrative 
figuration can be a solution that mediates the irreparable disjunction of the self. The 
protagonist Charlotte is portrayed as a character for whom the inner and outer split of the 
self is an actual lived experience. The novel introduces Charlotte as a model who is 
recovering from an operation to reconstruct her face that is damaged in a car accident. After 
the surgery in which ‘eighty titanium screws were implanted in the crushed bones […] to 
connect and hold them together’8, Charlotte’s face becomes a literal prosthesis, an artificial 
part of her body. However, the novel portrays how Charlotte also experiences other 
disconnections between herself and the new face. First, the face that is put together by 
mechanical parts reminds her of Rockford, the hometown she never identifies with because 
it is ‘a city known for its drills, transmissions, joints, saws, watertight seals, adjustable door 
bumpers, spark plugs, gaskets, […] invisible things that no one in the world would ever 
know or care about’.9 Charlotte claims to have her first moment of self-realization from 
identifying with Rockford: ‘A place revered among mechanics for its universal joint was 
not a place where I could remain. This was clear to me at age twelve: my first clear notion 
of myself. I was not Rockford.’10 The new face thus represents an alienation in that it 
epitomizes Rockford by being ‘full of titanium bolts and screws invented here’.11 Yet, for 
Charlotte, the new face also represents an existential threat; it does not look like her, and it 
reminds her that she never knows what she looks like: ‘I’d held up pictures of myself beside 
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my reflection and tried to compare them. But my sole discovery was that in addition to not 
knowing what I looked like now, I had never known.’12 With the new face, Charlotte 
realizes that she has lost the memory of her appearance, which means she has also lost the 
ability to find the surface layer that truly represents and corresponds to the true self inside.   
 Charlotte is doomed to inauthenticity if authenticity requires a faithful 
correspondence between one’s inner and outer selves. She is physically, mentally, and 
existentially disconnected from her outward appearance. Moreover, by not remembering 
what she previously looks like, the disjunction becomes irreparable. In other words, 
Charlotte’s new face becomes a simulacrum or a copy without an original. In Simulacra 
and Simulation, Jean Baudrillard describes the hyperreal as a phenomenon in the era of 
simulation in which there is no longer a reference to an origin or reality. The hyperreal 
liquidates all references and substitutes the signs for the real: ‘Never again will the real 
have the chance to produce itself. […] A hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the 
imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary.’13  Charlotte’s 
new face has no relation to reality and exists solely in the hyperreal. Her mirror reflection 
is a simulacra image that, in Baudrillard’s words, ‘didn’t conceal anything at all, and that 
these images were in essence not images, such as an original model would have made them, 
but perfect simulacra, forever radiant with their own fascination’.14 Consequently, 
Charlotte comes to realize that her real self can no longer be expressed authentically; she 
only has a simulacra image that reflects nothing about herself. With this recognition, 
Charlotte reverses the surface/depth model by constructing a new self to match the outward 
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appearance. In the scene when Charlotte looks at the new face for the first time, she then 
says to herself: ‘This is your Charlotte, and you must take good care of her so she’ll grow 
up to be a beautiful girl, and live an extraordinary life.’15 Without the inability to uphold 
the ideal of authenticity, she can accept the new face as a tabula rasa. As a simulacrum 
without an original reference, the new face can refer to another Charlotte whose life will 
be extraordinary. Accordingly, after recovery, Charlotte’s initial plan is to relaunch her 
modeling career as she pitches the idea to her agent: ‘Pretend I’m a new girl. […] No one 
recognizes me.’16  
 By characterizing Charlotte as a model, Egan also highlights the influence of the 
image culture imbued with the idea that a simulacrum is all that matters. In a scene of self-
reflection, Charlotte recalls a lesson she has learned from her modeling career: 
As a model, of course, I’d carried my face like a sign, holding it out a foot or so in 
front of me – not out of pride or vanity, God knew; those had been stamped out 
long ago, or at any rate, disjoined from my physical appearance. No, out of sheer 
practicality: here’s what I am. Calling card, handshake, précis, call it what you 
like; it was what I had to offer to the world where I had spent my life. (emphasis 
in original)17 
Being in the fashion industry Charlotte is conditioned to abandon her ego and self-pride as 
a matter of practicality. Modeling demands that she constantly changes her appearance to 
the point that it disjoins from her sense of self. Rather than making her more recognizable, 
Charlotte contends that being a model produces an opposite effect: ‘People who’ve known 
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me for years stare at me like they’ve never seen me before.’18 However, she also admits 
that she is ‘trying to view it a unique opportunity to start over’.19 Not having a recognizable 
self, she always has a chance to begin again as a new person. Charlotte’s reflection about 
her modeling career thus suggests that she has subscribed to the inverted surface/depth 
model even before the accident. From her perspective as a model, appearance takes 
precedence over the inner self; it is what she has ‘to offer to the world’. Even if there is a 
true self, it no longer serves a practical function for Charlotte. 
  Having a new face as a simulacrum only reinforces the inversion of the 
surface/depth model that she has experienced from being a model. However, the novel 
further portrays that, in realizing that she has lost the ability to express her real self and be 
an authentic person, Charlotte embraces narrative figuration in the formation of a self that 
does not have to adhere to the ideal of authenticity. With the new face as an empty vessel, 
she can fill it with stories and make up a new self as a beautiful girl with an extraordinary 
life. That is, her inability to be authentic also allows Charlotte to make use of what Adam 
Kelly characterizes as her ‘postmodern consciousness’, which he describes as a ‘detached 
awareness, even in the moment of action, of being the subject of future narration and/or 
technologized representation’.20 Her awareness as a narrativized self is also manifest in the 
mirror scene in which Charlotte sees the self behind the new face as a subject of her 
narration. The first-person Charlotte functions as a narrator who will tell the story of the 
person that the new face belongs to. In his reading of the novel, Kelly also argues that the 
postmodern consciousness reflects Charlotte’s inability to express herself: ‘narration here 
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functions for Charlotte less as an organic representation of her experience than as a 
displacement of her identity onto a notion of the subject defined from without.’21 However, 
I want to extend from Kelly’s argument and suggest that Charlotte’s postmodern 
consciousness may reflect the displacement of her identity;  narrative construction becomes 
indispensable to her. It is the only way for Charlotte to link the simulacra face to a self, 
even though it could only be an inauthentic, narratively figured self.  
 In the novel, Egan further explores the tension between narrative figuration and 
self-authenticity by incorporating Charlotte’s inverted model of the self in autobiographical 
writing. When a tech startup asks Charlotte to write her life story for their online platform 
called Ordinary/Extraordinary People, she recruits Irene Maitlock, a fake reporter later 
revealed to be an academic in cultural studies, to write the story for her. The collaboration 
with Irene reinforces the impossibility of authenticity for Charlotte. Their work process 
relies on narrative figuration in which historical and fictional narratives intertwine to 
produce a coherent story about Charlotte’s life.  Charlotte explains to Irene that in their 
workflow, ‘I’d give you the raw material and the rest would be up to you; you could tell it 
any way you want, you could make it up.’22 The final product will be a life story that, to 
use Ricœur’s words, ‘borrows from history as much as fiction making the life story a fictive 
history or, if you prefer, an historical fiction’.23 Irene thus describes Charlotte’s 
autobiography as an unholy hybrid creature created from the fusion of Charlotte’s voice 
with hers: ‘words tumbled from her in a voice that wasn’t her own or Charlotte’s but a 
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hybrid, an unholy creature that was Irene’s creation, too.’24 In other words, Irene and 
Charlotte’s writing is a hybrid of Charlotte’s facts and Irene’s creative imagination. 
Hybridity is needed to make sense of Charlotte’s life story as a fictive history or historical 
fiction.  
 After portraying Charlotte’s life story as a fictionalized narrative based on real 
events, Egan introduces another complication in the concept of authenticity. Thomas 
Keene, the owner of the online platform, comments to Charlotte that her story written by 
Irene is ‘too much like you for you to have written it’.25 In Thomas’s comment, the hybrid 
narrative unexpectedly renders an authentic style. However, he can correctly guess that 
such authenticity must imply that Charlotte has a ghostwriter, which he claims to have no 
issue with. Therefore, Thomas’s problem with Charlotte’s story is not that it lacks 
authenticity but that it does not correspond to his idea of an authentic autobiographical 
narrative. In the scene when he finally meets with Charlotte and Irene together, he explains 
his understanding of authenticity to them: 
Remember, authenticity is the beginning and the end of this product. Start with the 
ambulance, the siren, the rain, wheeling her in … ‘We don’t know if she’s going 
to make it, nurse.’ That kind of thing. I’m not saying make anything up – […] I’m 
saying find the drama, find the beauty, find the tension and give it to us. (emphasis 
in original)26 
By asking that they include a fictional nurse, Thomas may appear to contradict his own 
demand for authenticity as ‘the beginning and the end of this product’. However, he 
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contends that the fictional element may represent the kind of truth that can only come from 
the story's drama, beauty, and tension. In a statement that echoes Ricœur’s argument, 
Thomas claims that he ‘want[s] shit happens for a reason’, from using fictional elements 
to find ‘connections’ and the ‘buried logic’ within the story.27 At this point, it is possible 
to see that Thomas does not conform to the traditional model of ‘authenticity’ that 
presupposes truth in oneself. Instead, authenticity in a self-narrative is tied to its sense-
making. That is, a narrative should make sense not only to the subject but also to the 
audience. In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams distinguishes between a historical 
narrative such as autobiographical writing and a chronicle. He points to how narrative 
emplotment is used to select and make sense of how certain events are connected. 
According to Williams, a narrative will entail ‘a selection of elements from a suitably 
comprehensive chronicle’.28 Some historical facts could be left out, while some fictional 
elements might be added. Making sense becomes a subjective interpretation, which 
problematizes the notions of truth and truthfulness in a narrative. This leads Williams to 
conclude that we should not expect to find truth but truthfulness in historical narrative, but  
we must demand that interpretations of the past should tell us the truth, in the sense 
that they should not lie or mislead, what we need them for is not to tell us 
something called “the truth about the past.” We need them to be truthful, and to 
make sense of the past – to us.29  
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Through Williams’ argument, it becomes possible to see how Thomas links narrative 
fabulation to authenticity. Authenticity for him is an ability to make sense of the self and 
manifest its truthfulness to the audience.  
 However, with the sense-making ability and truthfulness introduced as a criterion 
of her authentic life story, Charlotte also finds that she has to rely on rhetorical styles, 
tropes, and genre conventions to write a story that makes sense. In Kelly’s analysis of 
Charlotte’s postmodern consciousness, he also explains that the influence from other texts 
represents ‘the invasive materiality of writing [that] increasingly plays for Charlotte the 
role of a posthuman prosthesis’.30 From here, I want to suggest that the trope of the 
prosthesis that Kelly proposes is not only resonated in Charlotte’s simulacrum face but also 
intensified when Charlotte agrees to sell her identity to Thomas who uses 3D animation 
technology to recreate her appearance and broadcast her life as a reality TV show. The 
animated figure represents a prosthesis that is twice removed from reality. It is modeled 
after the new face that has no connection to her original appearance. This leads Charlotte 
to claim at the end of the novel that the division between herself and Charlotte Swenson 
has become unbridgeable: ‘I had undergone a kind of fission, and the two resulting parts 
of me reviled each other.’31 The prostheses in the form of a new face and a fictional life 
narrative result in Charlotte’s self-perception being ‘gapingly fraudulent’.32 With these 
prostheses at both physical and textual levels, she has lost the ability to connect with 
herself, making her eventually decide to sell her identity.  
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 At the level of form, Egan also represents the prostheses by using a different 
typeface for the text that intrudes the characters' consciousness and disrupts the narrative 
continuity and unity of the novel itself. Moreover, Egan replicates the condition of narrative 
disruption and textual intrusion at the structure level by alternating Charlotte’s first-person 
narrative with the third-person narrative about a constellation of people from Rockford 
who are loosely connected to Charlotte. What is resonant at the formal and structural levels 
is the thematic concern about the ability of a narrative to confer authenticity, unity, 
continuity of the self. Witnessing the process in which narrative tropes and genres influence 
her life story before being adapted into a film and eventually turned into reality TV, 
Charlotte recognizes that she has moved further and further away from any kind of true 
self that she may have. The need for a narrative to ‘make sense’ and express truthfulness 
for others leads her to understand that authenticity as self-truth is impossible. It cannot be 
expressed without such truth being interpreted, twisted, or falsified in some way. That is, 
she comes to recognize that authenticity is unattainable and impractical in the social world. 
This revelation leads her to contend that the ‘public life’ causes an irreparable split in 
herself.33 A public life demands that she moves away from the truth and produces a 
narrative about her life that makes sense for others. The decision to sell her identity is her 
last effort to preserve the feeling of being true to herself, which, in her understanding, can 
only be done if she disappears from the public life completely: 
Life can’t be sustained under the pressure of so many eyes. Even as we try to reveal 
the mystery of ourselves, to catch it unaware, expose its pulse and flinch and 
peristalsis, the truth has slipped away, burrowed further inside a dark, coiled 
 




privacy that replenishes itself like blood. It cannot be seen, much as one might 
wish to show it. It dies the instant it is touched by light.34 
The ending of Look at Me thus makes a significant claim about the unattainability of self-
authenticity. As Charlotte expresses in the above passage, even in the attempt ‘to reveal 
the mystery of ourselves’, she finds that the truth nonetheless evades her. On the one hand, 
the paragraph suggests that there might be such a thing as the true self. On the other hand, 
it points to the fact that such a true self cannot be known: ‘It cannot be seen as one might 
wish to show it.’ Once the self comes into contact with others, it becomes twisted by the 
process of narrative figuration and pressed by an expectation from the other who demands 
that the narrative makes sense. The novel thus ends with Charlotte’s decision not to reveal 
her new name or tell the reader anything about her life after she sells her identity: ‘as for 
myself, I’d rather not say very much.’35 The moment she tells a story about her life, she 
realizes that she will give up her authentic self. 
Medium and Narrative Figuration in Innocents and Others 
The problem of truth and authenticity in self-narrative is also a central theme of Innocents 
and Others. Like Look at Me, Spiotta’s novel highlights how the fusion of fact and fiction 
confers coherence and meaning on a narrative. However, Spiotta also considers the role of 
mediums in narration to complicate further the notion of authenticity in self-truth, self-
expression, and the representation of one’s life story. In the novel, she thus juxtaposes four 
types of medium – telephone, documentary film, online blog, and prose fiction – to explore 
 





how each of these mediums may differently complicate, distort or enhance the process of 
narrative figuration in the practice of the self.  
 Innocents and Others begins with Meadow’s online essay about how she begins 
her career as a filmmaker. The essay serves two functions in the novel: it introduces the 
concept of narratively-figured self as a key motif and provides an example of how a 
medium plays a significant part in the production and reception of a narrative. According 
to Ricœur, a narratively figured self is formulated through the mechanics of narrative 
emplotment and interpretation. Implicit in the process of narrative figuration is a 
temporally dynamic self which he calls ‘ipse’. For Ricœur, ipse is ‘self-sameness’ or ‘self-
constancy’ that ‘rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic 
identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text’.36 As a narrative 
composition, ipse contains both historical fact and imaginative fiction that are combined to 
mediate changes that occur in life into a sense of self-sameness that the subject has 
developed through their lifetime. In other words, ipse is a version of self that ‘makes sense’. 
It relies on the mechanics of narrative emplotment to track changes and progressions in 
one’s life and interpret those events into a consistent story about the self that persists over 
time. That is, Ricœur argues that self-knowledge is interpretative, narratively mediated, 
and contingent on both historical and fictional elements to produce a coherent plot: 
Narrative mediation underlines this remarkable aspect about knowledge of the self 
as being an interpretation. […] What the narrative interpretation properly provides 
is precisely “the figure-able” character of the individual which has for its result, 
 




that the self, narratively interpreted, is itself a figured self – a self which figures 
itself as this or that.37 
Ricœur’s argument about narrative identity suggests that self-knowledge is not predicated 
on truth or facticity alone. Instead, the narrative mechanism produces a self as a creative 
figuration. Williams’s argument about narrative and sense-making also corresponds to 
Ricœur’s thesis in this regard. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that narrative identity does 
not have to be factual as long as it makes sense of the self in a ‘truthful’ way. 
 In Meadow’s ‘How I Began’ online essay, published on the Women and Film 
website, she cites a brief affair with Orson Welles as the starting point in her filmmaking 
career. According to Meadow, she has to lie to her parents about joining a film collective 
in upstate New York so that she can live with Orson in his house. To make the lie 
convincing, she buys filming equipment which she will eventually use to shoot films in 
upstate New York after Orson dies. Meadow frames her story in this way to suggest to the 
reader that a fabrication through narrative may be an approach towards self-knowledge and 
self-fulfillment. In her case, she does not know how she wants to pursue a career in 
filmmaking until she makes it up and becomes convinced by the lie herself. In the essay, 
she also makes a manifesto-like statement about her view on narrative fabulation:  
A lie of invention, a lie about yourself, should not be called a lie. It needs a different 
word. It is maybe a fabule, a kind of wish-story, something almost true, a mist of 
the possible where nothing was yet there. With elements both stolen and invented 
 




– which is to say, invented. And it has to feel more like dream than lie as you speak 
it. […] I made it up on the spot and I already wanted to do it.38 
The lie about one’s self, Meadow contends, should feel like a dream. There are both 
invented and wishful elements in the lie, which suggests that a story one makes up 
somehow reflects a more profound truth about oneself in the form of a personal desire – a 
wish. It is the ‘almost true’ quality about the self, about how one imagines oneself doing 
or becoming something. That is, it is the truth that reflects how the subject figures 
themselves in a certain way. Fabulation is merely a process of figuration that allows the 
subject to see itself as being this or that. Meadow’s essay thus introduces a key motif in the 
novel in that the truth about oneself, obtained through narration, may use fictional elements 
to figure or ‘make sense’ of the self for both the subject and the audience.  
 Apart from her statement about the necessary fabule-like quality of one’s life story, 
Meadow also uses the essay itself to restate the idea. Spiotta represents Meadow’s essay in 
an online blog format and includes the reader’s comment section at the end to show how 
Meadow manipulates the form and medium of the essay to reaffirm her conviction about 
narrative fabulation. One of the readers from the comment section suggests that Meadow 
is not entirely truthful in her story: ‘People, I am calling BS on this whole essay. Welles 
famously lived and died on Stanley Avenue in Hollywood, not Brentwood. Everybody 
knows that. Even the death date is off. She is pulling your chain.’39 The comment points to 
basic facts about Welles’s life that can be easily verified on the internet and accuses 
Meadow of being manipulative. However, considering that Meadow lies about verifiable 
and straightforward facts in the essay, it is possible to conclude that she uses the essay as 
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an example of a ‘wish story, something almost true’ that contains ‘elements both stolen 
and invented’ about one’s self. She wants it to be evident that she lies and invites the reader 
to consider how her lie expresses the truth. In the novel, Spiotta includes another online 
essay written by Carrie, Meadow’s best friend from high school who also becomes a 
successful film director. Spiotta uses Carrie’s essay as an annotation of Meadow’s in that 
it exposes and explains Meadow’s lies. In Carrie’s essay, it thus becomes clear that 
Meadow intends to manipulate the reader and that she sees the manipulation as a way to 
communicate the truth: 
Meadow was creating what she called a fabule, a wish-story about herself, half 
dream and half fact. I know Meadow, and I alone seem able to read her perfectly. 
Meadow is playful, and she tells her own truth in her own way – you just have to 
yield to her version of the world to see how it all fits together, surrender to her 
possibilities. In a sense, she is the lover of Welles. Welles the great confidence 
artist, the prevaricator, the big fake who tells you he is manipulating you and that 
makes the magic all the more magical. Sleight of hand, she is all of that.40 
In Carrie’s explanation, Meadow lies about her affair with Welles and makes up simple 
facts about him as a homage to Welles and to get her message across. With Welles as her 
idol, Meadow sees no difference between being an artist and a con artist. Being an artist is 
also ‘partly a confidence game. And partly magic’.41 Meadow lies to manipulate the 
reader’s confidence and expectation from the genre of the essay. Because it is a ‘How I 
Began’ story, an autobiographical piece, the reader expects authenticity and honesty from 
the writer. Meadow plays with the reader’s expectation by lying to them. Yet, as Carrie 
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points out, her lies express some truth about her love for Welles and how he inspires her 
career as an artist. For this reason, Carrie concludes that the essay is about how Meadow 
‘tells her own truth in her own way’. 
 By making the internet the medium for both Meadow’s and Carrie’s essays, Spiotta 
further problematizes the problems of confidence and manipulation in creative and artistic 
activities. In the novel, she characterizes most of the online comments about Meadow’s 
essay as sensational and argumentative. Most readers focus on her affair with Welles and 
argue about how she betrays feminist values and sleeps her way to success. In other words, 
almost no one, apart from the reader in the last comment, cares to verify those facts about 
Welles but takes the story at its face value. Here Spiotta highlights a significant implication 
of the internet as a medium. The real-time interaction of the internet may render obsolete 
Meadow’s view about narrative fabulation as a means to tell the truth. As illustrated in the 
comments, the truth becomes secondary to the affect and sensation that the story provokes 
among interactive readers. As such, the idea that a manipulative act can express some kind 
of truth might no longer be viable in the world of the internet in which the distinction 
between truths and lies is not a primary concern. 
 With Meadow’s essay introducing the role of the medium in shaping the production 
and reception of a narrative, Spiotta explores these issues more fully in the characterization 
of Jelly whose life story is mediated through three kinds of medium: telephone, 
documentary, and prose narrative of the novel itself. Similar to Charlotte in Look at Me, 
Jelly is a character that represents a disjunction between the inner and outer selves – how 
the outward appearance does not reflect how she perceives her true self. Jelly is partially 




doughnut. Spiotta explains in an interview that she bases the character Jelly after Whitney 
Walton, a woman from Louisiana known among famous men in Hollywood in the 1980s 
as Miranda Grosvenor, a mysterious woman who would randomly call and seduce them 
with her charm and wit.42 Similarly, Jelly also invents Nicole as a persona to call and flirt 
with successful men in Hollywood. In the novel, Jelly finally meets Jack, a film composer, 
and develops an intimate relationship with him. She stops calling other men after meeting 
Jack. When Jack asks to see her picture and meet her in person, Jelly experiences an 
irreconcilable conflict between how she perceives herself and her appearance:  
She did not feel like a forty-one-year-old woman, did not feel like being this heavy, 
invisible, unremarkable creature. She felt young and taut, a person who could 
beguile and a person who loved and understood men. That was the truth, and the 
rest was not of import to either of them.43 
It is suggested in the passage that Jelly contends that ‘the truth’ about herself as a young, 
beguiling, and understanding woman does not project outwardly. Moreover, for Jelly, what 
she calls ‘the rest’ or other aspects about her is inconsequential and irrelevant to these inner 
truths that she can express on the phone. At least, it remains irrelevant until the moment 
that those men ask for her pictures. When pressed by their request, she decides to send 
them a picture of another woman named Lynn. The narrator describes that Lynn’s body is 
a fantasy to Jelly that she visualizes through a similar kind of postmodern consciousness 
that Kelly prescribes to Charlotte: ‘In all of Jelly’s fantasies she looked exactly like Lynn, 
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not even a better version of Jelly. She watched her fantasy as if it were a movie; she could 
see the man – Mark – undress the perfect girl, and Jelly could feel him lose his breath.’44 
Jelly experiences a displacement in her subjectivity in this fantasy as she views her own 
self from a disembodied perspective of a narrator describing how Lynn’s body pleases the 
man. That Jelly can only see herself from this perspective paradoxically reaffirms that ‘the 
rest’ of other aspects of hers is ‘not of import’. She realizes these thoughts are mere 
fantasies and wishful thinking that are, in her own admission, ‘impossible to fulfill’. When 
Mark, a man she describes in the fantasy, wants to see her, she thus sends him the picture 
of another girl because ‘she was never dumb enough to believe that Mark could love her 
as she actually was’.45  
 Disembodiment thus emerges as a crucial element for Jelly’s self-figuration and 
explains why she prefers to use the telephone. She sees that the phone facilitates a 
disembodied experience that allows people to know each other from the inside: 
The phone was built for this. It had no visual component, no tactile component, no 
person with hopeful or embarrassed face to read, no scent wafting, no acid 
collection in the mouth. Just vibrations, long and short waves, and to clutch at them 
with your own thoughts was just wrong. A distinct resistance to potential. A lack 
of love, really. Because what is love, if not listening, as uninflected – as 
uncontained – as possible.46 
This paragraph restates Jelly’s view that embodiment obstructs how one can be known and 
loved. The telephone removes all the person's physical traits except for their voice that 
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functions as a lure to invite the listener to accept them in a precognitive and affective 
manner. Jelly thus sees the potential in the telephone to express the self that she figures 
herself to be. She is freed from the constraint of her body and able to build a relationship 
grounded on this version of self that she perceives as true. 
 Jelly’s relationship with Jack serves as an example of how a narratively figured self 
can be part of a genuine relationship due to the facilitation of the medium such as the 
telephone. However, Jelly’s relationship with Jack ends when he asks to see her in person, 
which is the scenario in which Jelly’s narratively figured self has to be measured against 
the ideal of authenticity. When Jack asks to see her, Nicole becomes a lie and Jelly a con 
artist. In this way, Spiotta also introduces a crucial element in the concept of narrative 
identity: the presence of the other who performs the task of addressing the subject to 
account for themselves. Overall, Innocents and Others is thematically centralized on a 
narrative construction that the self is potentially manipulative and can divide people, as the 
novel’s title suggests, into the innocent and the non-innocent other. Jelly understands this 
implication fully that, without the telephone, she will inevitably become a liar to Jack. 
 However, apart from the telephone conversation with Jack, the reader also learns 
about the character Jelly as a subject of a documentary film directed by Meadow. In this 
rendition of Jelly’s life, Spiotta invites the reader to consider the power of film narrative 
that can shape and influence the interpretation of a life story. Meadow’s documentary about 
Jelly, called Inward Operator, is presented in the novel from Carrie’s point of view. Unlike 
the reader, Carrie does not know anything about Jelly before watching the film. Her point 
of view is thus significant in that it illustrates how film as a medium may distort the 




Moreover, being a filmmaker herself, Carrie is able to comment on the editing and directing 
decisions that Meadow makes, which can reveal to the reader the extent of manipulation 
that a film narrative can achieve. The narrator describes Carrie as she is watching the film 
by pointing out how she is aware that the whole narrative is mediated from Meadow’s 
perspective: 
 Meadow’s camera moves slowly toward an artfully lit Rolodex. No shots 
of this woman. Soon, Carrie thought, she will have to show her. 
 The film cuts to the talking heads of the men. Three middle-aged guys, all 
successful in the entertainment business. All talking about this girl who called 
them, Nicole. Each one describes his phone connection in sequence, showing how 
Nicole used a kind of formula on the men. Through the manipulating of the men 
and the repetition of her technique, Nicole starts to emerge as a con artist.47 
The emphasis on ‘Meadow’s camera’ in Carrie’s perception is a reminder that the film has 
a perspective that is not neutral but subjective. Meadow decides to reveal Jelly in the film 
at a specific time and to include three men talking about her in a way that suggests a pattern 
in Jelly’s conversation with them. Moreover, there is an intentional ambiguity in the 
narrator’s description. In saying ‘through the manipulating of the men and the repetition of 
her technique, Nicole starts to emerge as a con artist’, it is not entirely clear who the 
possessive pronoun ‘her’ refers to. The description could refer to Jelly/Nicole’s 
manipulation and technique she used on those men in the past. Yet, it is also possible to 
read the description as ascribing the manipulation and repetition of the technique to 
Meadow. In this scene in the film, Meadow also manipulates the men by presenting them 
 




as talking heads in succession to suggest a repetition of Jelly’s lies. Moreover, by 
emphasizing that they are all successful men in the entertainment business, Meadow infers 
a pattern to Jelly’s choice of men. As a result of Meadow’s editing of the film, which is 
shown to be a process in which she ‘makes sense’ of Jelly’s phone calls and relationships 
with a certain kind of men for the audience, Jelly/Nicole ‘emerge[s] as a con artist’. To 
reaffirm such interpretation about Jelly, Meadow also arranges to have her meet Jack for 
the first time and film it as a closure to Jelly’s narrative. This ending effectively shapes the 
film into a narrative about Jelly’s confidence game that is eventually exposed and facing 
the consequences. Accordingly, Carrie is described to have felt ‘cringing’ when she 
watches Jack and Jelly’s meeting in the film. She wonders, ‘Why would Meadow do this 
to these people? Why would they go along with it?’48 Carrie realizes that the meeting 
between Jelly and Jack in the film’s ending will pass a final judgment on Jelly. That is, 
Meadow is able to use the film narrative to make sense of Jelly as a con artist. 
 Apart from the film, another version of Jelly’s life story is presented to the reader 
in her characterization in the prose narrative of the novel itself. In this version, Jelly’s story 
is most comprehensible in terms of its temporal span. Her story in the novel spans over 
five decades, from the 1970s when she first becomes a telephone enthusiast to the 2010s 
after Meadow’s film characterizes her as a con artist. The reader learns about Jelly from 
the prose version more than what she reveals in a telephone conversation or the film. For 
example, in the prose narrative, there is an extended story about her relationship with Oz, 
a blind phone phreaker who introduces her to the wonder of telephone technology. The 
reader also finds out that even after the film ends with Jack’s rejection of her when they 
 




meet for the first time, the two finally reconcile and build a new relationship. More 
importantly, in the prose version, the reader learns about the effect that Meadow’s film has 
on Jelly. She accuses Meadow of being a con artist herself, someone who plays with the 
trust and confidence of other people: ‘I am not stupid, although I was naïve to believe you. 
You had all the power, and you knew exactly what would happen.’49 Jelly’s accusation 
effectively bridges the gap between the artist and the con artist and reaffirms Meadow’s 
own conviction about artmaking being a confidence game. As Jelly’s conversations with 
men and Meadow’s essay and films demonstrate, the two kinds of artists share a 
commonality in that they can manipulate others through narrative. The manipulability and 
ambiguity of narrative form are further reinforced in the representation of Jelly’s story in 
the prose form. The comprehensiveness of Jelly’s story in the prose narrative functions as 
a reminder of the inherent ambiguity and ambivalence of any narrative that is adopted as a 
tool to make sense of things. It reveals how other versions of her story cannot fully portray 
her. Williams thus warns in his argument about truth and truthfulness that we should be 
mindful of ‘the extent to which the formation of a story can be governed by considerations 
that have anything to do with truth and truthfulness’.50 Jelly’s life story that is presented in 
various mediums reveals the process in which only some facts are selected, and creative 
imagination is used to construct a narrative. Facts could be left out, gaps are filled in, and 
editing renders a narrative sequence in a suggestive manner.  
However, even though the prose form may have an advantage in portraying Jelly 
most comprehensively, Spiotta adds a final complication by breaking her prose narrative 
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into fragments and recombining them in the thread structure of the novel. Jelly’s life story 
in the prose form is broken up, rearranged in a non-chronological order, and intertwined 
with other narratives, effectively creating a thread of different narratives.51 Her story in the 
prose form, despite its most comprehensibility, lacks unity and continuity, making it 
difficult for the reader to make sense of it. However, the thread structure is significant in 
that it demands that the reader trust in the eventual unity and comprehensibility of Spiotta’s 
novel as an extended prose form. In other words, Spiotta is also playing a confidence game 
with the reader and asks that they trust in the form and genre of the text they are reading, 
that the novel will eventually render itself a unified story and not just a collage of narrative 
fragments. The thread structure of Innocents and Others, therefore, reiterates the central 
theme of the novel about the interpretative figuration and manipulation of the narrative 
form that reminds the reader to question whether it is appropriate that a narrative, including 
that of the self, should be measured against the ideals of truth and authenticity.  
New Sincerity and the Confidence Game 
I have so far discussed how Look at Me and Innocents and Others use the process of 
narrative figuration and the function of mediums to problematize the possibility of a true 
self as an underpinning feature of the ideal of authenticity. Despite the novels’ implicit 
suggestion that self-authenticity may be unattainable, I contend that they also consider a 
new mode of authenticity based on the model of New Sincerity. While both novels 
highlight how the presence of the other may be a threat to the concept of self-truth and 
authenticity, the relationship with the other is also represented as a foundation of a new 
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kind of authenticity. This section will elaborate on how the two novels use New Sincerity 
as a condition for self-authenticity based on one’s relationality and accountability for the 
other.  
 According to Trilling, sincerity is an ideal that sees the act of being true to the self 
as a means to be true to others. Sincerity, for Trilling, is ‘a congruence between avowal 
and actual feeling’.52 Such a congruence warrants that one cannot be false to others. 
Sincerity as ‘the avoidance of being false to any man through being true to one’s own self’, 
Trilling explains, is a characteristic of Western culture for hundreds of years before being 
replaced by the ideal of authenticity that supposes the act of being true to the self as an end 
in itself.53 However, in the two novels, sincerity becomes a replacement for authenticity. It 
substitutes the inability to be an authentic self. As previously discussed, the unbridgeable 
disconnection between the inner and outer selves that Charlotte and Jelly experience makes 
them struggle to be an authentic person. Both characters resort to making up a story about 
themselves to exploit or overcome the profound disconnection within the self. However, 
in making up lies about their lives, both Charlotte and Jelly claim sincerity as a justification. 
In Look at Me, Charlotte proclaims that she is ‘the biggest liar of them all’, and she does 
not ‘pretend to be anything else’. Moreover, she explains that she makes her lies so blatant 
to avoid ‘pseudo-earnestness’.54 Following Charlotte’s reasoning, it seems that, to be 
sincere, she has to admit to her inability to be authentic. The lie comes to represent her 
sincerity because it truthfully expresses her inauthenticity to others. In Innocents and 
Others, Jelly similarly uses sincerity to justify her Nicole persona: ‘Making things up was 
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okay because it was all about feelings, real feelings and real longing.’55 In Jelly’s view, 
Nicole might not be authentic, but Nicole is an expression of her sincerity. As Nicole, she 
is being true to herself, and therefore she cannot be false to others. Nicole is an expression 
of her self-truth, her ‘real feelings and real longing’. 
 Through the characters of Charlotte and Jelly, it becomes possible to see how 
sincerity may come to substitute for lack of authenticity. Unlike authenticity that considers 
truth to oneself as an end in itself, sincerity regards the act of being true to oneself as a 
means to form an honest relationship with others. However, in Trilling’s account of 
sincerity, he also explains that the ideal of sincerity could risk being compromised because 
there are elements of theatricality and performance implicit in the ideal:  
Society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most 
efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, 
that we actually are what we want our community to know we are. In short, we 
play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, 
with the result that a judgment may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not 
authentic.56 
Trilling explains here why authenticity has come to replace sincerity as an ethical ideal in 
the practice of the self. Sincerity is a roleplay to satisfy others. We ‘play the role’ of who 
we are, a role that does not necessarily represent our authentic selves. Authenticity thus 
emerges as an ethical ideal that replaces sincerity.  However, for Charlotte and Jelly, 
authenticity is unattainable. Accordingly, both characters choose to uphold the ideal of 
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sincerity in their self-conduct. Deception and performance become an expression of self-
truth. Charlotte has turned inauthenticity into a form of honesty by admitting to her inability 
to be an authentic person. For her, attempting authenticity would only be a form of ‘pseudo-
earnestness’, which, in her view, is worse than her sincere inauthenticity. Similarly, Jelly 
also shows traits of sincere inauthenticity when she creates a Nicole persona to express her 
‘real’ feelings and desires. She lies so she can be honest.  
 When Irene presses Charlotte about her conviction to be sincerely dishonest, 
Charlotte retorts by asking Irene to consider whether pure honesty is possible: 
Can you look at me and swear that everything you’ve said is absolutely true, that 
none of it is bullshit? There’s no agenda hidden underneath, no ulterior motives – 
everything is exactly the way you’ve described it?57 
Charlotte’s question is significant because it introduces personal motives as another 
problem of the ideal of authenticity that values truth and honesty. Her conviction to avoid 
being pseudo-earnest is in part informed by the recognition of the impossibility of pure 
honesty. She realizes that there is always a hidden personal agenda behind every self-
conduct. Consequently, she perceives lies as a form of honesty and intends to never lie 
about lying. Moreover, Charlotte’s remark reflects a vital tenet of the New Sincerity model 
that explains her rejection of authenticity for sincerity. Kelly argues that sincerity is an 
inherently impure concept because there is always a motivation for being sincere: ‘sincerity 
is unavoidably contaminated from the beginning by the anticipation of the effect it will 
 




have upon the other.’58 The potential contamination by personal motivation is also reflected 
in Trilling’s characterization of sincerity when he mentions its role-playing and 
performative aspect. However, the model of New Sincerity, Kelly explains, seeks to 
overcome this issue by recognizing that the impurity is not a risk but a foundation of the 
concept of sincerity itself: ‘Yet this threat should not be understood as the deprivation of 
sincerity but as its very possibility. That sincerity depends not on purity but on trust and 
faith.’59 Precisely, New Sincerity presupposes that the subject can never be sure of the 
intention or motive behind the act of sincerity and needs to rely on the other to trust and 
have faith that the subject is truly sincere. Kelly thus concludes that New Sincerity depends 
on ‘a blind response from the other to legitimate it’.60 For this reason, New Sincerity 
becomes the model that fundamentally reconceptualizes the relation between the self and 
the other. It deprioritizes the ideal of being true to oneself as a fundamental aspect of one’s 
sincerity and replaces it instead with the other’s confidence that one is sincere. 
 Even though Charlotte’s remark reflects the concern of New Sincerity regarding 
the purity of intention, Charlotte does not rely on the other’s trust to reaffirm her sincerity. 
Instead, she chooses to tell blatant lies to demonstrate her honesty even though it risks 
destroying her relationship with other people. Moreover, the novel's ending suggests that 
Charlotte sees the other as a direct threat to self-truth and resolves to disappear from public 
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life altogether. Her reservation about the other originates from when she confesses to her 
ex-fiancé Hansen about an affair. The confession is her attempt to be both authentic and 
sincere. She describes Hansen’s response to her confession as ‘the innocence leav[ing] him 
like a spirit leaving a corpse’.61 She has destroyed his innocence even though she is not 
certain whether it is her honesty or dishonesty that kills it: ‘my betrayal, or the telling? 
Which was the poison?’62 After Hansen, Charlotte thus vows to ‘mean what I said as I said 
it’, to be sincere even about her dishonesty. However, she refuses to adopt the model of 
New Sincerity, to require others to have faith and be confident in her, because she contends 
that it designates a form of a double life. As she contemplates about the relationship with 
Hansen: ‘Still I wondered […] whether we might both have been better off if I’d seal my 
lips and led a double life, like everyone else.’63 If she lets him continue to trust her and 
chose not to confess, she would have led a double life and possibly be ‘better off’. 
However, this passage suggests that Charlotte sees that it is inherently dishonest, a form of 
pseudo-earnestness, to abuse the faith of others knowingly. 
 Besides Charlotte, Egan also problematizes the reliance on faith from the other in 
the character Aziz, a middle eastern terrorist gifted at mimicry and impersonation. Aziz is 
in the car with Charlotte when it crashes on the way to Rockford. Ending up in Rockford 
by accident, Aziz takes up the name Michael West and gets a job as a math teacher in a 
local school. In the novel, Aziz contends that his success in adopting serial identities and 
changing his persona is not due to his ‘light skin and chameleon face, his ease with 
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languages and ability to germinate documents’.64 Instead, he claims that faith from the 
other is a secret to his success:  
He owed it to faith: other people’s faith, which in most cases was so powerful that 
the most gigantic assumption – you were the person you claimed to be – was one 
they accepted at the outset. 
 Faith. Of all things.65  
In the characters Charlotte and Aziz,  Egan thus questions the fundamental aspect of the 
model of New Sincerity by portraying how faith can be exploited. For Charlotte, she cares 
so much about not wanting to be ‘pseudo-earnest’ that she refuses to ask for people’s trust 
altogether and becomes committed instead to being dishonest. Aziz, on the contrary, 
understands the potential of faith and succeeds in living a double life that Charlotte has 
been trying to avoid.  
 In Innocents and Others, Spiotta also highlights the problem of New Sincerity that 
relies on faith by suggesting that faith is indistinguishable from the other’s confidence in 
the scheme of con artists. The narrator describes that Jelly considers trust and faith as the 
vital component in her relationship with men she talks on the phone with: ‘What she liked 
was the connection she felt with them – and that’s what it was, a genuine connection 
between two strangers when they buy something. They trust you: it moves from 
transactional to faith.’66 She also characterizes her relationship with Jack as a form of 
mutual trust: ‘he trusted her and she trusted him.’67 Jelly sees trust as a reaffirmation of the 
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self that one presents to the other. She trusts in Jack’s trust in her, which allows her to be 
the person she claims to be. However, the novel problematizes the function of trust in 
interpersonal relationships by suggesting that, in the broader context, it can be perceived 
as a form of manipulation that is not different from how con artists exploit the other’s 
confidence in their scheme. When Jelly’s story is portrayed in the film, she is thus 
vulnerable to being perceived as a con artist. Such judgment about her character is directly 
expressed by Jack who sees himself as the victim of Jelly’s scheme. Seeing Jelly for the 
first time in the film, Jack announces that ‘it was all a trick’: ‘I can’t have feelings for her 
if there is no her. How can I know if any of it – of her – was real? I trusted her.’68 Jack’s 
comment in the film reflects the problem of betrayal that Charlotte has raised in Look at 
Me. Trust remains conditional in that it is still expected to be fulfilled and risks being 
betrayed. Even though New Sincerity claims that blind trust is needed to fulfill its 
possibility, it is nonetheless predicated on the expectation of fulfillment. That is, it is still 
the trust that is grounded on the belief in the existence of the truth. In this way, sincerity 
based on trust cannot entirely escape the ideal of authenticity. In the next section, I will 
suggest that both novels also use the model of New Sincerity as a starting point to consider 
how a new kind of authenticity that is relational and not grounded in the idea of having a 
true self might be possible. In this model of authenticity, trust from the other could be more 
than an affirmation but a constitutive condition of one’s true self. 
New Authenticity and the Necessary Other 
The kind of authenticity suggested in Look at Me and Innocents and Others is developed 
from the model of New Sincerity in which the other plays a crucial role in providing 
 




affirmation of one’s sincerity. However, this kind of authenticity relies on more than trust 
and faith from the other. Instead, the other is a constitutive element that provides a 
condition for the subject to express authenticity in the form of accountability. The other in 
this model can be described in Cavarero’s concept of ‘the necessary other’ whose presence 
demands the subject to account for themselves. My analysis in this section will also 
incorporate Butler’s argument about the scene of address in producing an account of one’s 
self. From the notions of the necessary other and the scene of address, I will discuss how 
Look at Me and Innocents and Others go beyond the New Sincerity model and introduce 
an alternative model of self-authenticity grounded in one’s relationality and accountability 
for the other. It is the kind of authenticity that can be understood through Whitehead’s 
model proposition in that it requires the other to constitute it. While Whitehead suggests 
that a proposition can be either true or false, he emphasizes that its primary concern is in 
the ability to appeal to the apprehending subject. Similarly, authenticity in this model can 
be either true or false, but that is not the point. What matters is that one has to fulfill the 
expectation that one uses to attract the other to trust and believe in them. In this way, it can 
be said that the traditional conception of how being true to oneself is a means to achieve 
sincerity for others is reversed. Both Look at Me and Innocents and Others suggest that 
sincerity in the model of New Sincerity can be a means to achieve authenticity. That is, 
being true to others becomes the means to being true to oneself.  
 In Relating Narratives, Cavarero uses the term ‘the necessary other’ to explain how 
self-narratability is contingent on the presence of the other. The other can be either real or 




to make of oneself an other.’69 As one tells the story to oneself, one has to imagine another 
person to perceive the self as a narratable subject. Charlotte’s postmodern consciousness 
is an example of the necessity of the other as she divides herself into the first-person ‘I’ 
who functions as the other who tells the story of the third-person ‘she’. The necessary other 
in Cavarero’s model is the one who narrates the story of the self, which reinforces the 
notion of necessity in that one cannot be a unique subject without the narration produced 
from the other. What Cavarero called the ‘unique existent’ is, therefore, the result of one’s 
exposure and relationality that allows the other to recognize and narrate one’s own life 
story: ‘In other words, the identity of the self, crystalized in the story, is totally constituted 
by the relations of her appearance to others in the world.’70 In his introduction to Cavarero’s 
monograph, Paul A. Kottman also clarifies the necessity of the other and one’s uniqueness, 
explaining that: 
It is this sense of being narratable – quite apart from the content of the narration 
itself – and the accompanying sense that others are also narratable selves with 
unique stories, which is essential to the self, and which makes it possible to speak 
of a unique being that is not simply a ‘subject’.71 
In other words, the necessary other invokes a desire to hear one’s story being narrated as a 
confirmation of one’s unique existence. The story is ‘essential to the self’ because it 
produces a sense of self-uniqueness. Moreover, in exposure with the other, the desire is 
mutual and reciprocal. As one recognizes the uniqueness of the other as a narratable being, 
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the same sense of uniqueness is reciprocated. The desire for recognition and uniqueness is 
thus fundamental to the narratable self. This leads Cavarero to conclude that the content of 
the narrative is not as important as the act of narration. What constitutes the self as a 
narratable being is not the text but the narration itself: ‘the narratable self is an exposed 
uniqueness that awaits her narration. The text of this narration, far from producing all the 
reality of the self, is nothing but the marginal consequence, or symptom, that follows that 
desire.’72  
 In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler further develops from the concept of the 
necessary other to illustrate how the subject ‘I’ is constituted in a scene of address where 
they are called upon to account for themselves as an agent to an action. The subject uses 
the narrative form to constitute the self as a causal agency and persuade the other to 
apprehend the agency of the subject as such:  
The narrative must then establish that the self either was or was not the cause of 
that suffering, and so supply a persuasive medium through which to understand the 
causal agency of the self.73  
However, Butler explains that when constructing a persuasive account about oneself, the 
subject inevitably internalizes the existing social norms and conventions that the subject is 
born into. Self-narrative thus always in the middle. As Butler explains, self-narrative 
‘begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make me and my story 
possible in language. I am always recuperating, reconstructing, and I am left to fictionalize 
and fabulate origins I cannot know’.74 Butler’s conclusion thus reflects Ricœur’s argument 
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that one’s life story is either a fictive historical account or a historical fiction. The subject 
is never an end in itself but entangled in various factors and conditions that constitute the 
subject, the conditions that exist before and may even persist after the subject. In any self-
story, the subject ‘I’ always begins in the middle of a larger story and needs to resort to 
fabulation to make sense of things the subject cannot know. In formulating a response to 
the query by the other, the subject is thus given an opportunity to reflect on who they are 
not only in relation to the addressor but also to these various external conditions. In this 
way, the scene of address can be said to constitute the ‘I’ as both a reflexive and relational 
subject.  
 Butler emphasizes that we should suspend judgment to avoid committing ‘ethical 
violence’ against the other who may fail to provide a satisfactory and coherent narrative 
about themselves because there are elements that exceed their ability to account for. 
Accordingly, Butler suggests that ‘in giving the account, I establish a relationship to the 
one to whom my account is addressed and whether both parties to the interlocution are 
sustained and altered by the scene of address.’75 In other words, Butler identifies the 
subject’s ethical responsibility in the transference in which both the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ are 
acting and being acted on in some way in the scene of address. In telling and hearing a 
story, we have an inevitable ethical responsibility for one another because the story is bound 
to have a mutual effect. Understanding that the self is always opaque, in media res, our 
relationality and transference can become a condition of our mutual ethical obligation 
 




based on an acceptance of the state of opacity that may result in the failure to achieve self-
mastery and narrative coherence: 
If violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and unity, 
then nonviolence may well follow from living the persistent challenge to egoic 
mastery that our obligations to others induce and require. […] The purpose here is 
not to celebrate a certain notion of incoherence, but only to point out that our 
“incoherence” establishes the way in which we are constituted in relationality: 
implicated, beholden, derived, sustained by a social world that is beyond us and 
before us.76 
Butler’s argument illustrates the necessity of the other as the condition of our ethics. We 
depend on the other to suspend judgment, accept and forgive our failure to provide a 
coherent and complete account of ourselves.  
 In Look at Me, the desire to hear one’s coherent life story from the other is reflected 
in the relationship between Moose and his niece, Charlotte Hausen, a 16-year-old daughter 
of Charlotte senior’s best friend from Rockford. Moose is once a promising young 
historian, but his rising academic career takes a downturn after he endangers his students 
in a potentially deadly experiment. He is also characterized as obsessed with the history of 
Rockford and a mysterious vision he claims to have discovered many years ago. For 
Moose, these two things can account for how he is constituted as a person he is, why his 
life takes such a turn, and what he can do in the future. That is, Moose is trying to construct 
a coherent narrative about himself, with a clear structure of having a beginning that is tied 
to Rockford history, the vision as a catalyst in the middle, and an ending that will hopefully 
 




tie everything together. Moose’s obsession is thus an attempt to produce a justifiable 
response to what he has done to his life that makes him fail to live up to the potential of a 
promising young man he was once perceived to be. In this way, it is possible to understand 
that the other in Moose’s scene of address is first and foremost the expectation and 
disappointment from his family, colleagues, and himself. These people constitute a band 
of the others who demand a coherent account of what he has done. However, Moose finally 
sees an opportunity to give a satisfying self-account to his niece Charlotte. He sees her as 
the person to pass the vision to. Through his niece, he may have a chance to achieve closure 
and have a narrative about his life that makes sense after all. 
 Moose’s attempt to produce a coherent and unified self-account ultimately fails 
when his niece refuses to accept his vision. Her refusal, moreover, is expressed as a 
rejection of Moose’s personhood. The young Charlotte does not want his vision because, 
as she says to him, ‘I don’t want to be like you.’77 Her negation prompts Moose to rethink 
his own life at an existential level, driving him to retrace the journey that led him to the 
vision many years ago. Moose’s road trip from Rockford to Chicago is a trip where he 
experiences a hallucinatory split between himself and ‘Moose-the-boy’ whom Moose 
conjures up as the other to ask ‘a question he could answer only with the greatest 
expenditure of energy. [...] What had happened to him?’78 The young Moose becomes the 
presence of the other that he has to give an account to. The narrative closure and unity that 
Moose is hoping to have are not in the future but, he realizes, requires that he return to the 
beginning to figure out how he has come to be the person he is. The trip also makes him 
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revisit the vision, what it means, and whether it is not just ‘a metaphor for something within 
Moose. […] That the vision was not the cause of his isolation, as he had always supposed 
but merely an expression of it’.79 Suspecting that the vision is the cause of his isolation 
leads him to realize that he can constitute another kind of subjectivity that is not contingent 
on narrative clarity and continuity.  Instead, it can be predicated on his relationality, the 
trust and belief he can instill in the other, and his ability to affect the other. The awareness 
of his relationality is described in the novel as ‘a tiny silver thread, a thread no bigger than 
a hair whose contents was plain strength, a will that endured within him and had survived 
all these years, albeit slenderly’.80 The thread confers strength, will, and endurance. That 
is, his relationality, implied in the thread that binds him, can give him the strength and 
ability to develop a will and follow through with it. 
When his wife Priscilla comes to pick him up after he experiences a breakdown 
during the road trip to Chicago, the narrator describes that he sees that ‘She was sad, he 
had made her sad. Again’.81 That he knows that this is not the first time he has done this to 
her allows Moose to accept his relational subjectivity and to take responsibility for it. He 
can be strong enough, willful enough, and enduring enough to do good things for others. 
With this acceptance, Moose is able to reconnect with Priscilla with a conviction that he 
will make her happy. Instead of narrative closure, her happiness is a validation of his 
authentic self that is encapsulated in the image of the thread. He promises his wife that he 
would take her to Hawaii because the promise will bind him to her. He will be able to 
refigure himself again as a person who fulfills the promises he makes to others: ‘Moose 
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recognized that in speaking it aloud to Priscilla he would make it real. There would be no 
possibility of retreat.’82 Moreover, on making the promise, the narrator describes that 
Moose sees that ‘faith returned to his wife like a soul reanimating a corpse.’83 The faith 
from the other that he can be the person that he figures himself to be through the act of 
making a promise is the form of new authenticity that Look at Me suggests. Moose 
understands that he can constitute an authentic self through promise-making. In doing so, 
he lets himself be bound to the other, and the bind is ‘that single strand of strength’ for 
him.84 He needs the other’s trust and faith to affirm the person he tries to refigure himself 
to be. At the same time, he knows that it cannot stop there. He is obligated to make good 
on the trust that he inspires, to fulfill the expectation from the other, to be accountable to 
them.  
 Meadow’s subjectivity in Innocents and Others is also constituted in a scene of 
address in which, like Moose, she is called upon to account for her action, to answer to 
what she has done and the person she has become. In Meadow’s case, the address from the 
other demands her accountability as an artist whose arts have a profound and unexpected 
effect on others. In the novel, Meadow is portrayed as an artist whose career as a filmmaker 
has shaped an artistic persona that she tries to cultivate. Her films primarily function as a 
representation of her hardship and sacrifice as a particular kind of artist. For Meadow, the 
actual film is thus subordinate to the creative and inventive process: ‘The making of the 
film as the art, and the film itself as merely an artifact of that artistic act, not the art itself.’85 
With this view, filmmaking becomes a deeply personal affair; it is not for the film's subject 
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or the audience but the filmmaker. As Meadow reflects on her devotion in the filming 
process: ‘But she knew somewhere, that where you arrived wasn’t as important as how you 
got there. If it was hard earned, that mattered.’86 Meadow’s representation in the novel is 
therefore reflective of a modernist artist. Her view on artistic creation also corresponds to 
what Trilling calls the paradox of modern art. According to Trilling, the modernist 
preoccupation with impersonality paradoxically pushes the artist to be more concerned 
with the problems of self and self-awareness which causes their impersonal persona to 
dissolve: 
For all their intention of impersonality, they figure in our minds exactly as persons, 
as personalities, […] asking, each one of them, what his own self is and whether 
or not he is being true to it, drawing us to the emulation of their self-scrutiny.87 
In Trilling’s view, modernism promotes the virtue of authenticity paradoxically through 
the emphasis on the impersonality of the artist. As Kelly’s explanation points out, in the 
modernist paradigm, ‘any demonstrable privileging of a public self […] became associated 
with bad faith or an artificial dishonesty’.88 However, self-exploration nonetheless appears 
to be the key motif of modernist artists. In Meadow’s case, this paradox causes her to be 
previously blind to the fact that her art is ultimately self-serving. She subscribes to the 
doctrine of impersonality and considers her films an expression of artistic invention and 
ingenuity that has nothing to do with her personally. However, even though she is blind to 
the narcissistic agenda, she cannot escape the consequences of her narcissism. The films 
that she makes will inevitably end up causing pain and damage to others.  
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 In the novel, Meadow is finally addressed to account for her action as an artist when 
she receives a call from Jelly who accuses her of being reckless with her power as an artist: 
‘You played me and then when you saw what you had, you put the film out there. […] 
What good did it do? What was it for?’89 Jelly’s question functions as the scene of address 
for Meadow as it prompts her to have to account for her art – ‘what good did it do?’ The 
question sets in motion an attempt to construct an account about her life, which is described 
in the novel as a kind of self-conversion: 
A damascene moment, a conversion. But if she was honest, she saw it was a number 
of moments – significant events, one building on the other. All of them converting her, 
spinning her toward her new life. It wasn’t a downward spiral, although it felt that way 
at the time; it was an inward spiral, a seashell spiral, a spira mirabilis, as if she were 
drawing the events to her, moving her closer to who she really was.90 
In this passage, it is possible to understand Meadow’s conversion experience as a 
reconfiguration of the self through narrative mediation, as ‘a number of moments […] one 
building on another’. Jelly’s accusation prompts Meadow to have to tell a story of who she 
is. The process of narrative mediation is portrayed as an inward movement that moves her 
closer to obtain self-knowledge, to ‘who she really was’.   
 However, the kind of self that Meadow comes to realize from self-reflection turns 
out to be the kind that she describes as destructive: ‘a person who not only didn’t make the 
world better, but a person who made some lives worse.’91 This revelation thus brings 
another damascene moment to Meadow. This time, it involves making amends and figuring 
 
89 Spiotta, p.243. 
90 Ibid., p.241. 




herself as a good person, which entails being good to others. However, in trying to do so, 
Meadow encounters another problem of sincerity: ‘To use another person’s need to make 
you feel as if you are good, even to use another person to remind you of your own luck and 
privilege – this is shameful.’92 The shame Meadow feels about her attempt to do good 
things reflects the impurity of sincerity. Her struggle in the second damascene involves 
guilt because she recognizes her selfish agenda. Eventually, Meadow concludes to herself 
that she does not have to be inherently good. She might not know whether she is a good 
person, but she can do good things for others: ‘How to be good? Maybe she would never 
be a good person. But she could do good things. […] Was it possible to be truly humble? 
No, but she could tread lightly, quietly.’93 Meadow’s realization reflects the model of New 
Sincerity in which the purity of intention may be ambiguous, but it should not deter one 
from trying to be sincerely good. Meadow is content with doing ‘whatever small good she 
could think of’ despite the question of true humility and selflessness in her action. Her new 
sincerity comes from the fact that she does not let the ambiguity of her motivation stop her. 
She could still try to ‘tread lightly’ and find a way to be sincerely good.  
 Meadow’s discovery of the new sincerity circles back to resolve the issue that 
drives her to account for herself in the first place – that is the problem of how to create art 
that is authentic to the artist but also true to the other. This is how the novel puts forward 
the concept of new authenticity that is informed by the model of New Sincerity. In Aaron 
Colton’s reading of the novel, he suggests that Innocents and Others represent the novel 
after authenticity in that it ‘refashion[s] authenticity into an antidote to postmodern culture’ 
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by paradoxically using the forms and techniques of postmodernism.94  The overt self-
reflexivity in Meadow’s art that previously characterizes her work as narcissistic becomes 
the condition of her new authenticity that Colton explains. In the novel’s penultimate 
chapter called ‘Kino-Glaz’, which is a reference to a film theory in the tradition of realism 
that compares cameras to human eyes and regards films as a form of documentation free 
from the artist’s artifice,95 the narrator describes how Meadow has found an inspiration to 
make films in the kino-glaz tradition in which the film is meant ‘to make us feel the infinite, 
find a form to express the infinite’.96 For Meadow, the concept of being infinite is the 
feeling of being part of a larger landscape in which she feels ‘small but also connected’.97 
The film that she imagines making again after she learns to account for herself as an artist 
is the one that will show a person in what she calls the ‘glimpse of the sublime’ or the state 
of being part of the interconnected infinity.98 That is, despite the self-awareness imbued in 
her through postmodern reflexivity, the kino-glaz tradition connotes the kind of self that is 
humble and relational. However, when she finds inspiration to make a kino-glaz film, she 
also realizes that such an attempt is impossible. By definition, a capture of an image either 
by a film camera or a human eye will always be tainted by interpretation and subjective 
consciousness. Meadow thus contemplates to herself about the impossibility but also the 
inspiration to make such a film:  
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Can an image convey something unnameable, impossible, invisible? What is an 
image if not inflected by a consciousness, a noticing? Something quieter and 
simpler: a person with an open face – any person, any face – sitting alone. How 
plain could an image be, how humble? Something to make her refutation or 
resistance give way. She imagined making this film, but also knew and hoped that 
everything would change in the doing. Change her vision, and change her, again.99 
The film that Meadow visualizes suggests a new kind of authenticity in artistic creation 
made possible by the condition of New Sincerity that she discovers earlier in her attempt 
to figure herself as a good person. That is, it is the film that accepts the impossibility of 
what it tries to achieve but still attempts to make it happen with a keen sense of humility. 
As Colton suggests, postmodern reflexivity in Spiotta’s novel is both the condition of 
narcissism and humility. In her new film project, Meadow's humility is figured in the novel 
as something like a new authenticity. Meadow realizes that it is impossible to make a film 
in which her presence as an artist will be eliminated. The film will always represent an 
image that reflects her noticing – her conscious interpretation of the event which she used 
to do through the editing process of her previous films. However, this time, she will 
recognize her part in it instead of making the same mistake with Jelly in thinking that she 
has no power to control the film's narrative. In other words, she is ready to accept 
accountability for her action as an artist. Moreover, she also acknowledges that she will 
also be affected by the process of making this film. It will change her as much as it will 
change others, including the subject and audience of her film. However, this film will be 






implications of her artistic creation and influence as an artist. Meadow’s ending in the novel 
thus suggests that her future career as a filmmaker will require a similar kind of effort that 
she makes in trying to be sincerely good in her life – that is, she will have to ‘tread lightly, 
quietly’. In short, Meadow’s authenticity as an artist will not demand that she becomes an 
impersonal persona but a person who has much at stake in making her art yet willing to let 
all that happen affect her and is ready to account for her creation as an artist.  
Conclusion  
I have demonstrated in this chapter that Look at Me and Innocents and Others use the 
representation of narrative subjectivities to highlight the inadequacy of the ideal of 
authenticity in the practice of the self. I discussed how the novels problematize authenticity 
by emphasizing the inverted model of the self in Look at Me and the use of mediums to 
create and express a narratively figured self in Innocents and Others. I also suggested that 
the novels represented a new kind of authenticity that develops from the model of New 
Sincerity. This mode of authenticity relies on the trust and belief from the other as its 
constitutive condition. It is formulated through one’s relation with and accountability for 
the other. Moreover, I proposed that the new authenticity can be understood through the 
concept of the proposition. To bring my discussion to a close, I will look at the intersection 
between the new authenticity and the concept of the proposition in the novels’ form and 
structure. In other words, I contend that it is possible to characterize Egan’s and Spiotta’s 
novels as a propositional narrative that produces an authentic yet relational meaning 
through their relationality and accountability for the reader.  
 To an extent, the two novels can be characterized as New Sincerity fiction. 




texts are characteristically ambiguous in that there is a reader who is figured as the 
necessary other in the writer’s consciousness. The figure of the reader testifies to the 
inherent impurity of the writer’s intention and motivation in producing the text. However, 
Kelly also explains that ‘the reader is consistently imagined to represent a future beyond 
what the writer can anticipate, and thus to offer the only possible relief from solipsistic 
self-consciousness.’100 That is, the reader may affirm the undecidability of the text in terms 
of the sincerity of intention. Still, they can relieve the burden of ambiguity from the writer. 
The reader can be the one to decide the writer’s sincerity. This leads Kelly to argue that the 
writer-reader relation presupposed in New Sincerity writing is ‘a highly affective 
process’.101 In one instance, he uses Eve Sedgwick’s model of reparative reading as an 
example of such an affective process in which the reader engages with the text’s 
performativity on a personal level – what it does to each individual reader– instead of 
whether it is true. The ‘ethical energy’ of New Sincerity writing derives from the shift from 
epistemology to affect, from the concern about truth to performance.102 This shift makes it 
possible for the reader to relieve the burden of sincerity from the writer. They can use affect 
generated from the reading experience to decide what the text means to them and the extent 
of its sincerity.  
 The emphasis on affect in New Sincerity fiction can be understood more fully in 
Egan and Spiotta’s novels that use the model of New Sincerity as a foundation of the new 
concept of authenticity as a form of proposition and accountability. Affect is mutual and 
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reciprocal. In an affective relation, both parties are bound to affect and be affected by the 
other. This is how both novels develop their concept of authenticity that requires one’s 
ability to attract trust and belief from the other like a proposition and to fulfill the trust they 
inspire with full accountability. The trust that one instigates is affective in that it binds one 
to the other; it affects the subject to follow through with the belief the other has in them as 
much as it affects the other who places trust and faith in the subject. The duality of trust 
and fulfillment in authenticity is most fundamentally grounded in the ‘highly affective 
process’ that Kelly argues to be the foundation of New Sincerity.  
The form and structure of Look at Me and Innocents and Others contain the dual 
function of trust and fulfillment. They ask that the reader trust in the integrity of the novels 
as a unified narrative and proceed to adequately respond to the expectation from the reader. 
The meeting of the two Charlottes in the first chapter in Look at Me functions as a promise 
to the reader. The novel promises that the suggested connection between the two characters 
in the beginning will be followed through. As the story progresses, the reader begins to see 
a link between the two Charlottes. The connection is manifest in the narrative structure that 
alternates between the first-person account of Charlotte senior and the third-person 
narrative that follows Charlotte junior and a few other characters in Rockford. The novel’s 
structure hints at a deeper meaning of the initial meeting between the two characters while 
implicitly indicating the circumstance and possibility of their reunion. The character 
Aziz/Michael West is also revealed to be the same person in Charlotte’s life story and 
emerges as a key connection between the two characters. It is not until the final chapter 
that the two Charlottes meet again on Charlotte senior’s movie set about her life and 




Michael West, whose name is brought up and lingers as a final word of their conversation. 
The reader never knows whether the two Charlottes finally make a connection between 
Michael West in Rockford with Z from New York. His name and identity linger and 
suspend mid-sentence as an unresolved closure to the narrative. Yet, the reader is aware of 
the deeper connection between the two Charlottes in the final chapter. The text from Irene’s 
writing about Charlotte’s life and the third-person narrative of Moose’s road trip intersect 
with Charlotte senior’s first-person narrative narration about the movie set. The 
intersection of various narratives functions as a form of accountability for the reader who 
has been attracted to follow the novel’s alternating narrative structure throughout. Rather 
than conferring a sense of discontinuity, the intertextual element in the final chapter 
provides narrative closure and unity for the reader, fulfilling their expectation even though 
the novel does not offer any closure at the level of content.  
The thread structure of Innocents and Others serves a similar function of being a 
lure that attracts the reader to trust in the novel's integrity as an extended prose form. 
However, unlike Look at Me and the opening meeting of the two Charlottes, it does not 
offer any hint connecting different strands of narratives. Meadow’s 2014 essay that opens 
the novel is immediately followed by Jelly’s telephone conversation with Jack in the 1980s 
without any suggestion about how these characters from different timelines will cross 
paths. It is not until halfway through the novel that the reader learns about Jelly being the 
subject of Meadow’s film. Structuring the story in this way, Spiotta asks the reader to trust 
in the form of the novel, that these stories will somehow come together as a coherent story. 
These narrative strands whose connection is not made clear until near the end become the 




words, the thread structure offers a proposition about the novel. It invites the reader to 
rearrange and reconstruct these textual fragments into a narrative that makes sense. At the 
same time, the reader needs to trust that the novels will fulfill either its obligation as a novel 
form, and the attempt at piecing different narrative strands together will eventually arrive 
at a coherent narrative unity. 
Moreover, similar to Look at Me, the final chapter of Spiotta’s novel also offers a 
version of accountability to the reader. However, instead of providing accountability in 
narrative closure, Spiotta chooses to introduce a whole new character at the ending of the 
novel to reinforce the inherent ambiguity and undecidability of narrative form. The final 
chapter follows Sarah, an inmate who is supposed to be the subject of Meadow’s film 
before the project is aborted due to Sarah’s indifference in her confession. Her 
shamelessness and affectlessness about her crime are reasons that drive Meadow to quit 
her career in making films centered on the theme of confession. Sarah’s blatant and ‘weird 
lack of affect’ kind of confession leaves no room for Meadow to make sense of it as a film. 
Moreover, it becomes an experience that ‘shook Meadow completely.’103  
The feeling that shakes Meadow to the core is attributable to the discovery of the 
limit of narration to make sense and experience the world. Meadow can no longer rely on 
film narrative as a tool to make sense of things after Sarah’s confession, which eventually 
causes her to reassess her career as a filmmaker. In the final chapter, the reader is allowed 
to inhabit Sarah’s consciousness. The reader has a chance to hear the complete version of 
Sarah’s confession about leaving her young daughter to die in a house fire, the confession 
 




that Meadow refuses to listen or to make a film about. The reader also learns that Sarah 
attempts to make sense of her crime before giving up the effort to do so: ‘But then Sarah 
began to strip back the reasons, the story of why she thought she did what she did. Because 
even if it were true, it only served the self that she wanted to discard. She must simply 
contemplate what she did.’104 For Sarah, the confession that makes sense could only serve 
her ego. To be forgiven, she must resist the need to address and account for herself, that 
she simply ‘contemplates’ what she did, accept it, and let go. The novel's final passage 
describes Sarah’s experience of what she calls ‘the Prisoner’s Cinema’, which mirrors 
Meadow’s vision of the new film that can ‘convey something unnameable, impossible, 
invisible.’ Sarah’s Prisoner’s Cinema is a hallucination. It comprises visions of vibrant 
colors and patterns that ‘took her through the limits of who she was and what she had done, 
and for this she felt gratitude, and with this, at last consolation’.105 Her cinema is not a 
traditional narrative of any kind. It does not interpret, nor does it have any meaning. Being 
lost in the hallucination, Sarah transcends her ego. She no longer needs to account for 
herself or what she had done to experience a sense of existence. The ending of Innocents 
and Others thus offers a glimpse of the possibility of an authentic existence that is 
decoupled from the need to narrate and make sense of the self.  
Reflecting the thematic concern about the unattainability of self-authenticity, Look 
at Me and Innocents and Others suggest that the novel's authenticity as a long prose 
narrative also requires a collaboration between the text and the reader to arrive at an 
authentic meaning. To an extent, both novels ask for the reader’s trust in the integrity of its 
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form as a novel, that the use of the alternating or thread structures will nonetheless resolve 
into a unified and coherent narrative. Their endings also attempt to produce a narrative 
closure as a response to the trust from the reader. However, as I discussed above, both 
novels create an ending that imagines the reader as the necessary other. Egan leaves the 
issue between the two Charlottes explicitly unresolved, knowing that the resolution is 
already offered to the reader at the level of form. The reader knows that Michael West and 
Aziz are the same person and a crucial link between both Charlottes. Spiotta ends the novel 
with a short chapter on Sarah Mill as a final thread that the reader could weave into the 
knotted narrative that centers on the issue of self-truth, trust, and confession.  
Nevertheless, the two novels also make a significant claim about the narrative form 
in their ending. Despite the reader's closure upon reaching the end of the novels, a narrative 
cannot be used to completely acquire or make sense of the truth. There will always be an 
excess that escapes narration. Even though she does not disclose any information about 
Charlotte senior’s new identity, the final Afterlife chapter in Look at Me Egan lets the 
reader learn that Charlotte does not entirely abandon the effort to connect with herself by 
calling her old voicemail to hear her voice. Yet, this attempt to reach into herself will not 
be portrayed as a narrative in the afterlife. Sarah in Innocents and Others finally experience 
consolation in the manner that transcends the mechanics of narration. Even though the 
reader is imagined as the necessary other, in the end, there is still knowledge that escapes 
them. In this way, both novels make a final appeal to the reader as a propositional narrative, 
asking that they embrace the novel in all of its possibilities and take from it what they will. 




having to rely on narrative figuration. What the reader will make of such an ending that 





Urban Subjectivities in Colson Whitehead’s The Intuitionist  
and Jonathan Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude 
 
‘Cities may be seen as roiling maelstroms of affect.’ 
— Nigel Thrift, ‘Intensities of Feeling’ 
Describing cities as ‘roiling maelstroms of affect,’ Nigel Thrift suggests that they are not 
only [1]a static and immutable space but also a taking-place of an event. That event is the 
movement of affect that appears to have a wild and volatile nature ofas a ‘roiling 
maelstrom’. The affective movement seems to leave only chaos, confusion, and destruction 
in its wake. While Thrift’s description characterizes the city space as affectively vivacious 
and potentially chaotic, in this chapter, I will explore how affect can also be the source of 
the city’s livelihood[2]. As Thrift explains, affect could be ‘actively engineered with the 
result that it is becoming something more akin to the networks of pipes and cables that are 
of such importance in providing the basic mechanics and root textures of urban life’.1 In 
short, he contends that affect is ‘a vital element of cities’2 that constitutes the city itself. 
I focus on affect in city space to explore its constitutive power and the challenge it 
produces on urban life. The first chapter discussed affect as a framework that describes 
self-authenticity as one’s affective relation and accountability to others. Here I will 
consider affect as a productive force that constitutes the city and subjectivity of urban 
dwellers. At the same time, as Thrift’s description implies, affect is potentially volatile and 
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may complicate the attempt to render both the city and urban subjectivity legible. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I will also explore the intersection between affect and new 
epistemology in the representation of urban life. I choose Colson Whitehead’s The 
Intuitionist (1999) and Jonathan Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude (2003) as the primary 
texts because they rely on tropes of reading and writing to represent urban life as a 
racialized experience. The novels also demonstrate the affective relation between city 
space and urban subjectivities and how both only become legible through an affective mode 
of knowing.  
I will divide the chapter into two parts. First, I will discuss the notion of ‘affective 
literacy’ in The Intuitionist. Whitehead’s novel uses various book tropes and the practice 
of textual signifying in the African-American literary tradition to characterize urban space 
and subjectivities as a type of text that requires affective literacy or the ability to read and 
write texts that produce affective meaning. Then I will discuss an affective mode of reading 
that I term ‘affective gutter’ in Fortress. I invoke the term ‘gutter’ from comic books whose 
structure and tropes heavily influence the novel. While reading comics, the reader has to 
bridge the gutter, or the empty space between panels, to find coherence in the story. 
Affective gutter thus refers to the practice of reading that is comparable to a type of spatial 
navigation that aims to trace and make connections between independent entities. In other 
words, the gutter is a type of virtual space in which meaning is not yet actualized but 
charged with affective potentials that the reader can use to make sense of the panel 
connection.   
 In one respect, I pair the two novels together because they both emphasize race in 




interested in how The Intuitionist and Fortresss consider the problem of legibility of the 
affectively-constituted urban life and how they explore alternative ways to portray and 
make sense of urban experiences. Moreover, I will discuss how affective literacy and 
affective gutter apply to the experience of reading the novels. I hope to demonstrate how 
The Intuitionist and Fortress represent contemporary American hybrid fiction by using 
their forms, genres, and styles to reflect on the affective textual practice that they are 
representing. Similar to how the city space is understood both as a place and a taking-place 
of an event, the textual space of the novels is also a representation and an actualization of 
how meaning may be affectively produced and comprehended. 
Affective Literacy in The Intuitionist 
Affective literacy describes the ability to perceive and gain knowledge about affective 
constitution and relation of different entities. At first glance, the term may appear to be an 
oxymoron. On the one hand, it refers to the theory of affect, which is a materialist mode of 
knowing. On the other hand, the notion of literacy seeks knowledge in textual 
representations. Affect presupposes that the body, or the materiality of things, can form a 
mutually transformative relation with other bodies that it encounters. Each gains 
knowledge about one another from such contact. At the same time, literacy, or the ability 
to read and write, assumes the importance of textual representation in providing knowledge 
about reality. Using the term affective literacy, I intend to emphasize a possible 
convergence of the two modes as a method of knowledge acquisition that Whitehead’s and 
Lethem’s novels suggest as an alternative way to experience and make sense of urban life. 
The difference between materialist and representational views of knowledge is also 




a type of body with affective potentiality. This approach to the city is already established 
in ‘affective urbanism,’ a field of study that focuses on urban space's affective composition 
and characteristics. Ben Anderson and Adam Holden argue that affective urbanism regards 
cities as a body that is ‘made up of multiple, differentiated affects, feelings, and emotions; 
that is, affects as impersonal movements that constitute what a body can do’.3 In this regard, 
affective urbanism echoes Thrift’s remark about affect being the source of cities’ 
livelihood[3]. However, affective urbanism also extends Thrift’s argument by emphasizing 
the materiality of cities. It does not only view the city as a place that affect traverses and 
transforms. Instead, the urban space is itself an affective body that can affect and be 
affected by other bodies with which it interacts. 
In his argument about affective mapping, Jonathan Flatley also describes how one 
relies on the affective potential of space to create a physical and a social map of a place. 
An affective map is a picture that ‘we all carry around with us on which are recorded 
affective values of the various sites and situations that constitute our social worlds’.4 
Describing the process of affective mapping, Flatley also distinguishes it from the typical 
cognitive process used to acquire knowledge about a place. However, he sees that cognitive 
and affective approaches are complementary because they both negotiate ‘the gap’ between 
one’s subjective experience and the external environment, albeit in a different way. 
Cognitive mapping helps one make sense of and move through the world in the present. 
Affective mapping, on the contrary, is concerned with one’s position and belonging in a 
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place over some time; it ‘represents the historicity of one’s affective experience’.5 In other 
words, both affective urbanism and affective mapping propose a way to gain additional 
knowledge about urban space and subjectivities that a traditional mode of knowledge 
acquisition may be unable to deliver. 
 On the contrary, when assuming that there could be a type of literacy used to gain 
knowledge about the city, urban space becomes a type of text. For example, Michel de 
Certeau once describes cities as ‘the most immoderest of human texts’ produced by city 
walkers and only become legible from an elevated vantage point.6 The nexus between cities 
and texts is also central in the study of athe relationship between race and urbanity. In her 
monograph Signs and Cities, Madhu Dubey examines the juxtaposition between print 
literacy and urban modernity. She argues that the proliferation of the book tropes and 
scenes of literacy acquisition in African-American literature testifies to the twinned crises 
of racial representation in printed mediums [4]on the one hand and the problem of urban 
communities that have become increasingly abstract and unknowable on the other[5]. 
Tropes of books, Dubey writes, are ‘perfect vehicles’ for the attempt at[6]to ‘frontally 
tackling the difficulties of imaging racial community within contemporary urban 
conditions’.7 For Dubey, print readership and racial communities are also urban-like 
because they constitute an ‘imagined community’ across space and time.8 Therefore, the 
text-like quality of urban life may be helpful in imagining an alternative to racial 
representation and racial community in the context of modern urbanity. Liam Kennedy also 
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similarly argues about the relation between representation and urbanity, writing that: ‘The 
making of urban space requires critical consideration of the conditions and effects of the 
signifying practices, discourses, and images which give it legible form.’9 For Kennedy, one 
can obtain knowledge about urban space by focusing on ‘the workings of representation in 
the production of space as simultaneously real, symbolic and imaginary’.10  The city 
becomes legible if we pay attention to how it is represented and signifieds. Both Dubey 
and Kennedy foreground textual practices as a means to understand urban conditions. 
Textual signification is applied to urban space and communities, with the assumption that 
they will become comprehensible if approached as a text. 
 However, the view of city space as a type of text does not necessarily contradict the 
notion of the city as a body or the assumption that urban life is an affective, embodied 
experience. As I hope tThe term affective literacy can demonstrate that, the two approaches 
are reconcilable and complementary. As de Certeau also suggests in his description, the 
production of urban texts is directly tied to the bodies of city walkers. [7]‘They walk – an 
elementary form of this experience of the city: they are walkers, Wandersmänner, whose 
bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban “text” they write without being able to read 
it.’11 His description characterizes the body of city walkers as the urban text. If the city 
space is comparable to a text, such text is made up of bodies of walkers. However, de 
Certeau emphasizes that those city walkers cannot read the text they produce because of 
the limit in vantage point. The city appears vast and incomprehensible, like a material 
object separated from those down below. He proceeds to ask whether ‘the immense 
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texturology spread out before one’s eyes [is] anything more than a representation, an 
optical artifact’.12  Through my reading of The Intuitionist, I will argue that the city can be 
considered as both a representation and a material entity. Consequently, the legibility of 
city space relies on both materialist and representational views of the city. In other words, 
the urban text that is made by the day-to-day embodied and lived experience of city 
dwellers requires affective literacy. 
Literacy is a central motif of Whitehead’s debut novel. The story is set sometime 
in the mid-twentieth-century in the post-civil rights era and ‘in a city with an increasing 
vocal colored population’.13 This city remains unnamed throughout the novel. The reader 
only knows that it is ‘not a Southern city, it is not an old money city or a new money city 
but the most famous city in the world’.14 The city is also a mystery to the novel’s 
protagonist, Lila Mae Watson, who moves from the south to begin her career as an elevator 
inspector. She sees the city skyline as ‘a row of broken teeth, an angry serration gnawing 
at the atmosphere’ and wishes that it will look ‘uniform, doubtless, regimented’ from afar.15 
Her wish expresses the desire to tame the untamable beast of racism that Lila Mae’s father 
warns. Just like the city appearing to her like a beast, white people, even in the north, could 
also ‘turn rabid at any second’.16 Although ‘the times are changing’, and that even the city’s 
new municipal building is named after Fanny Briggs, ‘’a slave who taught herself how to 
read,’17 Lila Mae finds that she still has to construct the map of the city according to the 
intensity of affective responses her presence provokes: ‘Lila Mae has pinpointed a spot as 
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the locus of metropolitan disaffection. A zero point.  […] With the zero-point as reference, 
she can predict just how much suspicion, curiosity and anger she will rouse in her cases.’18 
Precisely, her ‘cases’ are that she is an African-American woman in a profession dominated 
by white men. In fact, Lila Mae is the first of her race and gender to become an elevator 
inspector. Therefore, she also finds that, like in the city, her position in the guild is 
‘precarious’. For this reason, she trains herself to keep a low profile in the guild and blend 
into the environment in the city: ‘Her position is precarious everywhere she goes in this 
city, for that matter, but she’s trained dread to keep invisible in its ubiquity, like fire 
hydrants and gum trod into black sidewalk spackle.’19 
 Apart from her race and gender, Lila Mae’s struggle to assimilate in the guild is 
also due to the fact that she is an intuitionist, an elevator inspector who uses Intuitionism 
in hertheir[8] work. Contrary to Empiricism that relies on empirical data, the principle of 
Intuitionism suggests that it is possible to communicate directly with the elevator by 
interpreting sensory information such as vibration and sound. Each inspector has different 
ways to visualize and analyze the intuited data: ‘Everyone has their own set of genies. 
Depends on how your brain works.’20 For Lila Mae, the data appears in geometric forms 
that she can interpret into the health and safety data of the elevator she inspects. For this 
reason, intuitionists like her are sometimes called ‘voodoo inspectors’ or ‘witch doctors’ 
and are the minority group in the guild. Being an African-American woman and an 
intuitionist, Lila Mae is thus ‘three times cursed’ in elevator inspection and in the city.21 
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 The novel opens with the news of a clash of an elevator in the Fanny Briggs 
Memorial building that Lila Mae has recently inspected. She believes that the accident is a 
setup to defame her and discredit Intuitionism. Lila Mae is determined to find the truth 
about the accident. To defend Intuitionism, she also sets out to find the missing blueprint 
of the ‘black box’ or the perfect elevator that James Fulton, the founder of Intuitionism, 
designs after his principle. The black box assumes a mythical status among elevator 
inspectors. If discovered, it is believed to bring the end of Empiricism and the end of 
modern cities as we know it. The black box will transform vertical transportation. Urban 
high-rises and skyscrapers will have to be destroyed and rebuilt according to the new 
elevation technology. Both empiricists and intuitionists rush to find the black box blueprint 
because the first to discover will hold the key to what Fulton calls ‘the city to come’. 
 The indeterminate setting of the novel and the characterization of Lila Mae as an 
anxious yet determined and somewhat successful woman in the city reflects the novel’s 
central themes of literacy, ambiguity, and knowledge acquisition of urban life, especially 
for marginalized subjects. Lila Mae’s anxiety leads her to adopt an alternative method of 
learning and belonging, both for her life in the city and her career. Whitehead employs 
many tropes in African American literature to portray the problems of literacy and 
epistemology not only in Lila Mae’s struggle but throughout the novel. First, he uses the 
trope of passing in the character Fulton, who passes for a white man. Fulton writes the 
Theoretical Elevators, a text that becomes the foundational text of Intuitionism, as a joke 
to undermine the power of vision heralded by his white, empiricist peers. In other words, 
Intuitionism is conceived to project the critical power of racial passing and challenge the 




also present at the level of genre. Elam argues that the novel itself participates in the act of 
passing. It passes for being detective fiction when, in fact, it criticizes the genre’s 
assumption about knowledge. In the case of The Intuitionist, ‘The detective novel’s 
epistemological requirement – that the world can be known – dissolves into science 
fiction’s conceit – that worlds can be imagined.’ Elam then concludes that the genre passing 
of the novel is ‘the call to surrender generic expectations and commitments, to reconsider 
and remake acts of interpretation’.22 
 In addition, Whitehead uses the trope of passing in connection with the trickster 
trope in African-American vernacular culture. Fulton’s passing identity and his writing as 
a joke characterize him as a trickster comparable to the mythical figure Esu. According to 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Esu ‘embodies the ambiguity of figurative language’ and represents 
the interpretative process attuned to Black literary texts’ double-voice quality. 23 Alison 
Russell also suggests that Whitehead is himself a trickster in that he writes the novel with 
so much ambiguity that ‘makes interpretation a problematic enterprise - for readers as well 
as for Lila Mae’.24 However, Russell further argues that the trickster trope and the novel’s 
ambiguity can challenge the primacy of textual authority or factual authenticity in favor of 
‘the felt connection afforded by a story worth telling’.25 Both the passing and trickster 
tropes create ambiguity. The reader must recalibrate their expectations when reading the 
text and pay attention instead to how the story seeks to connect with them by using 
ambiguity to elicit their active interpretation of the text. 
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Racial uplift is another trope in African American literary tradition that Whitehead 
uses to foreground the issues of literacy and knowability. On the one level, it is possible to 
interpret the novel’s emphasis on elevation technology and its role in creating urban space 
as an allegory to racial uplift. However, Linda Selzer argues that Whitehead’s novel reflects 
‘a deeply ambivalent stance toward uplift’ by suggesting that the prescription to uplift 
ideology may limit one’s ability to learn and be part of a community. 26 From the beginning, 
Whitehead portrays Lila Mae’s alienation from other black folks who work in the basement 
garage of the guild building. Her successful uplift makes her aware of herself as a ‘dicty 
college woman’ to colored men underground. Her alienation also makes her internalize 
racist assumptions of whichthat she is also a victim of; she ‘prays she will make it safe past 
them’.27 Lila Mae feels threatened by the presence of other black people who are now 
unlike her. Her uplift, symbolized in the fact that she is working upstairs while they work 
down below, bringsmakes her feel a deep sense of disconnection from the black community 
and drives her to adopt a racist attitude towards other black people. 
The ending of the novel also demonstrates the precarity of uplift ideology. The 
novel ends with Lila Mae’s isolation in a small room where she tries to write the third 
volume of Theoretical Elevators in Fulton’s voice. She believes that she is working 
towards realizing the city to come withto which she truly belongs. Her position at the end 
of the novel, Selzer writes, ‘leaves her increasingly isolated from black community, 
progressively alienated from her own body, and even more in thrall to the seductionve 
attractions of uplift’.28 The ending portrays Lila Mae being cut off from both the outside 
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world and herself to fulfill the uplift prophecy. She disappears from the public and assumes 
another person's voice so that the ‘second elevation’ will finally happen and bring forth the 
new world.  
In a way, an elevator crash in the Fanny Briggs Building is also a critique of the 
uplift ideology that elevation technology symbolizes. However, the novel portrays the 
crash as an extraordinary event in that it is a ‘total freefall’ which is ‘a physical 
impossibility’.29 Accordingly, Lila Mae rejects this conclusion and becomes determined to 
find the cause of the accident. In one regard, her rejection of the freefall can be read as a 
refusal to accept the shortcoming of the uplift ideology for racialized minorities. However, 
the novel later reveals that the accident is indeed a total freefall, thus calling into question 
everything Lila Mae has learned or believed. In the novel, Lila Mae discovers the truth 
about the freefall at the same time that she finds out about Fulton’s passing identity. This 
knowledge drives her to develop a new literacy to decipher Fulton’s text about Intuitionism 
and change her perception about the city and her own racial subjectivity.  
Several analyses of the novel connect the elevator freefall and the discovery of 
Fulton’s passing identity with an opportunity to develop a new literacy. Lauren Berlant’s 
analysis of the novel’s representation of the historical present is an example that 
demonstrates how the elevator crash encapsulates a moment of crisis as ‘the phenomenon 
of affective disruption’.30 Such a moment provides an opportunity to perceive the historical 
present, or the happening of a historical event as a collectively felt experience in the present 
that has not yet been transformed into knowledge. Apart from portraying the historical 
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present through the crisis such as the elevator crash, Berlant also argues that The Intuitionist 
tracks ‘the building of an intuitive sense of the historical present in scenes of ongoing 
trauma or crisis ordinariness’.31 Lila Mae’s anxiety about her ‘precarious’ position in the 
city and in her career renders her ordinary life an ongoing traumatic experience that Berlant 
describes. Being embedded in the historical present, Lila Mae struggles to make sense of 
her place and the space she inhabits. Her use of the zero point to map the city is an example 
of how she turns to affective sensorium to obtain knowledge about city space. In other 
words, Berlant’s suggestion that the historical present is an affective moment is also 
manifest in the novel as the need to find an affective mode of knowing to comprehend it.  
In Spencer Morrison’s argument, the elevator crash characterizes The Intuitionist 
as a novel in the tradition of infrastructuralism that examines the connection between 
infrastructure and political power. He argues that the elevator accident makes it possible to 
perceive a new vision about how infrastructure can be designed to reflect a more inclusive 
and embodied version of political agency. ‘Amid what the novel portrays as a city of failing 
infrastructure, tropes of elevator ruin enable reimagined political configurations wroth 
through sensory recalibrations.’32 Spencer thus follows in the same trope by interpreting 
the accident as an opportunity to reinvent or reimagine an alternative mode of sensing the 
world. Mitchum Huehls also similarly suggests that the supposed impossibility of the total 
freefall makes ‘characters and readers alike struggle to determine the meaningful 
significance of these things, but, in each case, the things refuse to participate in the 
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symbolic exchange of representation and figuration’.33 Lila Mae cannot help but interpret 
the fall as an attempt to sabotage her reputation and Intuitionism because she subscribes to 
the traditional mode of signification. According to Huehls, she is compelled to factor race 
into her rationale, thinking that it must signify something. ‘Lila Mae can’t read what she 
doesn’t already know how to read, and yet the world is filled with objects, like falling 
elevators, that are illegible and opaque to representation.’34 However, while it might be 
appealing to assume that the novel favors Intuitionism to Empiricism as a mode of 
knowledge acquisition that is not dependent on rationality and representation, the total 
freefall of the elevator demands a third option, a completely new mode of literacy that falls 
in-between. As Huehls also writes, there is a limitation in both approaches: ‘Intuitionism, 
as much as Empiricism, merely tells us what we already think we know.’35 The limitation 
is the subject themselves. Lila Mae cannot read what she does not already know how to 
read. For this reason, she can never predict the free fall. No mode of reading can account 
for such an accident. 
Thus, the novel suggests that the new literacy has to go beyond the limit of 
rationality or even affectivity. N. Katherine Hayles writes that errors such as the elevator 
freefall ‘tear open a rip in the temporal fabric of the historical present, through which a 
better and more utopian future may be glimpsed’.36 For Hayles, the error enables an 
alternative mode of imagining a utopian possibility that would have been beyond the 
wildest dream. Hayles’ reading also extends from Ramón Saldívar’s analysis of the novel’s 
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postrace aesthetic. In his argument, postrace aesthetics uses the framework of speculative 
realism to imagine the possibility of a postracial world. Saldívar explains that speculative 
realism is ‘a critical realism that would posit the knowability of phenomena […] to 
construct the possibility of a weird kind of realism that posits the speculative possibility 
that we may be able to imagine the conditions under which the thing in itself and its 
phenomenal form might coincide.’37 When the framework of speculative realism is used in 
literary aesthetics that imagines the postrace phenomenon, it becomes ‘a symbolic way’ 
that hybridizes the reality of racial politics with ‘the heart’s fantastic aspirations’ for social 
and racial justice.38 That is, while postrace may not be real, it nonetheless functions like a 
total freefall that enables one to imagine one’sthe wildest dream.  
 Pilar Martinez Benedi suggests that the convergence of race and speculative realism 
in imagining a new mode of cognition that Hayles and Saldívar’s arguments put 
forthsuggest might find its affinity with the condition of neuro diversity that enables us to 
‘recognize how much “nonhumanness” the human incorporates’.39 While Huehls writes 
that both Intuitionism and Empiricism fail to adopt a non-anthropological viewpoint, 
Benedi’s neuro-diversity reading suggests that Intuitionism may be comparable to a form 
of neuro diversity. It is ‘an atypical cognitive style’ that allows both Lila Mae and the 
reader to visualize a materialist approach to gaining knowledge, one ‘that relies on a 
different dynamics[9] of communication: direct, unmediated […], horizontal’.40 In other 
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words, Benedi’s analysis extends from the previous arguments about new literacy. While 
she may allude to the theory of affect in her reading of Intuitionism as a non-
representational mode of thinking, she does not completely abandon cognitive function. 
Instead, she makes room for a third possible alternative such as neuro-diversity in her 
interpretation. I also follow this path in examining affective literacy in the novel. I suggest 
that the new affective literacy is still rooted in the textual and signifying tradition. I contend 
that Whitehead returns to the tropes of the book in African-American literary tradition and 
adopts the practice of ‘signifyin’ to imagine a new literacy that is affective yet deeply 
connected to textual conventions. 
 According to Gates, ‘signifyin(g)’ is a form of ‘repetition and revision, or repetition 
with a signal difference’ that is foundational of Black vernacular culture. 41  The practice is 
highly reflexive of its history and tradition yet suggestive of new possibilities and changes. 
In The Intuitionist, Whitehead uses signifyin’ tropes such as the Talking Book or the double 
voice in the signifyin (g) tradition to encourage the use of affective literacy for both the 
protagonist Lila Mae and the reader of his novel. From the first page, the novel portrays 
how literacy, or the ability to read, write and decipher texts, is significant to Lila Mae’s 
subject formation. She is introduced in the opening scene while decoding previous 
inspectors’ initials in an inspection record. The elevator that she lasts inspects is also named 
after Fanny Briggs, a slave who becomes famous for her self-taught literacy. Later, the 
reader learns that Lila Mae becomes an elevator inspector and an intuitionist through 
engagement with texts. She first discovers elevatordiscovers the elevator technology by 
learning to read a text about elevators with her father. Then at the Institute for Vertical 
 




Transport, where she receives her formal training, Lila Mae discovers James Fulton’s 
Theoretical Elevators. Her reading of his work then converts her to Intuitionism.  
 However, the scenes of literacy in the novel are represented as a visceral or spiritual 
moment. When Lila Mae first listens to Fanny Briggs’s story on the radio, the narrator 
describes her in a state of heightened sensitivity. She is sitting on her mother’s lap, leaning 
towards ‘the brown mesh of the radio speaker,’ and feeling the actress’s voice as ‘iron and 
strong’. What Lila Mae hears from the speaker is not only Fanny Briggs’s story but also 
the quality of the sound as ‘tiny particles of darkness pressed beyond the cracked, wheaty 
mesh of the speaker’.42 In the scene in which she learns to read with her father, she also sits 
on his lap and feels ‘the words in his chest against her back’.43 Not only that Lila Mae not 
only experiences literacy through an intimate relationship with her parents, but she also 
perceives the language as something visceral that can either be pressed through the speaker 
or felt in the chest of another human being. Moreover, when her father teaches her how to 
read, Lila Mae learns from distinguishing the text’s physical quality, such as its position. 
She notices the ‘white space’ as a signal of the end of the word before she comes to 
associate those words with any meaning. While Whitehead invokes the trope of literacy 
commonly found in the African-American literary tradition, he only does so signifyingly 
by suggesting that literacy can be learned affectively through attention to the physical and 
visceral quality of the language.  
Apart from suggesting that literacy is tied to an affective experience, the novel also 
adds further complication by presenting texts in a broken and fragmented form to 
 
42 Whitehead, p. 12. 




emphasize their physical quality. The two texts responsible for Lila Mae’s career as an 
elevator inspector are presented in fragments. The letters in the text that she reads with her 
father are far apart, scattering around and not grouped together. The fragmented quality 
leads her to invent a new method of reading for herself. In her attempt to make sense of the 
text, she decides that ‘starting one place was the same as starting any other place.’44 She 
then begins reading by connecting words she knows in random order. Excerpts from 
Fulton’s Theoretical Elevators are also inserted in the novel as textual fragments that 
scatter and interrupt the main narrative throughout. Its fragmentation also echoes how 
Fulton’s text is also a mystery to people in the story-world, including Lila Mae. Presented 
as disconnected fragments, this fictional writing requires active input from the reader of 
the novel in the same way that Lila Mae and other characters struggle to make sense of the 
text. Both the reader and the characters need to find a starting point and put the text together 
in a meaningful order. 
The use of textual fragmentation in the novel reflects its motif of affective literacy. 
On the one level, the novel suggests that intuition is, to an extent, a form of affective 
literacy. To intuit is to interpret the information by using one’s personal instinct instead of 
objective reasoning. The fragmentation of text turns the act of reading into the practice of 
intuiting textual meanings. Since the text is scattered and incomplete, the reader has to 
guess and fill in the missing gap to make sense of the message. Moreover, the working of 
intuition and textual interpretation is also presented in the novel as an entry into the world 
of affective entities. For example, an intuitionist elevator inspector communicates with the 
elevator as an object that exists and operates outside the realm of human’s understanding 
 




and reasoning. From the perspective of intuitionism, the elevator is simultaneously a 
passive technological object and a communicating subject capable of connecting and 
conversing with humans. The fragmented text reveals the similarity between the text and 
the elevator from the intuitionist point of view. Broken texts become an almost passive 
body that cannot properly signify. Yet, they retain an ability to produce meaning by 
forming an affective relationship with the reader. Moreover, textual fragments also reaffirm 
the notion that textual meaning is not fixed, definite, or conclusive. Instead, it relies heavily 
on the act of reading and interpreting from the reader. At the same time, the meaning can 
differ according to the personal circumstances of each reader. Therefore, a piece of text, 
either whole or fragmented, will always have numerous and various versions of 
interpretation.  
Moreover, the trope of broken text is a binding motif that drives the novel’s plot. 
Fulton’s writing about the Black Box and the unfinished manuscript of the third volume of 
Theoretical Elevators are broken into fragments. In a way, Lila Mae’s detective-like 
mission partly entails the need to track down and piece his broken text together. As athe 
novel that passes for being a detective story, Intuitionist uses the broken text functions as 
a bait that promises true knowledge when discovered in whole. However, even though Lila 
Mae finally finds all of his lost writing, she also learns of Fulton’s identity. With this 
knowledge, she contends that she needs to learn to read his text in a new way by factoring 
in the significance of race in her interpretation. Although she possesses both his writing in 
whole and the knowledge about his identity, it only leads to more mysteries and 
ambiguities. At this point, it appears that the novel questions the possibility that complete 




manuscript, claiming that ‘she’s just filling in the interstitial parts that Fulton didn’t have 
time to finish up. […] They just need a little something to make them hang together. 
Seamlessly’.45 With this ending, the question of textual ambiguity is exacerbated by the 
problem of textual authenticity. Not only that the text is ambiguous, but it also might not 
even be authentic. However, as Lila Mae sees it, her writing of the text is not that different 
from her reading of it – she is filling in the missing gap that will bind broken texts into a 
seamlessly coherent story. Therefore, the questions of ambiguity and authenticity seem to 
be trumped by the importance of comprehensibility that will grant what Russell describes 
as ‘the felt connection afforded by a story worth telling’.46 
Not only isthat the broken text is present in the novel’s structure as textual intrusion 
and in the novel’s theme about textual authenticity and ambiguity, but Whitehead also 
constructs a narrative that is essentially broken. He uses free indirect speech to disrupt the 
continuity of the story. The third-person narrator constantly interrupts their narration by 
offering a counterargument about Lila Mae. For example, the narrator describes that ‘[Lila 
Mae] has never thought of herself as an imposing person (that’s how little self-perception 
she has)’.47 The observation of Lila Mae’s lack of self-awareness, which the narrator 
repeats throughout the novel, complements the novel’s theme about knowledge acquisition. 
However, the free indirect speech also undermines the ability of the novel to tell a complete 
and coherent story. The narrator’s intrusion suggests that some information is blind to Lila 
Mae and even to the reader had the narrator not intruded and offered it to the reader. 
Moreover, the free indirect speech adds more ambiguity and confusion in that it is 
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impossible to determine the reliability of the narrator and their input. Thus, the novel 
becomes a broken text at the levels of structure and theme and its form as a prose narrative.  
The use of fragmented texts also makes The Intuitionist part of the African-
American literary tradition. The free indirect speech, for example, is part of the trope of 
the ‘Speakerly Text’ that, according to Gates, manipulates narrative voices to represent the 
double-voiced characteristic of black vernacular tradition that uses written texts as a 
medium for black voice.48 The play with rhetorical strategies and language use in black 
texts that render them ambiguous and highly interpretative is the reason Gates uses the 
trickster figure to develop a theory of criticism for African American literature. At the heart 
of Gates’s theory is the practice of textual signification. The double-voiced, the Speakerly 
Text, or the Talking Book all point to how a piece of text can ‘signify’ by repeating and 
revising previous traditions. In this way, it is possible to understand Whitehead’s novel as 
a fragmented text by examining its participation in the signifying practice. The Intuitionist 
signifies with other black texts by using tropes such as passing and social uplift. The novel 
itself is a composite of different genres and traditions. The most obvious example is Lila 
Mae’s investigation of the elevator accident that turns the novel into a detective story. 
However, when considering Fulton’s writing about Intuitionism and the perfect elevator, 
the influence from the utopia genre and Afrofuturism becomes discernible. 
Moreover, as Sandra Liggins argues, the description of the urban environment and 
the spectral presence of Fulton also gives the novel a gothic tone that aims ‘to terrify, to 
reflect the threats and anxiety that individuals and societies often confront’.49 The passing 
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identity of Fulton, Lila Mae’s northward migration, and their penetration into the world of 
white people through the means of reading and writing, also recalls the tropes of the great 
migration and racial uplift in earlier slave narratives. The signification to various genres 
and traditions essentially makes The Intuitionist a pastiche of different styles of writing. 
The novel is a composite of generic fragments without its own core identity. Accordingly, 
the novel itself is indeterminate and fragmented as the broken text intrinsic in its content 
and form.   
However, the novel’s participation in the ‘signifyin(g)’ tradition also makes the 
novel’s concept of affective literacy rooted in the textual tradition. As I previously 
discussed, many readings of the novel suggest that Whitehead seeks to introduce a new 
mode of affective epistemoglogy through the freefall accident. To an extent, the use of the 
broken text suggests an affective mode of reading and writing, in which the missing gaps 
need to be intuited and filled in. Yet, as Huehls argues, Whitehead is as critical of the 
affective practice of intuitionism as empiricism. The novel’s signifying relation with other 
African American tropes and how Whitehead is himself a trickster in the way he plays with 
genre conventions suggest that he seeks to find a middle ground on which textual 
signification and affective epistemology may converge. The attempt to find a middle 
ground is ultimately part of the signifying tradition. It is reflected in the figure of Esu in 
Gates’s argument. Esu, the trickster God, embodies multiplicity, fluidity, and 
indeterminacy. As Gates asserts, ‘Esu, in other words, represents power in terms of the 
agency of the will. But his ultimate power, of which even the will is a derivative, is the 




himself ad infinitum figure the plurality of meanings.’50 Affective literacy is itself a 
trickster method. It is fluid and ambiguous, neither affective nor cognitive. This method, 
in Gates’s words, ‘puts everything up for grabs’.51 Just like the signifyin (g) practice, 
affective literacy also embraces everything that may factor in the process of meaning 
production. To signify, it requires that one recognizes texts, in Gates’s word, ‘on its own 
terms, formal terms, beyond its surface or literal, thematic “meaning” of their own’.52 In a 
way, affective literacy is a method that is best suited to discern the signifying process in 
the text because it is open to all possibilities. Gates’s theory of signification also proposes 
that the reader is as open-minded in their encounter with the text. Gates further explains in 
detail the process of meaning production: 
The text, in other words, is not fixed in any determinate sense; in one sense, it 
consists of the dynamic and indeterminate relationship between truth on one hand 
and understanding on the other. […] The relationship between truth and 
understanding yields our sense of meaning.53 
Gates’s remark above reveals that textual meaning comes from a corroboration between 
texts and the reader. Textual meaning is a combination of the text’s ‘message’ and the 
reader’s ‘understanding’. How the understanding yields the meaning to the text surpasses 
the boundary between affect and cognition, materiality and representation. In this 
collaboration, the reader needs affective literacy, the ability to read, write, and feel the text.  
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In a way, affective literacy is akin to the concept of the textual ecological system 
in Rachel Greenwald Smith’s argument that the text and the reader are equal members in 
the ecosystem of meaning production. Smith invokes the term ecological to express the co-
presence of human and nonhuman entities in the system in which humans are situated.54 
Likewise, even in the realm of textual representation, the material reality of the text exists, 
and thus it requires more than just literacy to make sense of it. Whitehead’s emphasis on 
textual fragmentation and indeterminacy testifies to the need for a mode of affective 
literacy that can account for all the elements present in the ecosystem. Moreover, when the 
notion of the ecosystem is applied in the tradition of black signifying, it becomes clear how 
such a method is adopted to express black culture. Blackness exists in an ecological system 
with other things that come before. It is established through the connection with the 
ancestors or what comes before. The production of black art, as Toni Morrison explains, is 
essentially a ‘continuum’ with other Black or African-American art. As the practice of 
signifyin(g) implies, all traditions are interconnected and speaking to one another as 
repetition or revision, or in Gates’s term, in the ‘chain of black signifiers’.55  
Therefore, the practice of signifying is a communal activity and an 
acknowledgment that nothing exists or becomes meaningful in isolation. Everything works 
together as a connected part in a network, an ecological system, or a community. 
Community is an essential part of black identity, and it comes to define ‘blackness’ in art. 
Whitehead participates in this tradition by imagining affective literacy as a communal 
method of meaning production. He advocates for the communal aspect of the reading and 
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writing process that considers both affective and representational aspects of a text. To 
achieve this, Whitehead emphasizes on textual indeterminacy through the use of the trope 
of fragmented texts. Affective literacy in the novel requires the vision of the ‘village’ that 
Morrison refers to in her essay about rootedness and the black community. It takes more 
than one person or one aspect to make sense of things. Whitehead uses Lila Mae’s many 
shortcomings to reflect on the failure to do adopt the village value and her ignorance of the 
significance of collective action. His criticism of uplift also recalls Morrison’s warning of 
the danger in being self-reliant and possessing no consciousness of historical connection. 
In Morrison’s argument, she essentially links the village value to textual practices and 
declares that ‘The point of the books is that it is our job. […] If anything I do, in the way 
of writing novels (or whatever I write) isn’t about the village or the community or about 
you, then it is not about anything.’56 The community behind the production of a book is 
then the working of a network of people and things – a network in which texts and readers 
need to collaborate to make a piece of writing meaningful. When Morrison asserts that her 
writing will not be about anything if it is not about the reader or ‘you’, she gives her reader 
the authority to impart meaning into her writing, personalize and contextualize it according 
to their understanding and experience of the text. As Whitehead also demonstrates in The 
Intuitionist, texts are neither a signifier nor a signified but a hybrid of both – they are 
representational and affective, and it takes a village to come together to make them 
meaningful. 
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Apart from the use of textual fragmentation and the adoption of the signifyin(g) 
practice, the novel also centralizes Lila Mae’s adjustment to the city as a circumstance that 
demands affective literacy. The city in the novel is an object of mystery to both the reader 
and Lila Mae. For the reader, the city setting of the novel is highly ambiguous. There is no 
information about its name or location or even when the story takes place. The reader has 
to guess from the clues, such as references to popular culture and technologies. The 
ambiguity surrounding the city’s identity suggests the ontological turn in the novel’s 
treatment of the city. The city, in its indeterminacy, becomes a ‘thing.’ Without the reader’s 
imaginative interpretation, the city remains a ‘thing-in-itself’ that does not necessarily 
produce any specific meaning or value. Only when the reader actively applies their 
knowledge about American culture and New York City that Whitehead’s fictional city has 
an identity and becomes meaningful. In this case, I use the term ‘thing’ after Bill Brown’s 
understanding of the term as ‘a word that tends, […] to hover over the threshold between 
the nameable and unnameable, the figurable and unfigurable, the identifiable and 
unidentifiable’.57 The act of ‘hovering over the threshold’ in Brown’s definition 
corresponds to my observation that the city in The Intuitionist exists as a threshold of the 
subject and object that requires affective literacy to comprehendmake sense of. Whitehead 
only writes that the story happens in ‘the most famous city in the world’. Described as 
such, the city functions as both a subject that is meaningful and legible (as the most famous 
city in the world) and as an object whose legibility is entirely dependent on the reader 
(whose imagination and interpretation will determine what should be the most famous city 
 




in the world). The duality makes it possible for the city to be simultaneously nameable and 
unnameable, figurable and unfigurable, identifiable and unidentifiable.  
 A similar process of collaboration that grants meaning to the city also happens in 
the relation between Lila Mae and the city space. Not long after she first arrives in the city, 
the narrator describes that Lila Mae sittingsits in her room brooding over the subway map 
that she has to decode. She finds that the subway system is inferior to vertical transportation 
and ‘aesthetically weak, not to mention just plain atavistic, this horizontal maundering 
about.’58 In this scene, when she reads the map in the confines of her room, Lila Mae makes 
two mistakes. First, she thinks that it is possible to read and understand city space without 
first-hand experience. No matter how much she tries to decipher the subway map, she is 
still doing it by sitting at home instead of going out and using the subway. Secondly, Lila 
Mae approaches the city space with a bias against one of the most efficient ways to 
comprehend the city – by becoming a city walker. As de Certeau suggests, walking in the 
city, or the atavistic ‘horizontal maundering about,’ produces the urban space itself: ‘the 
act of walking is to the urban system what the speech act is to language or to the statements 
uttered’.59 Walking produces the space that the walkers traverse. ‘It is a spatial acting-out 
of the place,’60 de Certeau further explains. Lila Mae’s refusal to leave her oom and walk 
around the city does not only prevent her from not only learning about the space, but the 
city also ceases to exist as a meaningful object without Lila Mae’s active participation as a 
city walker. Moreover, de Certeau also argues that, the walker’s subjectivity is constituted 
‘in relation to his position, both a near and a far, a here and a there’ (emphasis in original).61 
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Therefore, Lila Mae’s urban subjectivity can only be constructed as she walks and produces 
the city space. Her failure to fully know the city and become the city girl results from her 
insistence on treating the city as a signifying and decodable text that exists and can be 
known prior to her contribution as an inhabitant of the city. This explains why Lila Mae is 
often frustrated by the city’s illegibility and why she sees it as a wild and untamable beast 
that she wishes she could control.  
 However, Lila Mae fails to recognize that she has already been taming the beast 
whenever she walks in the city. That is, she is actively constructing a legible and accessible 
city space for herself. The zero-point map is an example of how she can make the urban 
space legible by encountering it firsthand. Lila Mae’s accumulative experiences from 
walking in the city allow her to locate the most lively and bustling point. Moreover, the 
zero point helps her map the city according to how her race and gender affect other people 
and vice versa. It becomes a reference in which her racialized and gendered body is least 
affective, and in whichthat she is least affected by how other people perceive her. 
Therefore, upon walking the streets of the city, Lila Mae does not only remap the city space 
according to her personal affective experience; she also has her subjectivity constituted 
according to her race and gender.. 
 Yet, despite her attempt to map the city and make it known to her, there are also 
several instances in the novel where the city refuses to be known. The most telling example 
is when the city appears to be multiplying. To Lila Mae, the city is constantly shifting 






race of its dwellers (there is a hidden ‘colored city’63 buried deep underneath the city 
surface). Lila Mae finds that there always seems to be ‘a secret scofflaw city within the 
known city,’64 which leads her to perceive it as ‘an endless city’.65 In one respect, the city 
can multiply into endless variations because of the movement of affect in the city, which 
transforms it into a relational entity in Bruno Latour’s argument about ‘relational 
ontology’.66 As a relational-ontological space, the city is made up of a ‘plurality of 
relations’ that has no essences but ‘attains meaning through its numerous – and changeable 
– relations to other entities’.67 Lila Mae’s zero-point is an example of this relation. The city 
changes according to its affective relation to Lila Mae. The city is endless because it is not 
simply defined and restricted by its built environment. It evolves and expands along with 
its associations with other human and non-human entities.  
In his collection of essays, The Colossus of New York, Whitehead also describes 
New York City’s multiplication along with the people that live in it: ‘There are eight 
million naked cities in this naked city – they dispute and disagree. The New York City you 
live in is not my New York City; how could it be? This place multiplies when you’re not 
looking.’68 The nakedness of New York City testifies to the notion of the non-essential, 
relational city in the ontological sense. Whitehead also invokes the concept of the city’s 
nakedness in The Intuitionist by stripping the city of any specific details and inviting the 
reader to give meanings and significance to an otherwise indeterminate city. The reader’s 
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attempt to make sense of the city thus parallels Lila Mae’s struggle to tame and map the 
city that manifests itself to her endlessly. 
There is another city in The Intuitionist that seems even more ambiguous for both 
the reader and the characters in the novel. It is the ‘city to come’ in Fulton’s writing. The 
meaning of this city, which does not exist and may not even come to exist in a built form, 
lies exclusively in the collaborative relationship between the text and the reader. The city 
to come only exists in the reader’s interpretation of the text. In the novel, this city is once 
interpreted as the new kind of city enabled by the black box or the new elevation 
technology. However, after Lila Mae discovers the truth about Fulton’s passing identity, 
she comes to interpret the city to come in a racial sense. It is now a utopian dream and a 
metaphor about the improved situation of the oppressed race that will be uplifted in this 
new city. In other words, the city in Fulton’s writing only transmits meaning to the people 
who have read about it and imagined its possibility.  
The city to come also demonstrates how Whitehead uses the convention of 
Afrofuturism to connect racial experience with affective literacy. Fulton’s Theoretical 
Elevators expresses a vision of the future of African-Americans in the new city enabled by 
the new elevation technology. It is essentially an Afrofuturistic text; it imagines a new city 
enabled by the technology invented by African Americans to and will be inhabited by 
African Americans who will be uplifted both in the literal and metaphorical sense. 
Considering Afrofuturism as a form of black resistance, Ytasha L. Womack asserts that:  
imagination, hope and the expectation for transformative change is a through line 
that undergirds most Afrofuturistic art, literature, music, and criticism. It is the 




some create their way of life. It’s a view of the world. Where there is no vision, 
the people perish.69  
Fulton’s writing about the city is afrofuturistic because he emphasizes the importance of 
hope, imagination, and vision. To demonstrate the relationship between the city and racial 
experience through the genre of Afrofuturism, Whitehead needs to portray the city in its 
ambiguous relationality to acknowledge the equal significance of both the material and the 
imaginary city in the urban experience of African Americans.  
The indeterminacy of the city testifies to the need for affective literacy to make 
sense of things. Moreover, aAs Sean Grattan argues, Lila Mae’s solitude and affective 
relationship with the city has a utopian potential in suggesting a new form of collective 
experience not only with other humans but with other things. With reference to Jane 
Bennett’s argument about the affective potential of things in Vibrant Matter, he also writes 
that the city to come ‘is a utopia that allows for a more capacious understanding of what 
kinds of bodies vibrantly matter’.70 The city’s ambiguity presents an opportunity for a new 
community in which humans and things co-exist. That is, to echo Smith’s argument, the 
ambiguous city represents an ecosystem in which all entities need to be embraced to find 
its compressibility. Moreover, the indeterminate city is also one of the elements that make 
the novel as a whole a pastiche of fragmented and ambiguous elements, a hybrid that lacks 
meaning when torn apart. Not only the city but the novel itself is ambiguous and impossible 
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to be categorized. Essentially, Whitehead writes a trickster novel, a shapeshifter in genres, 
forms, and contents. The novel’s ambiguity resists the division of texts and things, humans 
and nonhumans, and asks that affective literacy is adopted. Most importantly, with 
affective literacy, the novel also asks that the reader become a trickster themselves and play 
with all the possibilities that the novel has to offer. 
Affective Gutter in The Fortress of Solitude 
Lethem’s 2003 novel has many connections with comic books. The title itself is a direct 
reference to Superman’s secret sanctuary. The protagonist, Dylan Ebdus, is also a comic 
book fan. Growing up, Dylan uses comics to fill the void left by his absent mother, Rachel, 
who also introduces comic books to him. Moreover, Lethem uses magical realism to 
incorporate comic book elements in the story, such as a magical ring that grants superhero 
power to fly or become invisible. Lethem also uses the superhero trope to explore the 
possibility of postracial identities. Dylan, the only ‘white boy’ on his street, finds and 
shares the ring’s secret with Mingus Rude, his mixed-race friend,, and neighbor. Together 
they use the ring to create a superhero persona, Aeroman, that becomes a shared identity 
between the two boys with different racial backgrounds. David Coughlan writes that 
Lethem uses comic books both literally and figuratively as a medium that forms unlikely 
relationships: ‘Comics seem to offer a world without a discriminating gender or racial bias, 
providing grounds for a more egalitarian community.’71 The friendship between Dylan and 
Mingus is also formed through comic books. Mingus will read comics with Dylan to 
distract him from the absence of his mother. They have a system in which New comics 
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arrived at newsstands on Tuesdays. Mingus Rude would have an armload, bought or 
stolen’. Twice a week they will read comics together, ‘shoulders hunched to protect the 
flimsy covers from the wind, puzzling out the last dram, the last square inch of information, 
the credits, the letters page, the copyright, the Sea-Monkeys ads, the insult that made a man 
out of Mac’.72 Comics become a fortress for the two boys. It has its system, secrets, rituals, 
and a whole new universe to explore. 
Coughlan’s reading of Fortress also points out that Lethem incorporates the comic 
book systems such as the gutter and panel relations and its serial nature into the form and 
structure of his novel. He argues that Lethem uses serialization and panel relations in 
comics to ‘warn[s] against absolute repetition’ that threatens to abolish the possibility of 
sequential growth and development.73 Exact repetition, Couglan explains, ‘rejects the 
meaningful spacings, differences, repetitions, and deferrals which define not only comics 
as a medium but, as Lethem describes, characterize and are the condition for social and 
personal relations’.74 My discussion will extend from Coughlan’s argument by further 
examining the novel’s use of the gutter, or the space between panels in comics, to imagine 
an affective mode of experiencing and gaining knowledge about the world. Here I use the 
term ‘affective gutter’ to describe the ability to track the affective movement, navigate, 
connect, and interpret fragmented and ambiguous elements into a comprehensive 
understanding of the world. According to Scott McCloud, the gutter in comic books relies 
on the reader’s ability to infer wholeness from parts and achieve ‘closure’. Closure, 
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McCloud explains, is the ‘phenomenon of observing the part but perceiving the whole’.75 
Without the reader’s ability to find closure, comics, with their fragmented structure, will 
struggle to achieve cohesion and comprehensibility. Accordingly, McCloud concludes that 
comics is a collaborative medium ‘where the audience is a willing and conscious 
collaborator and closure is the agent of change, time and motion.’76  
My reading of Fortress will argue that affect plays a vital part in an attempt to 
achieve closure and find meaningful sequences and connections among panels. The gutter 
is comparable to the virtual space in Brian Massumi’s argument about affect and 
movement. Like a virtual space as ‘the seeping edge’ between the potential and the actual,77 
the gutter is full of possibilities awaiting transformation into the realm of the actual through 
the reader’s ability to bridge the gap. Thierry Groensteen’s analysis of the gutter and panel 
relations in comics also reflects the virtual quality of the gutter. According to Groensteen, 
the gutter is ‘a forced virtual’ or ‘the interior screen on which every reader projects the 
missing image (or images)’.78 The gutter is not an empty space. It is filled with potentialities 
that the previous sequences and panels have conditioned. However, how the reader will 
turn these potential meanings into an actual meaning in their reading of the comics is 
entirely up to them. 
Moreover, Groensteen suggests that the gutter is needed to render each panel an 
independent entity in its own right, in ‘a complete and compact form’.79 With the gutter, 
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Groensteen suggests, the panel becomes a ‘polysemic image’ with open meaning that can 
be inferred into a meaningful sequence through the gutter linkage that forms a semantic 
relation among panels. In the following, I will demonstrate how Lethem uses the gutter-
panel relation to imagine an affective mode of navigating and gaining knowledge about the 
city space. First, he uses graffiti art to introduce the complexities of racialized experiences 
in the city. With graffiti Lethem also outlines a new mode of reading and writing that can 
render the city space legible. Then, he uses the movement across the gutter, from one panel 
to another, to represent the movement in the grid-like space of the city, which that is 
comparable to the panel structure of comic books. In other words, Lethem represents the 
city like a comic book whichthat requires a mode of reading that is attentive not only to the 
presence of the gutter but also the sensitivity to affect in the virtual and empty space that 
may yield meaning outside a typical textual representation. 
 The novel begins with the section called ‘Underberg’ written in the third-person 
point of view and centered on Dylan’s experiences growing up on Dean Street in a 
Brooklyn neighborhood called Gowanus. The story starts when Dylan’s family first moved 
to Dean Street in the 1970s when he was only five years old. The Ebduses are one of the 
first white families who settled in the neighborhood at the start of Gowanus’s 
gentrification. Isabel Vendle, an old white woman who owns most of the properties in the 
area, visualizes that the presence of white families will transform her streets. The 
gentrification officially starts with Isabel changing the name of the neighborhood to 






it was made and so they would come to live in the new place which was inked into reality 
by her hand.’80  
 ‘Inked into reality’ is a key phrase that effectively illustrates the juxtaposition 
between textual practices, racial experiences, and urban subjectivity in the novel. There is 
certainly a disparity between Boerum Hill imagined by Isabel and Gowanus that is the lived 
reality of the neighborhood residents. Boerum Hill comes into existence and replaces 
Gowanus only via the print medium. ‘Isabel Vendle’s Boerum Hill was declared “The 
City’s Best-Kept Secret,” New York Magazine, September 12, 1971.’81  Boerum Hill 
receives validation from the magazine while Gowanus remains the place ‘without a name’. 
However, Gowanus's reality as the city ghetto, whose existence is denied in print media, is 
what Dylan experiences throughout his childhood. Dylan’s characterization in the novel 
pivots around one fact about him: he is the only white kid in the predominantly black and 
Hispanic Gowanus neighborhood. Growing up there, Dylan has seen poverty, decay, racial 
tension, and violence, all of which he is also a victim of of. Dylan is labeled a ‘white boy’ 
and often finds himself the target of ‘yoking.’ Yoking is a form of racist bullying founded 
on the assumption that white people have more money than black people. The yoking 
victim is therefore always white while the perpetrator is black. When being yoked, one will 
be ‘nicely asked’ for money: ‘Hey, you got a dollar you could lend me?’82  However, this 
seemingly friendly and innocent question is veiled by the threat of physical assaults such 
as headlocking. Yoking, in other words, is a manifestation of the racial and economic 
disparity that will be exacerbated by gentrification. Dylan’s progressive mother Rachel 
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always tells him to respect the racial significance of the neighborhood and reminds him 
that ‘if someone asks you say you live in Gowanus.’83 His presence on the street already 
signifies a gradual disappearance of Gowanus and the emergence of the gentrified Boerum 
Hill in its place. While Dylan may be yoked by black kids growing up, he does not know 
then that he will be part of the process that exacerbates racial inequality in which he is 
certainly not the victimized one. 
 Dylan’s traumatizing childhood, defined by his white identity and later by his 
mother’s departure, becomes more tolerable through his friendship with Mingus Rude. The 
Underberg section then focuses almost entirely on how the two boys become close friends 
and separate as adults.  I contend that the role of Mingus in the novel and Dylan’s life is to 
introduce an alternative form of textual production and interpretation to both Dylan and the 
reader. For example, while Gowanus is not recognized in print media, its existence is 
affirmed by another kind of text: graffiti arts and tags. It is Mingus who teaches Dylan to 
read and create tags. He teaches Dylan to spot and read seemingly illegible scribbles on the 
city space that marks the parameter and affirms the existence of Gowanus[10]. When Dylan 
later visits the neighborhood as an adult later, he describes that ‘I saw meanings encoded 
everywhere on these streets, like the DMD and FMD tags still visible where they’d been 
sprayed twenty years before.’84  Despite the city being fully gentrified by then, the adult 
Dylan claims he can still ‘see Gowanus glinting under the veneer’.85    
 Dylan’s ability to see Gowanus owes to his friendship with Mingus, without whom 
Dylan would not acquire the kind of literacy he needs to perceive another city that exists 
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underneath the shiny surface of the newly gentrified city. Moreover, Mingus teaches Dylan 
to use graffiti and tagging to turn the city space itself into a publication medium. Victoria 
Carrington argues that graffiti ‘provides evidence of an alternative city and alternative 
textual practices. It is loud: it screams from the walls “I am here and I want you to know.” 
It screams “I don’t respect your boundaries—textual or spatial”‘.86  Carrington’s argument 
also suggests that graffiti is an unsanctioned textual artifact that ‘opens the way to 
examining the articulation of identity and textual production in contested spaces’.87  Graffiti 
defies boundaries by carving out its own space for expression. Moreover, as Carrington 
writes, it is pivotal in forming and expressing oneself in the urban space with racial and 
economic inequality. For Dylan and Mingus, graffiti does not merely cross textual or 
spatial boundaries but also defies racial boundaries. As the reader will later learn, the two 
boys will come to share the tag name DOSE, making the author of the DOSE tag neither 
black nor white but both. DOSE represents not a disparity or inequality but ‘a team, a united 
front, a brand name, an idea’.88  
 Graffiti represents an alternative mode of textual practice that requires a new 
literacy. Similar to the affective literacy in The Intuitionist, graffiti and tagging turn the 
city surface into an affective textual space that defies traditional representation. Graffiti 
does not signify or produce meaning in a conventional way. As Dylan himself learns, a tag 
is simply what people write and does not have meaning. It is ‘visual noise’; ‘a reply, a call 
to those who heard, like a dog’s bark understood across fences.’89  What matters is that one 
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makes tags. The proliferation of one’s tag is also a form of amplification. The more one 
tags, the louder the noise and the more chance one is heard and recognized. The 
significance of tags does not hinge on what it means but how often it appears and affects 
other people. Accordingly, graffiti and tagging also need to have a loud, bold, and 
unconventional design as well as an impressive size or an appearance in unexpected 
locations. These qualities intend to invoke affective responses from the city walkers 
because they primarily express affect, feelings, and sensations instead of traditional 
meaning. 
 The relationship between Dylan and Mingus also operates on the affective level, 
like the tag that they co-produce. DOSE will become one of the secrets and identities that 
the two boys share. Their childhood secrets lead the adult Dylan to later remember Mingus 
as ‘the rejected idol of my entire youth, my best friend, my lover.’90 However, their 
intimacy also exemplifies the racial tension and violent encounter among racialized bodies 
that Dylan experiences growing in Gowanus. The racialization of Dylan’s identity always 
happens in a highly sensualized and affective manner. For example, Dylan’s whiteness is 
most emphasized when he is yoked.  The act of yoking itself is a literal clrash of white and 
black bodies. In a yoking episode, bodies are tangled in a headlock that contains ‘a ghost 
of fondness’ – it has ‘a polyrhythm of fear and reassurance, a seduction’.91  During a yoking 
episode, there are both violence and fondness, fear and seduction – it is a racialized ritual 
that is contradictory, confusing, and even challenges the racial divide that the act of yoking 
represents. It is only through being yoked – having his white body entangled with black 
ones – that Dylan grows into being ‘a white boy’, learning his role, becoming visible on 
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the street crowded with black faces. In other words, Dylan grows up and learns to make 
sense of race by in an affective way. For Dylan, race is real in so far as it produces affective 
charges through physical encounters. This is the reason that when he first meets Mingus, 
Dylan ‘felt himself permeated by some ray of attention, moved so that he felt an uncanny 
warmth in the half of his chest that was turned toward Mingus. He wanted to put his hand 
in Mingus’s Rude’s crispy-looking hair’.92  The feeling that permeates Dylan is most 
intense when he looks at Mingus’s hair, which is racially distinctive from Dylan’s own 
‘waterfall of girlish hair’ that stands out ‘among the Afros’.93  Hair has also been a primary 
racial marker for Dylan since before Mingus becomes his friend. As a young boy, he learns 
to read racial differences through how different hairs make him feel. He is first drawn to 
the two white girls on Dean Street because they have ‘gauzy, sky-pink hair streaming like 
it had never been cut’.94  Later he is also struck by Mingus’s hair that cannot be more 
different from his. The moment he wants to run his hand through Mingus’s hair is thus the 
moment Dylan teaches himself to discern racial differences through an affective sensation.  
 Dylan’s childhood in the pre-gentrified Gowanus endows him with a sense of 
authenticity and expertise in the inner-city culture. Even though he claims authenticity from 
being in the neighborhood before the gentrification, Dylan nonetheless benefits from the 
process he identifies himself against. [11]As Matt Gobey argues, ‘Dylan is a synecdoche 
for a class of urban dwellers that expresses its authentic identity through the consumption 
of lifestyles associated with a geographic locale that has been symbolically configured as 
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authentic.’95 Dylan’s adulthood is defined by such an authentic identity that he associates 
with the neighborhood before gentrification. He also develops his writing career around 
black music and culture. However, despite claiming authenticity, Dylan fails to have a 
successful career and adult life in general. In fact, his characterization throughout the novel 
is grounded in the connection between the failure to produce texts. As a boy, he cannot 
write his original tag and share Mingus’s DOSEose tag. As a music journalist, he 
specializes in soul and R&B. He writes liner notes about R&B and Soul bands that are not 
well received and unlikely to be widely published. The movie script he intends to write 
about an R&B group, The Prisonaires, is unfinished. I contend that Lethem uses Dylan’s 
failing writing career to reflect on his inability to fully adopt a non-signifying, affective 
way of writing, reading, and understanding texts. Even though Dylan learns to perceive 
racial differences affectively, he cannot fully appropriate the nonsignifying textual practice 
such as graffiti writing or tagging. The racial gap between Dylan and Mingus, for example, 
is not merely encoded in their skin colors but inherent in the way the two boys use two 
different systems of signification. One of the significant moments in the novel that 
foreshadows their inevitable separation is in a conversation they have as a young boys: 
“That’s my tag,” said Mingus when he caught Dylan studying the cloud of visual noise. 
[…] 
“What’s it mean?” 
“It’s my tag, Dose[12]. It’s what I write.”96  
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In this exchange, Dylan expects that the tag will signify or represent something meaningful 
about Mingus’s life. Yet, as Mingus replies to him, Dose [13]does not mean but simply is. 
It is his tag. It is what he does. Throughout the novel, Dylan repeatedly fails to grasp the 
nonrepresentational mode of thinking. His lifelong yearning for and failure to be 
recognized for his authentic experiences on Dean Street as an authentic inner-city kid is 
rooted in his expectation that his childhood, specifically his relationship with Mingus, must 
signify something authentic about the neighborhood and his life. He fails to recognize that 
Dean Street, Mingus, and his self are separate entities whose interrelation is affective rather 
than representative. They simply are and become what they are through the process of 
mutual affectation. The novel then seems to suggest that Dylan’s failure as a writer is 
symptomatic of his inability to adopt an affective approach to the act of reading and writing 
and in inhabiting the city space with his own racialized body. 
 While Dylan is characterized as failing to make sense of his Gowanus childhood in 
a nonrepresentational way, the novel nonetheless seeks to tell his story in an affective 
manner by exploring the many relations between one’s subjectivity and the city space. 
Implied in the novel’s title, Fortress alludes to the connection between space and 
subjectivity. More specifically, the novel tells a story about how one’s subjectivity is tied 
to a place until it becomes a fortress that isolates a person. In the most literal sense, the 
fortress of solitude may refer to a heavily guarded place like a prison designed to lock 
people in individual cells. Primarily, the novel uses the prison motif to distinguish between 
black and white experiences in the neighborhood. Devika Sharma argues that the 
connection between race and imprisonment in Fortress characterizes it as a ‘neo-slave 




racialized experiences’.97 Indeed, the main black characters in the novel, including Mingus, 
Dylan’s childhood nemesis Robert Woolfolk, and Mingus’s grandfather Barrett Rude, Sr., 
are isolated or imprisoned at one point in the story, suggesting that imprisonment is almost 
exclusively a racialized experience. However, Sharman also argues that Lethem uses the 
prison motif more figuratively by representing the color prison or how ‘the notion of color 
being a form of confinement’.98 The confinement of the color prison partly conditions 
Dylan’s inability to appropriate the nonrepresentational mode of signification of Black 
urban culture. As Sharman writes, the novel uses the theme of representation and 
appropriation to project this racial division and confinement: ‘The novel reads like a 
literary test site for various ways of representing African American characters. […] It thus 
seems as if Lethem explicitly tests his own way of representing black and white while 
simultaneously allowing his reader to recognize the challenges.’99 
The prison motif is also used to describe the city in Dylan’s memory. The landmark 
of Gowanus itself is also an incarceration facilityplace called Brooklyn House of Detention. 
Its dominant presence in the neighborhood projects a sense of inevitability to the people of 
color who live there. It is also an edifice that keeps the ghost of the ghetto Gowanus lurking 
in the shadow of the gentrified Boerum Hill. Moreover, the haunting and lingering presence 
of Gowanus and the detention center are symbolic of how the neighborhood becomes a 
fortress that imprisons Dylan. He finds himself trapped in his Gowanus childhood no 
matter how long and how far he has been away from the place. As his girlfriend, Abby, 
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once confronts him: ‘Your childhood is some privileged sanctuary you live in all the 
time.’100 The fortress imagery is also connected with Dylan’s father, Abraham, a secluded 
film-painting artist. Abraham often works alone in his attic studio and rarely goes out onto 
the street. The narrator comments early in the novel that: ‘In truth, Superman in his 
‘Fortress of Solitude’ reminded you all too much of Abraham in his high studio, brooding 
over nothing.’101 The same reference to Superman’s sanctuary is then adopted by Dylan, 
who remarks that he, like Abraham, also has his Fortress of Solitude designed to keep the 
compilation and collection of childhood memories, ‘of my lost friends, life’s real actors’.102  
 The recurring image of the fortress in the novel has another significant implication. 
It represents a ‘striated space’ or the space that is ‘necessarily delimited, closed on at least 
one side.’103 Since a young age, Dylan has always perceived space in the logic of striae. 
‘There were two worlds’ for Dylan. The first world is indoor and divided according to the 
contrasting personalities of his parents. There is the peaceful space of his father’s upstairs 
studio and the chaotic space downstairs that is always filled with noises and activities of 
his mother. As he grows up, Dylan is pushed onto Dean Street – the second world. Similar 
to the indoor space of his house, the outside world of Dean Street is also divided into slates 
and zones. Dylan learns this spatial system from his early childhood experiences on Dean 
Street:  
They walk in front of Marilla’s gate – her share of the irregular slate path was her 
zone – marked. This was Dylan’s first knowledge of the system that organized the 
space of the block. He would never step into Marilla’s house, though he didn’t 
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know that now. The slate was her parlor. He had his own, though he hadn’t marked 
it yet.104  
Dylan’s movement on Dean Street is limited to his ability to hear his mother Rachel calling 
him in. He cannot move further than that. However, being out on the street, Dylan finds 
that Dean Street itself is part of a much larger system of zones and grids. It is a block – a 
fortress of a sort – Nevins and Bonds Streets bracket that. The world beyond Dean Street 
is unknown to the young Dylan.  
 Dylan’s knowledge of the spatialization system, both indoor and outdoor, is 
described as occurring to him before he even learns to cognize it. For example, his later 
knowledge that he should avoid the Brooklyn House of Detention on Atlantic is intuitive 
– it is a kind of ‘knowledge you couldn’t have guessed you already had’.105 That is, Dylan 
first learns about the system of zones as affective knowledge. He learns it from how his 
body moves from one point to another and how each position affects how he conceives and 
expresses himself. Being upstairs with his father, for example, Dylan is left alone. His 
father leaves his solitude ‘unbruised’ – the solitude that when he is downstairs ‘his mother 
burst[14][s] like a grape’.106 Dylan is completely exposed and overwhelmed by Rachel’s 
highly affective presence. ‘She was too full for the house […] too full for Dylan who 
instead worked Rachel’s margins, dodging her main force to dip sidelong into what he 
could make sense of.’107 The force of Rachel leaves Dylan’s subjectivity entirely vulnerable 
to affectation. He has to adjust his position and bodily movement around her while he can 
afford to remain static and fixed in his father’s presence. 
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 Likewise, Dylan also obtains the affective knowledge of the city's zones system 
before developing a cognitive comprehension of the system itself. For example, having to 
go to Bergen Street, he decides that he cannot trust the place because ‘he could feel the 
sidewalk tilt there’.108 The distrust, which translates into the feeling of walking on a tilting 
surface, is a projection of anxiety for being a ‘white boy’ that can leave him vulnerable to 
being yoked. Dylan thus knows about the racialization of the space before it becomesis 
cognitive awarenessknowledge. The queasy and distrustful feeling that Bergen Street 
causes is later translated into knowledge about racial tension when he runs into Robert 
Woolfolk, a black kid in the neighborhood who is also Dylan’s perpetual tormentor. Seeing 
Dylan, Robert makes it clear to him that if he ‘comes around here’ again, he will be yoked. 
Robert’s threat, however, provides relief to Dylan’s previously indescribable feeling of 
distrust. The threat gives Dylan a sense of affirmation and reassurance about who he is and 
the role he has to play in this neighborhood. Dylan is then described to feel ‘grateful for 
the implied sense of pooled information. He and Robert could move forward together from 
this point into whatever was required’.109 The pooled information that Robert shares with 
Dylan is that there are racial differences in the neighborhood, and each race has a role to 
play. Dylan now learns that outside of Dean Street, into a different zone, he is known as 
the ‘white boy’ who has to play the role of a yoking victim for other black kids. 
 Dylan’s knowledge of the city as a striated space is partly the legacy of his parents 
on the one hand and of the process of urbanization on the other. Modern urban planning 
divides the city space into blocks and neighborhoods. Each area is predominantly occupied 
by one race or another. The uneven racial distribution across the city space creates racial 
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tension and reinforces the racialization of one’s subjectivity. The encounter between Dylan 
and Robert is an excellent example of how Dylan embraces his whiteness and learns to 
differentiate himself from Robert. This process of racialization can only take place in a 
striated space such as the modern urban space like Gowanus. Urban planning creates zones, 
which can cause a change in one’s perception of self when one moves from one zone to 
the next. The further Dylan moves from Dean Street to a more predominantly black 
neighborhood, the more the learns of racial differences that his presence provokes. 
However, such knowledge of racial disparity occurs to him first and foremost as a 
noncognitive, unexplainable feeling of unease before it is translated into knowledge about 
racial tension and his own racialized identity.  
 Dylan’s perception of the city through the logic of striae has constantly been 
challenged by his mother who introduces him to the smooth space. Deleuze and Guattari 
explains that, unlike striated space, the smooth space has ‘the points [that] are subordinated 
to the trajectories.’110 Instead of emphasizing the occupation of a single point, the smooth 
space focuses more on the act of traversing the space. It is thus compared to the kind of 
space that is produced nomadically. The occupant of the smooth space does not necessarily 
occupy a single position; they move around. ‘It is a space constructed by local operations 
involving changes in direction.’111 More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari contend that 
the smooth space is affective. It is filled with ‘intensities, wind and noise, forces, and 
sonorous and tactile qualities’.112 One’s traverse across such space is bound to be affected 
by these forces.  
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Dylan is first acquainted with the smooth space through the way Rachel transforms 
the house downstairs into a place filled with noises, voices, music, and physical contacts. 
Rachel’s presence itself is highly sensuous and affective. She also represents a type of 
‘force’ that has influenced Dylan’s life even after she has left him. Abraham’s nude 
paintings of Rachel, whichthat can be seen even from the street, serve as an analogy for 
Rachel’s forceful, affective presence that cannot be avoided. Her ultimate transformation 
into the ‘running crab’ – the nickname she signs in the postcards sent to Dylan – also 
symbolizes the kind of nomadic movement she wants Dylan to learn. Instead of moving in 
the upward/forward direction like most animals, crabs move sideways. They create a line 
of movement that traverses space in an atypical manner. Any traditional boundaries are 
bound to be crossed by the crab’s movement. Therefore, it is Rachel, the running crab, who 
interrupts Dylan’s usual movement of up and down directions indoors and sends him out 
into Dean Street. It is also with Rachel that he learns to defy the system of zones in the city 
and learn to venture out. Againa and again, Rachel pushes Dylan from his comfortable 
position and urges him to explore the space, both physical and racial, nomadically. She 
drives him out to play with other kids on the streets. She sends him to a public school to 
mingle with other black kids. Rachel’s decision to move her family to a predominantly 
black neighborhood such as Gowanus is also one attempt to transform the striated space 
into the smooth one. If there are boundaries, Rachel will cross. If there are fortresses, she 
will escape. Therefore, it is not surprising that she chooses to leave the confinement of 
motherhood and family life and literally runs sideways from Brooklyn to the Midwest. 
 The fact that Mingus moves to Dean Street right after Rachel has gone thus bears a 




continue the work that she has started. For example, Rachel introduces Dylan to comic 
books while Mingus turns it into a passionate hobby for Dylan. Rachel smokes weed and 
gets high in Dylan’s presence, but it is Mingus with whom Dylan picks up weed smoking 
as a habit. Rachel and Mingus also share several traits and characteristics. Both are wild, 
affective, and sensuous. Rachel is described by the narrator as being full of 
‘unpredictability and unrest,’113 while Mingus is ‘an exploding bomb of possibilities’.114 At 
the same time, both Rachel and Mingus introduce Dylan to the world of secrets, nicknames, 
and doubleness. There are secrets and names that Dylan shares with his mother that he 
cannot tell anyone else. Likewise, Dylan and Mingus have nicknames and secrets such as 
the magical ring, the shared identity of DOSE and Aeroman. In fact, their friendship is only 
secured when they share secrets. As the narrator describes the moment after Dylan and 
Mingus help each other masturbate: ‘Dylan was flushed with understanding: he and 
Mingus were restored. They had secrets again […] absolute secrets from anyone. […] 
Dylan could trust Mingus, they were again sole and extraordinary.’115 
 Therefore, it is inevitable that Mingus will be the one who takes over Rachel’s job 
in creating and guiding Dylan through the smooth space of the city. He does so primarily 
by introducing Dylan to graffiti and tagging. One of the first few trips out of Dean Street 
that Dylan makes is to follow the trail of tags with Mingus. ‘Mingus showed the way,’116 
the narrator begins. The two kids walk to the Brooklyn Bridge. On the bridge, heading 
towards Manhattan, Dylan finally understands that Mingus wants him to see two giant tags 
painted on a Manhattan tower. The tag is only visible if you are on the Brooklyn side. ‘The 
 
113 Lethem, p.10. 
114 Ibid., p.56. 
115 Ibid., p.211. 




painted names had conquered the bridge, pinned it to the secret street, claimed it for 
Brooklyn. […] Tags and their invisible authors, […] the hidden lore.’117 The walk to the 
bridge is a significant moment for Dylan in that it is the first time he acquires new literacy 
to help him read and understand the city space. Therefore, the two boys are portrayed 
during their walk as a detective, following clues, trying to gain hidden knowledge about 
the city. ‘Dylan Ebdus and Mingus Rude in the spring of 1975, walking home along Dean 
Street studying marker tags in black and purple ink on mailboxes and lampposts, DMD and 
FMD, DINE II and SCAR 56, trying to break the code, mouthing syllables to 
themselves.’118 After learning about tags, Dylan’s perception of the urban space has 
completely changeds. Now he sees tags everywhere and learns that tag authors disregard 
the zoning system. Instead, they place their tags across the city with the desire to be 
recognized and acknowledged. The proliferation of tags that Dylan sees is evidence of how 
the city can be transformed into a smooth space. As Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
In striated space, one closes off a surface and “allocates” it according to 
determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one “distributes” oneself in 
an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one’s crossings.119  
Tagging is a form of self-distribution in a smooth space. That is why the frequency, 
proliferation, and quantity of one’s tag take precedence over the quality. Dylan is allowed 
to copy Mingus’s tag because ‘the black kid gets to see his tag spread father, in search of 
bragging points for ubiquity, that bottom-line standard for a graffiti writer’s success. […] 
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Mingus, the smoothing out of the city zones and grids through tagging also serves to 
smooth out their racial differences. By sharing the same tag name and working as a team 
to spread the tag, Dylan and Mingus can dismiss the reality of race and merge their 
identitiesy.  
 Mingus and Rachel also have another commonality. Despite the significant 
influence they have on Dylan, neither of them is the narrative’s focal point. The absencse 
of their point of view in the story echoes their absences from Dylan’s life. Moreover, the 
departure of Rachel and the gradual disappearance of Mingus ultimately represents the 
failure of racial integration that Dylan and Mingus try to achieve through their shared tag. 
Rachel’s departure also signifies the failure of her ideal vision for racial integration that 
drives her family to settle in the inner city in the first place. After she leaves, it is up to 
Dylan and Abraham to face the reality of economic disparity and racial segregation that 
Rachel fails to acknowledge, which becomes part of the reason that drives her out of town.  
 Mingus’s absence from Dylan’s life happens more gradually. Mingus and Dylan 
start to grow apart when they learn to racialize their identities. Mingus comes to embrace 
his blackness and black identity. On the other hand, Dylan cannot fully assimilate no 
matter[15] how much he tries to appropriate black and street culture. He is always the 
‘white boy’ to other kids.  The inevitable doom of Mingus and Dylan’s friendship is acutely 
captured in the scene in which a white woman offers to walk Dylan home when she sees 
him standing with Mingus and a group of black kids. This is the moment that Dylan is 
reminded of the unbridgeable racial disparity between him and Mingus, leading him to 
resent his own whiteness:  
That’s my best friend, Dylan wanted to tell the blond woman, who the longer he 




miscalculated, like he might be a thing spoiled by the company she’d found him in 
[…] and that’s what he wanted to be to her, spoiled, stained with blackness.121  
The reality of racial inequality that prevents Dylan from being ‘stained with blackness’ and 
later separates him from Mingus is projected most forcefully in his access to education. 
Dylan first attends the prestigious Stuyvesant School that only accepts students with high 
achievement before going to Camden, the most expensive private university in the country. 
The education system is an example of how race has been institutionalized and 
incorporated into the social structure. The inherent racism in the system will inevitably 
separate him from Mingus, no matter what Dylan tries to do. As Dylan’s white friend, 
Arthur, explains to him: ‘If you don’t get to Stuyvesant or at least Bronx Science you’re 
dead. That’s how the test works, highest scores get into Stuyvesant, next highest to Bronx 
Science, Brooklyn Tech’s a last resort. Sarah J. Hale or John Jay, those places are 
practically like prison.’122 What Arthur is advising is not different in principle from the 
random white woman who offers to walk Dylan home. Sarah J. Hale is for black kids. 
According to Dylan’s teacher, going to that school is like going ‘straight to the Brooklyn 
House of Detention’.123  The school system remainsis still economically and racially 
segregated even though it is not legally so. Dylan experiences this segregation first hand 
through the gradually increasing absence of Mingus from his life as they attend separate 
schools. Mingus indeed goes to Sarah J.Hale and eventually ends up in prison as the system 
has prescribeds for him. 
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 Both Rachel and Mingus assert their presence in the novel and Dylan’s life as an 
affective force despite their absences and failure to overcome systematic racialization and 
segregation. On the one hand, the minimal narrative focalization on these two characters is 
intended to reflect their relative absence from the life of Dylan‘s life. On the other hand, 
the novel uses their absence to introduce the affective mode of being present. In Rachel’s 
case, her physical presence is substituted by the postcards signed by her alias name, the 
Running Crab. Her messages on the postcards are always cryptic, incoherent, and formatted 
unconventionally. For example, on one of the postcards, she writes: 
If the mets had to trade seaver 
for a red 
they should have shipped him 
to cuba for this guy 
better fit for che stadium 
so saith commissioner crab124 
The postcard message does not have a sensible, coherent meaning. It functions only to 
assert Rachel’s affective presence back into the family. It is a scribble, not unlike graffiti 
writing, that expresses affect instead of meaning. The writing on the postcard makes 
Abraham and Dylan feel her presence instead of giving them any cognitive rationale 
for[16]of her departure. This explains why Abraham experiences a strange physical 
sensation when he touches the postcards: 
Abraham handled the stack of postcards just as he had the slices of burned toast, 
loosely, nearly dropping them, and frowning as though they had ruined something 
 




or were ruined themselves. He stared at his fingers after he’d scattered them on the 
breakfast table. Perhaps the postcards had left a scent or a smudge of something 
on his fingertips.125 
The imaginary scent or smudge on his fingers is not dissimilar to the tilting ground that 
Dylan feels when he steps out of Dean Street. These feelings neither exist nor make sense, 
but they are real insofar as they are felt. They are created by the intense affect that one 
experiences through an encounter with something that is affectively charged, such as the 
postcards sent by the runaway wife or the tilting streets full of strangers.  
 Rachel thus manages to carve out and reside in an alternative space in Abraham 
and Dylan’s lives the same way that tag authors change the city space into a canvas on 
which they declare their presence. The scribbles on the city wall do not make any more 
sense than Rachel’s cryptic messages. Yet both are highly affective texts. The authors 
produce these texts to announce their presence by transmitting affect and sensation to the 
people who encounter the texts. 
 Mingus’s absence is also substituted by a trail of affects that he leaves behind. With 
Mingus hardly around, Dylan begins to be more observant of the presence of the tag 
DOSE[17]ose on the city surface and physically engages with those tags to confirm 
Mingus’s presence: ‘Dylan would covertly push a forefinger against the metal, wondering 
if he could measure in the tackiness of the ink the tag’s vintage. If his finger stuck slightly 
Dylan imagined he’d followed Mingus by minutes to the spot, barely missed catching him 
in the act.’126 In this instance, Mingus’s tag literally affects Dylan through physical 
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sensations. Dylan uses the feeling on his finger to make sense of the tag and to estimate his 
proximity to Mingus’s body.  
 The illegible yet affective texts produced by Rachel and Mingus require an 
alternative reading method similar to reading comics. Reading comic books, the reader has 
to use their imagination to link separate panels and make sense of the story as a whole. 
According to McCloud, ‘No matter how dissimilar one image may be to another, there is a 
kind of alchemy at work in the space between panels which can help us find meaning or 
resonance in even the most jarring of combinations.’127 The alchemy to which that 
McCloud refers to is comparable to the process of affectation. As McCloud further 
explains, ‘Such transitions may not make “sense” in any traditional way, but still a 
relationship of some sort will inevitably develop.’128 Affect makes it possible to feel the 
presence of something before it becomes legible. A relationship between disparate entities 
such as whiteness and blackness can still be developed at the level of affect. Dylan and 
Mingus’s friendship is an example of such a relationship that requires an affective 
connection to sustain. The bond between Dylan and his mother is also preserved because, 
despite her absence, she still continues to transmit affect onto him either via the postcards 
or simply by the fact that Dylan has to live in the space she envisions for him. As the 
narrator tells us, ‘Rachel went omitted, unnamed, but both knew that to speak of this place 
was to speak of her, however little they wished to. Possibly Dylan and Abraham only 
remained in Gowanus for Rachel, holding down her spot.’129 The absence of Rachel and 
Mingus in Dylan’s life leaves an empty space similar to the gutter that needs to be 
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experienced through affect. Rachel and Mingus thus remain a dominant influence for Dylan 
because their presence is always affectively felt.  
That empty space – the gutter – is directly referred to in the novel as ‘the middle 
space’. As the adult Dylan tells the reader, the middle space is ‘a nonexistent space’ similar 
to a utopia. It exists only as a dream or a tiny moment in time stretched out into infinity:  
It was the same space the communists and gays and painters of celluloid imagined 
they’d found in Gowanus, […] a space the width of a dwindled summer, a place 
where Mingus Rude always grooved fat spaldeen pitches, born homeruns. […] A 
middle space opened and closed like a glance, you’d miss it if you blinked.130  
The image of the fortress that appears throughout the novel also directs our attention to the 
middle space between each fortress across which that only affect can traverse across. As 
the novel suggests, affect is capable of filling in the middle space of the gutter and later 
transforms it into the smooth space in which there will be neither a fortress nor a gutter. 
 The novel itself is also written in a manner that requires the reader to apply a similar 
affective approach. First of all, the structure of the novel is comparable to the layout of 
comic books. Each of the three sections functions as an individual panel. Each section or 
panel is independent to the extent that they tell the story from different viewpoints and 
from different times in Dylan’s life. The reader has to infer the connection between these 
sections. The gap between the Underberg and Prisonaires sections, for example, includes 
the missing 20 years in the storyline and the shift from the third-person narrative voice to 
Dylan’s first-person perspective. The only connection between these two parts is the liner 
note that Dylan writes as a music journalist. The novel asks that the reader create a story 
 




of what happens in the missing 20 years of Dylan’s life to make sense of how he transforms 
from being a lonely white boy in Brooklyn to a 36 years-old music journalist who struggles 
to move on from the past.  
 The writing style in each section is also different. The Underberg section is written 
with meticulous and extensive details. It covers the period of approximately 10 years, 
between the 1970s and 1980s, and follows the Dylan’s growth and progress as he moves 
from one school year to the next. Each year in school also represents a panel that contains 
different stages in Dylan’s emotional and intellectual maturity developed parallel with the 
gentrification in his neighborhood. The third-person point of view serves two functions in 
the Underberg section. It gives the reader a more comprehensive overview of the racial 
relations and life in the city by including other events and actions that happen outside 
Dylan’s knowledge. This, in turn, reflects Dylan’s innocence and ignorance about what is 
happening in the city and how those events have affected his understanding of himself and 
the city. The elaborated third-person narration of Dylan’s childhood is used to portray the 
process of affectation that constitutes his subjectivity and New York City that he comes to 
know and remember later in his adult life. The recollections and memories of the city are 
then captured in the final part of the book, in which Dylan gives a first-person account of 
his disorientation and alienation from both the city and his subjectivity that he thinks he 
knows. On the one hand, the sense of estrangement and confusion that Dylan experiences 
throughout his adulthood may be understood as an effect of the process of gentrification 
on histhe personal growth and development. The gentrified New York City is no longer 
the same city he knew and grew up in. Being alienated from his own childhood memories, 




On the other hand, Dylan’s alienation as an adult returning to New York may also 
come from the fact that he has been absent from the city for almost two decades. Unlike 
his childhood self, Dylan does not have an opportunity to develop an affective relationship 
with the space he remembers. In a sense, New York City ceases to exist the second Dylan 
leaves it. The city he returns to is a conjecture of a new affective relation that the adult 
Dylan has forged with it. It is a complicated relationship in which the memories of the past 
affectation are fused with the active working of affect in the present moment. The use of 
the first-person point of view becomes helpful in this regard. It allows the reader to see the 
influence of past affective experiences in shaping new affective encounters. At the same 
time, it reveals the unbridgeable gap between the city Dylan encounters in the past and the 
city he comes back to. This gap that causes Dylan’s feeling of estrangement testifies to the 
nature of affect that is capable of constantly changing and transforming any bodies that it 
moves through.  
 The short intermission chapter also plays a significant role. It features a liner note 
that Dylan writes about the music career of Mingus’s father, Barrett Rude, Jr. The piece 
functions as a gutter – the space between the two panels – in which the reader is required 
to infer its significance as the connector between the two main sections. Underberg ends 
with Dylan at eighteen and who isabout to leaveing New York City. Then the novel 
resumes his story in the Prionaires section almost 20 years later as a middle-aged man[18]. 
What happens in the two-decade gap is only given to the reader as thirteen-page writing of 
a failing music critic about an unsuccessful blues singer. With this limited material as an 
interlude, the reader is reintroduced to Dylan, now an adult, in the novel's final section. 




gives the reader a similar feeling of estrangement towards the character whose life they 
have followed in an extensively detailed 300-page long narrative in the previous section. 
Dylan thus becomes to the reader what New York City appears to him in his adulthood – 
familiar yet estrangeding. The reader is asked to combine their earlier recollection of 
Dylan’s childhood that they have read with their fresh encounter with the adult Dylan in 
the novel's final section.  
 The structure of the novel and the different writing styles in each section urges the 
reader to adjust their way of reading and understanding the story in the same way that 
Dylan himself has to change the way he views and understands the city when he returns as 
an adult. In this way, the novel becomes comparable to the city. While Dylan needs to 
actively use his own imagination to bridge the 20-year gap between the city in his 
childhood and the present, the reader is similarly asked to be an active participant in 
constructing the complete story that is missing 20 years of the protagonist’s life missing 
from it.  
 Apart from the structure and the style of writing, Lethem also borrows from comic 
books the use of iconography. He creates a prose narrative that is essentially ‘sight-based’. 
According to McCloud, comics are a sight-based medium because ‘the idea that a picture 
can evoke an emotional or sensual response in the viewer is vital to the art of comics’.131 
However, the use of icons in Fortress happens when the narrator switches from the 
characters’ proper names to using general pronouns, nicknames, tags, and secret identities. 
For example, Abraham and Barrett Rude Jr. are sometimes referred to simply as the ‘father’ 
while Dylan sometimes becomes Mole-boy. Mingus is also referred to as DOSE by in the 
 




only two chapters that exclusively focuses on him. The characters also often refer to one 
another by nicknames or secret names such as ‘Vendlemachine’ for Isabel Vendle, 
‘Dillinger’ for Dylan, ‘The Collector’ for Abraham, and ‘Running Crab’ for Rachel. The 
use of pronouns and secret names serves to shift the viewpoint from which the characters 
are represented to the reader. These names work like images in comic books, as Groensteen 
suggests, in that they are both ‘something that we inevitably grasp from a specific angle 
and from a specific distance’.132 When Abraham is referred to as the ‘father’ instead of his 
name, the narrative presents him to the reader from a different angle. In moments like this, 
the reader is made to feel estranged from the characters and experiences the gap or the 
discontinuity, for example, between Abraham as a person and the father to which that he 
is sometimes referred to. 
 According to McCloud, comic books also create ‘closure’ or complete and coherent 
meanings only with the reader being a partner in crime:  
The comics creator asks us to join in a silent dance of the seen and the unseen. The 
visible and the invisible. This dance is unique to comics. No other artform gives 
so much to its audience while asking so much from them as well.133  
Likewise, Lethem also actively invites his readers to join him in creating meanings out of 
the void by using their imagination to bridge the gaps, visualize the invisible, and feel the 
affective sensation. It might not be too far-fetched to consider Fortress as a comic book in 
the guise of a prose novel. There are superheroes, villains, magical rings, and supernatural 
powers. Yet what explicitly links the novel to comic books is its insistence on harvesting 
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the power from readers’ imagination and affective reading experience to create a 
meaningful story no longer confined by any form of fortress or boundary that might divide 
the reader from the text.  
Conclusion 
When viewed through the lens of affect, the city becomes a body. It can transact affective 
sensation with its dwellers, who construct their subjectivities through the affective 
connections with the city space. Both The Intuitionist and Fortress use many textual tropes 
to represent affective movements in urban space. They essentially compare the interaction 
between affective bodies to the act of reading and writing texts. In this chapter, I developed 
the terms affective literacy and affective gutter to discuss how The Intuitionist and Fortress 
imagine a new kind of literacy that is attentive to the role of affect in urban experiences. 
 Affective literacy demonstrates how texts can be understood as both a sign and a 
thing. According to Huehls, a ‘sign-thing duality’ such as this ‘behave[s] as signs to link 
themselves forward to other things in the world, which might in turn link themselves 
forward by functioning as signs as well’. 134 Accordingly, it requires a mode of reading and 
writing that is mindful of the text’s ability to signify as well as its material reality. In The 
Intuitionist, Whitehead uses the rivalry between Empiricism and Intuitionism as an analogy 
of the mutual exclusivity between a sign and a thing. The elevator’s total freefall is an event 
that challenges the limitations of both approaches. Neither approach can account for a freak 
accident like a total freefall. With the elevator clash, the novel thus introduces a third 
alternative, affective literacy, as a mode of thinking that is attentive to how an entity or an 
event behaves as a sign-thing duality.  
 




 Whitehead adopts the signifyin(g) tradition of African American literature to 
imagine what affective literacy may look like. The practice of signifyin(g) simultaneously 
repeats and revises other texts. In other words, it treats the text as a sign-thing duality. The 
text is simultaneously an inert object that can be picked up and repeated and a subject that 
can revise – communicate something new in the repetition. In my discussion, I proposed 
that the novel uses many instances of textual fragments and various tropes of books to 
demonstrate the duality of the text and the process of textual signifyin(g). To comprehend 
these fragments as a cohesive whole, it is not enough to treat them as a text or a thing but 
both. The fact that the text can be fragmented testifies to its material reality that exceeds 
its representational capacity. Consequently, the reader and the characters in the novel alike 
need to adopt a new literacy to make sense of broken texts. Moreover, as I discussed, 
Whitehead uses the trickster trope to demonstrate the ambiguity and fluidity of textual 
practices. The character such as Fulton, to the novel as a whole, and even Whitehead 
himself all behave like a trickster that challenges the reader to be more open and creative 
in their reading of the text. In a way, the sign-thing duality is also a trickster. It is a hybrid 
that resists easy categorization. It promotes an understanding of the world that is fuller, 
richer, and filled with more possibilities. Only with such a view, the novel suggests, that 
the ‘city to come’ may be possible.  
 Similar to affective literacy, affective gutter in Fortress proposes a mode of reading 
and writing that acknowledges the hybrid quality of texts. In part, the term affective gutter 
echoes the novel’s use of comics conventions in its form, themes, and writing style. The 
image of the gutter primarily refers to the empty space between panels that demands the 




Moreover, the panel in comics is one of the many imageries in the novel, including the 
fortress, the city block, the prison, that express spatial division. I invoked the concept of 
the gutter to suggest a mode of reading akin to a type of navigation or movement that can 
transcend the division and bridge disparate parts into a whole. I discussed that the gutter 
space is comparable to a virtual space that is filled with affective potentialities. In filling 
in the gutter, the reader transforms some of those possible meanings into an actual meaning 
that can make sense of the connection between panels. In Fortress, Lethem uses urban 
conditions as an analogy of how affective gutter can be applied. First, he compares the 
urban system with comic books to analogize how the city space can transform into a type 
of text. He also uses alternative texts such as graffiti to illustrate the materiality of texts 
that requires an affective gutter reading. Moreover, graffiti texts become another analogy 
of the signifying ability of a passive object such as the city space.  
 With the concept of the gutter, the act of reading becomes a movement and 
navigation in space. I proposed that affective gutter can transform a striated space, such as 
the textual space in comic books or the urban system, into a ‘smooth space’. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, a smooth space is ‘infinite, open, and unlimited in every direction; 
it has neither top nor bottom nor center; it does not assign fixed and mobile elements but 
rather distributes a continuous variation’.135 Most importantly, it is ‘the space of affects 
[that is] haptic rather than [being] optical perception’ (emphasis in original).136 Smooth 
space is directionless, open, and can be experienced through the affective forces as one 
traverses through such space. The urban space, which Deleuze and Guattari also call ‘the 
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striated space par excellence’,137 can be transformed into smooth space if one acknowledges 
the movement of affect within it. Once it becomes a smooth space, the urban dwellers will 
have more freedom to occupy and manipulate the city space, whichthat is no longer 
restrained by the rigidity of forms and structures such as zones, grids, or panels. Instead, 
the city can shift and change according to the affective movements and contacts of its 
dwellers. 
 In one regard, The Intuitionist and Fortress can be considered a striated narrative 
through their use of fragment and gutter tropes. There are sections, chapters, and shifts in 
points of view and writing styles that transform the novels into pastiche fragments. 
However, these elements invite the reader to actively and affectively transform the textual 
space of the novels into a smooth one. They ask that the reader learn to play with new 
possibilities, to become a trickster themselves, or, in the case of Fortress, a superhero 
endowed with special abilities. As with the power to fly or become invisible, or the ability 
to invent a second elevation for the city to come, the reader can adopt an affective mode of 
experiencing the world to find meaning at the limit of their imagination. 
  
 





Network Subjectivities in Gary Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story  
and Dave Eggers’s The Circle 
In this final chapter, I will examine the influence of hybridity and affect in critical practice. 
Previously, I discussed the role of affect in the conception of self-authenticity as a form of 
accountability and explored how affect is part of alternative literacy that is attentive to the 
duality of the text as both a sign and a thing. Here, I am interested in examining how affect 
theory plays a part in the recent post-critical turn in contemporary literature and criticism. 
Accordingly, I will be investigating the connection between affect and post-critique in the 
representation of network subjectivities in a neoliberal society. Network structure and 
neoliberal conditions are crucial elements in the post-critical turn. A network form 
expresses connectivity and relationality that become essential to post-critical practice that 
seeks to transcend the rigidity and inclination for suspicion of traditional criticism. 
Neoliberalism also creates a circular impasse in which the conventional mode of critique 
becomes ineffective. In a neoliberal society, it is no longer sufficient to defend one side 
and debunk the other because neoliberal ideology can exploit either side of an argument. 
For this reason, there is a need to find an alternative mode of critique that acknowledges 
the encompassing power of neoliberalism while trying to engage with it critically. 
The novels that I select for the discussion in this chapter are Gary Shteyngart’s 
Super Sad True Love Story (2011) and Dave Eggers’s The Circle (2013). Both texts 
thematically explore social conditions and lived experiences in a neoliberal society. 
Specifically, the novels highlight how neoliberalism and advanced information 




‘Individuals have become “dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.”’1  
Both Super Sad and The Circle are concerned with the conditions of human subjectivities 
in such a society. They share a common motif in exploring how the marriage between 
neoliberalism and information technologies creates what Shoshana Zuboff calls the system 
of ‘surveillance capitalism’ in which human experiences become ‘free raw material for 
translation into behavioral data’ in the system of surveillance capitalism.2 Both writers also 
use Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s model of ‘Empire’ to imagine the kind of power 
and control that corporations have in societies of control. According to Hardt and Negri, 
the rise of Empire reflects the decline of sovereign power and the rise of ‘a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule’(emphasis in original).3  Empire thus represents a ‘new 
global form of sovereignty’. The two novels focus on each side of the equation that 
contributes to the emergence of Empire. On the one hand, Super Sad focuses on the decline 
of national sovereignty, emphasizing the U.S. on the verge of collapsing. On the other hand, 
The Circle pays attention to how a corporation comes to wield the new global power in 
place of nation-states.  
However, what the two novels have in common is their emphasis on the kind of 
subjectivities that emerge as an outcome of the new form of social control. Previous studies 
of both Super Sad and The Circle focus precisely on how the novels imagine conditions 
and characteristics of the new subjectivities. As Gregory Rutledge proposes in his reading 
of Super Sad, the novel essentially asks, ‘how would we, modern and technologically 
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sophisticated people […] everywhere, have allowed such a complete take-over of ourselves 
and the world to happen?’4 Annie McClanahan also argues that Shteyngart’s novel 
introduces new subject formations or ‘modes of characterization’ in concomitance with 
credit scoring and the financial system.5 In his reading of The Circle, Garfield Benjamin 
also writes that Eggers imagines how surveillance capitalism has ‘gamified’ human 
behavior and social structures, resulting in ‘the self-perpetuation of gamified surveillance 
as a new political system’.6 
With the focus on human subjectivities under a new form of control, many critics 
characterize the novels as dystopian narratives. Some studies focus on how they portray a 
dystopia in which advanced information technologies become an apparatus of surveillance 
and control in a neoliberal society and a serious threat to democracy.7 Some studies also 
discuss how Shteyngart and Eggers depict the decline of the US hegemony and the 
traditional form of sovereign power due to the rise of powerful corporations.8 In addition, 
several studies focus on the posthuman turn in the novels’ representation of information 
technologies as an extension of human bodies, which also become characteristic of a 
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neoliberal subject.9 While I will touch on some of these issues, my primary goal is to 
consider how the novels are written as a critical discourse. Specifically, I am interested in 
examining how Shteyngart and Eggers adopt and reassess the genres of utopia and dystopia 
as a mode of critique for the new kind of human subjectivities they represent in the novels. 
I will argue that both writers emphasize the affordances of form, especially that of the 
network, in critical dystopia and anti-utopia genres. Accordingly, they produce a post-
critical narrative that departs from the politics of suspicion and moves toward an alternative 
mode of critique that can respond to neoliberal hegemony more constructively and 
effectively. 
 In the following, I will provide an overview of the intersection of form and critique 
by discussing the connection between the post-critical turn and new formalism. Then I will 
examine the novels’ use of the genres of utopia and dystopia to represent network 
subjectivities. Mainly, I will illustrate how the novels use the network form to characterize 
a new kind of subjectivity in line with their adoption and reassessment of utopian and 
dystopian conventions. In Super Sad, I will consider the use of the immigrant trope in 
connection with the genre of critical dystopia. I will argue that the novel endows in these 
immigrant characters ‘a new form of political opposition’, which, according to Tom 
Moylan, is a type of political agency often depicted in a critical dystopian narrative. The 
main characteristic of such a political agency is its ability to form a network of diverse 
alliances.10 Shteyngart characterizes his main characters as a second-generation immigrant 
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who is experiencing the immanent collapse of the US as a sovereign nation. In doing so, 
he can illustrate how these characters develop a new oppositional consciousness to 
critically respond to their social circumstances and redefine their agency as an immigrant 
subject.  
In The Circle, I will examine its anti-utopian characteristics. Specifically, I contend 
that Eggers’s novel seeks to expose the limitation and danger of the utopian rhetoric in the 
neoliberal era by representing network subjectivity as a schizophrenic condition. My 
analysis will be based on the concept of ‘networked individualism’ that Lee Rainie and 
Barry Wellman develop to describe a social system in which people increasingly connect 
as individuals rather than part of a group.11 I will look at how the notion of networked 
individualism is represented as a utopian ideal and characterizes network subjectivity as a 
type of schizophrenia or the condition in which one constantly experiences the paradox of 
being connected yet isolated in a neoliberal network society.  
 Throughout the chapter, I will also explore how the novels utilize the network form 
to produce a post-critical narrative that relies on what Caroline Levine calls the 
‘affordances of forms’ or the latent potentials and limitations inherent in different kinds of 
form.12 I will discuss Shteyngart’s use of the network form in Super Sad in two types of 
self-writing, namely the diary and the correspondence. I will suggest that, with the diary 
and epistolary forms of writing, Shteyngart positions the text of Super Sad and its main 
characters as a dynamic and ambivalent network node. As a network node, texts and 
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humans constantly undergo transformations in meanings and senses of selves as they move 
through multiple networks and form relations with various other nodes and entities in 
different contexts. Then I will analyze how The Circle uses the affordance of juxtaposing 
forms to critique the use of utopian rhetoric to promote and justify the totalitarian power 
of neoliberalism. Mainly, I will examine the intersection of the narrative form, the network 
form, and the form of the circle and consider how the tension among these forms does not 
only render the novel’s use of the utopian genre ineffective but also demonstrates a deeply 
anti-utopian sensibility at the heart of the novel.  
 The effectiveness of Super Sad and The Circle as a literary representation and a 
critical discourse of neoliberalism relies on the reader’s ability to navigate and make sense 
of the forms and patterns. Both novels do not seek to contest neoliberalism on the 
ideological ground. Instead, their criticism focuses on the function of forms, especially the 
network form, that allows neoliberalism to become an all-encompassing ideology. At the 
same time, they use formal affordances to imagine an alternative way to engage with 
neoliberalism critically. In a way, the post-critical narrative of Super Sad and The Circle is 
still a product of utopian imagination. Despite its aversion to traditional critique such as 
utopian rhetoric, the post-critical turn is still committed to and remains driven by a utopian 
impulse to imagine how things could be better and otherwise. In seeking to produce a post-
critical narrative by reassessing the rhetoric of utopia, the two novels thus affirm Moylan’s 
argument that ‘it has become necessary to destroy utopia in order to save it’.13  
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Form and Critique 
Network is a dominant form of neoliberalism. Neoliberal thinking holds that human well-
being hinges on the entrepreneurial freedom to participate and trade in the market. Thus, 
the network structure is privileged in neoliberal society as it facilitates the market flow and 
connectivity among individual market actors. Moreover, with the advancement of 
communication and information technologies, the network form emerges as a primary 
mode of organization behind the conduct of most human activities. Consequently, critical 
discourses in the neoliberal era appear to pay more attention to forms, especially the 
network form.  
 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker argue that the omnipresence of the 
network form in the neoliberal world makes it difficult to look outside the network, imagine 
other possibilities, and think critically about it. They develop a concept called the ‘political 
ontology of networks’14 as a framework to identify a set of protocols that operates within a 
network and to imagine a ‘non-protocological’ approach that can provide a counter-
perspective and critical insight about the network. 15 Writing that ‘it also takes networks to 
understand networks’, Galloway and Thacker suggest that one must think with the network 
logic and find the ‘exploits’ within its protocols to produce a counter-discourse. 
Protolocological exploits can instigate ‘an activation of a political consciousness that is 
capable of the critiquing of protocological control as it is capable of fostering the 
transformative elements of protocol’.16 Resistance to the network form relies on finding 
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and manipulating its protocol for critical and transformative ends. It is, in short, an act of 
resistance that comes from within the network itself. 
 Galloway and Thacker’s concept of protocological exploit is an example of the 
intersection between form and critique that informs the current post-critical thinking. They 
propose that a constructive act of critique should be rooted in the understanding of and the 
ability to manipulate the logic of the dominating form. Levine’s argument about formal 
affordances similarly stresses the significance of forms in critical thinking:  
If forms always contain and confine, and if it is impossible to imagine societies 
without forms, then the most strategic political action will not come from revealing 
or exposing illusion, but rather from a careful, nuanced understanding of the many 
different and often disconnected arrangements that govern social experience.17  
Levine’s remark directly challenges traditional critique as she deprioritizes the act of 
‘revealing and exposing illusion’ that typically characterizes a standard critical practice. 
Instead, she prioritizes the need to understand how the social is arranged and governed in 
a particular form and pattern. In making this argument, Levine also echoes Bruno Latour’s 
view about the new critical sensibility that does not succumb to ‘critical barbarity’.18 
Specifically, Latour uses the term critical barbarity to describe how critics tend to dismiss 
‘any crossover between the two lists of objects’19 so that they can use one side against the 
other to expose whichever side the opposition takes and win any argument. For Latour, 
traditional critique does not consider the reality of ‘how many participants are gathered in 
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a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence’ (emphasis in original).20 However, 
critics with the new critical sensibility will pay attention to the reality in which things cross 
over. They will trace and describe the convergence of different entities in the production 
of social realities to produce a critical discourse that adds more knowledge about the world 
rather than subtracting from it. As Latour writes, ‘The critic is not the one who debunks, 
but the one who assembles.’21 When critics trace and assemble different factors that 
intersect to produce more knowledge of the world, the act of critique will no longer be 
impoverishing but become constructive again.  
 The post-critical thinking that privileges the operation of forms also influences 
literary criticism. Rita Felski expresses concern about how the suspicious impulse of 
traditional critique has become an unchallenged mode of reading that dismisses ‘the many 
possible ways of trying to figure out what something means and why it matters’.22 She then 
suggests alternatives to critical reading that can engage with texts without establishing or 
finding a fixed and underlying meaning. According to Felski, such alternatives can be 
imagined through ‘a greater receptivity to the multifarious and many-shaded moods of 
texts’.23 She proposes ‘post-critical reading’ as a reading mode that ‘casts texts and readers 
as cocreators of meaning’.24 Specifically, Felski’s concept of post-critical reading 
emphasizes the importance of forms in the reading process: 
In the act of reading, we encounter fresh ways of organizing perception, different 
patterns and models, rhythms of rapprochement and distancing, relaxation and 
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suspense, movement and hesitation. We give forms to our existence through the 
diverse ways in which we inhabit, inflect, and appropriate the artistic forms we 
encounter.25 
Felski’s argument thus resonates with the formalist approach. She sees that attention to 
forms can shed light on the relationship between the text and the reader as a mutual 
collaborator. This assumption can then expand our understanding of the role of literature 
and literary studies in today’s world. As Felski and Elizabeth S. Anker write:  
We can no longer assume that a stance of negativity and opposition is sufficient to 
justify the aesthetic or social importance of literature or our practice as critics. […] 
The current moment in literary and cultural studies […] thus involves a broad 
interest in exploring new models and practices of reading that are less beholden to 
suspicion and scepticism, more willing to avow the creative, innovative, world-
making aspects of literature and criticism.26 
In Anker and Felski’s view, the post-critical turn can introduce new perspectives about 
literature’s ability to create and affect the social world. When literary practice is free from 
suspicious reading, it can consider other factors involved in producing textual meaning and 
value. Literary criticism could be more concerned with the multiplicity of truth and 
meaning and how literature may affect social realities, which leads Anker and Felski to 
claim that the post-critical turn reaffirms the ‘world-making’ potential to both literature 
and criticism.  
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 In his account of exomodern literature, Mitchum Huehls also describes the form of 
literature that resonates with the post-critical sensibility and the formalist approach to 
criticism. Huehls’s argument directly connects Latour’s notion of critical barbarity and 
what he calls a ‘neoliberal circle’.27 The term describes the phenomenon in which 
neoliberalism becomes so pervasive that it can benefit from either side of an argument. 
Moreover, Huehls uses the subject and object division to demonstrate a neoliberal circle, 
writing that: 
The neoliberal circle vacillates between subjective and objective representations 
of the individual, playing each against the other, even as we experience those 
positions as irreconcilable. But as far as neoliberalism is concerned, both positions 
buttress its laissez-faire engagement with the world. It wins either way.28 
The circularity of neoliberalism makes it impossible to use traditional critique against it – 
‘it wins either way’. Exomodern literature then emerges as a group of literary works that 
seek to overcome the impasse of the neoliberal circle by emphasizing a more ontological 
understanding of the hybrid and interconnected nature of any position. Huehls thus defines 
exomodern literature as ‘literary forms that are neither reflexive nor recursive, that favor 
networks over oppositions, and that successfully produce meaning without conventional 
forms of reference’.29 With the emphasis on ‘networks over oppositions,’ this group of 
literary works can produce a constructive critical discourse and literary representation of 
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neoliberal conditions without subscribing to polarizing politics that neoliberalism 
reinforces and exploits.  
Put differently, Felski’s post-critical view and in Huehls’s exomodern fiction 
consider literary works as actors in the actor-network theory or ANT. From ANT 
perspective, the knowledge about the social world can only be uncovered by following and 
describing traces of associations among different human and nonhuman actors. Latour, one 
of the most prominent ANT theorists, thus writes that a constructive engagement with the 
social world is to ‘deploy actors as networks of mediations’30 or to identify as many actors 
as possible that are assembled in the production of the social.   
In his discussion, Latour also uses ANT logic and the concept of assemblage to 
describe what he calls a ‘good text’: 
A good ANT account is a narrative or a description or a proposition where all 
the actors do something and don’t just sit there. Instead of simply transporting 
effects without transforming them, each of the points in the text may become a 
bifurcation, an event, or the origin of a new translation.31 
A good textual account does not offer a passive representation of the social. It does not 
‘just sit there’ and wait to be interpreted. Instead, a good text creates a new ‘translation’ or 
a new meaning as they contact other entities such as a reader, a new circumstance, or 
another text. As the text moves through different contexts, textual meaning will always be 
fluid and changing. In other words, a text can be understood as an actor in a networked 
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relation. Similarly, the post-critical text such as exomodern fiction seeks to produce 
meaning as a good text in Latour’s understanding. It is committed to portraying and tracing 
networked connections and relationships that it represents or critically engages with. 
Moreover, by claiming texts and readers as ‘cocreators of meanings’, or that exomodern 
fiction does not rely on ‘conventional forms of references,’ both Felski and Huehls 
foreground the significance of networked associations that contributes to the fluidity and 
ambivalence of textual meaning. Texts will always produce a ‘new translation’ or a new 
meaning as they move and encounter different reader-actors in different networks and 
contexts. 
 The post-critical turn in literary criticism, as demonstrated by Felski’s argument 
and Huehls’ account of exomodern fiction, is an example of Galloway and Thacker’s 
earlier argument about how the network ‘has emerged as a dominant form describing the 
nature of control today, as well as resistance to it’.32 Huehls considers exomodern fiction 
to be an effective mode of representation and critique because it exploits the network 
protocols to respond to the dominance of the network logic in neoliberal society. However, 
exomodern fiction, or the post-critical turn in general, also risks being accused of 
capitulating to neoliberal hegemony. Huehls himself notes that exomodern texts are 
vulnerable to the accusation of complicity and capitulation because it formally mirrors the 
structure of neoliberalism.33  
Rachel Greenwald Smith’s concept of ‘compromise aesthetics’ attempts to make a 
case for the value of the post-critical thinking that privileges networks, relations, and 
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alliances while acknowledging the risk of capitulation. Smith argues that, for critical 
discourse and literary representation to become relevant and effective, they need to 
recognize their entanglement in the condition they set out to critique and represent. That 
is, they have to be willing and able to ‘compromise’. According to Smith, ‘Compromise 
aesthetics […] celebrate works in which the constructed nature of the individual is 
highlighted but where that constructed individual nevertheless remains the vessel of 
enormous emotional energy.’34 Smith’s remark suggests that compromise aesthetics 
compromises by adopting the neoliberal view of human subjects as an entrepreneur or a 
form of capital with exploitable values. As Smith further explains, ‘the appeal to actually 
existing personal and emotional value is in pronounced agreement with the neoliberal 
model of the entrepreneur, who is envisioned as both an artificial construct and intensely 
important, both mutable and unique, both the result of a process of production and a site 
specific and undeniable value.’35 The personal and emotional value of the subject, Smith 
argues, is the animating force behind the production of meaning and value in the neoliberal 
context. Only when the subject views themselves as ‘the vessel of enormous emotional 
energy’ can they enter into a networked relation with the text and invest themselves as one 
of the ‘cocreators of meanings’. In other words, only when the subject fully becomes a 
neoliberal subject, who can provide emotional and personal input into the process of 
meaning production, critique and representation can then become effective and relevant 
again.  
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Network Subjectivities and the Genre (s) of Utopia 
Super Sad and The Circle demonstrate the intersection between form and criticism through 
a reassessment of the utopia genre as a mode of critique. Both novels use the network form 
to examine how a utopian narrative is used as a critical discourse. However, the novels 
adopt two different stances towards the genre of utopia according to their different 
approaches to the network form. I propose that while Super Sad is written as a critical 
dystopia to demonstrate the power of network connections in producing an effective 
criticism, The Circle projects an anti-utopian position in its narrative that criticizes the 
rigidity, exclusivity, and enclosure aspects of the network. These contrasting positions are 
then demonstrated in the way the novels represent network subjectivities. As I will 
demonstrate later, Super Sad follows the convention of critical dystopia and portrays 
network subjectivities as a new oppositional agency. Moreover, the novel ends with these 
network subjects being in an ambivalent yet hopeful position. Such an ending thus further 
reflects a critical dystopia’s tendency to use ambiguity to imagine a utopian possibility. On 
the contrary, The Circle expresses its anti-utopian attitude in the way it represents network 
subjectivities as a schizophrenic condition. Specifically, the novel imagines how a 
seemingly utopian social system such as networked individualism can produce a sinister 
outcome in the form of a network subject being cut loose and drifting aimlessly in a social 
network.  
According to Latour, there is a ‘specific double movement’ embedded in the notion 
of the network. He cautions that, with the word the network, ‘we must be careful not to 




heterogeneous set of elements that allow circulation to occur’ (emphasis in original).36 For 
Latour, it is crucial to distinguish between and understand these two senses of the network 
as ‘complementary phenomena’. On the one hand, the network refers to how heterogeneous 
elements can come together and constitute an entity. However, their connections can be 
diverse, discontinuous, and unpredictable. The only way one can gain knowledge about the 
network is by tracing the trail of links. On the other hand, the network is a stable, 
continuous, and wholesome structure in which diverse entities circulate and connect. We 
can only appreciate the network in this sense only by paying attention to the heterogeneous 
connections within it. Therefore, Latour suggests a more specific definition that attends to 
both aspects of the network form. In Latour’s definition, the network becomes ‘a series of 
associations revealed thanks to a trial […] that makes it possible to understand through 
what series of small discontinuities it is appropriate to pass in order to obtain a certain 
continuity of action’ (emphasis in original).37  
 Utopia contains a similar double meaning to the network. It can be understood as 
either a ‘method’ or a ‘goal’.  On the one hand, utopia is a form of thought experiment. 
Ruth Levitas refers to utopia in this sense as ‘the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society’.  
She defines it as a hermeneutic method that ‘facilitates genuinely holistic thinking about 
possible futures, combined with reflexivity, provisionality and democratic engagement 
with the principles and practices of those futures’.38 Utopia as a method matches Latour’s 
earlier suggestion about tracing the network and exploring a variety of elements that pass 
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through and interconnect with one another. Utopia is also a trial of thought that attempts to 
find and trace associations that make up possible futures. That explains why Levitas refers 
to utopia as ‘holistic thinking’ or ‘democratic engagement with the principles and practices 
of those futures.’ In other words, utopia as a method is a network method. It imagines a 
future by trying to understand what elements and factors need to be connected. It is a trial 
of thought that aims to discover possible associations that can make a better future possible. 
 On the other hand, utopia can also be perceived as a fixed idea about a perfect 
society. It is an approach to utopia analogous to thinking about the network as a wholesome 
structure. Characterizing utopia in this manner glosses over the complexity of utopia as a 
hermeneutic mode of thinking and simply viewing it as a goal that could and should be 
realized. Moreover, linking utopia with perfection reinforces the idea of utopia as a static 
and unchallengeable ideal. Any derivation from the utopian plan is obstructive to the effort 
to realize it. Accordingly, utopia can come across as a totalitarian concept and beget anti-
utopian criticism. According to Lucy Sargisson:  
Anti-utopianism articulates deep fears. […] Lurking at the root of these fears is a set 
of associations between utopianism and perfection. […] Exponents of this view believe 
that utopianism is, at some essential and definitional level, perfection seeking, 
authoritarian and intolerant of dissent.39  
Conflating utopia with perfection, anti-utopian critics see the concept as inherently 
oppressive and possibly violent in its intolerance of dissident opinions. Sargisson thus also 
warns that ‘it is important to distinguish between utopias that function as catalysts for 
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change […] and those that function as blueprints for a perfect society’.40 Thinking of utopia 
as a mandate is a narrow interpretation that does not only mischaracterize the concept but 
undermines its critical potential as a never-ending process of desiring and striving to 
achieve a better future that can never arrive. When understood as such, utopia becomes an 
anti-perfection concept. As Moylan explains about the mechanism of utopia as a method: 
 [U]topian hope pulls us forward by challenging us with figures of new social 
possibilities: possibilities that, once approached, will themselves yield to more 
far-reaching visions at the moving horizon of our, necessarily collective, efforts 
to create a better society out of what is available.41 
Here Moylan explains the inherent paradox of utopia. Its ‘perfection seeking’ quality 
cannot be confused with perfection. The act of looking for perfection is a negation of the 
existence of perfection itself. The moment that utopia is realized, a better vision will be 
inevitably conceived, and the utopian effort continues. 
 Historically, the genre of dystopia used to be associated with anti-utopianism.42 
However, just as anti-utopian criticism tends to gloss over the complexity of utopia, it 
would be remiss to conflate dystopia with anti-utopia. Dystopia, according to Moylan, is 
‘a contested continuum between utopian and anti-utopian positions’.43 To label dystopia as 
anti-utopian is to ignore the nuances of the genre. Some dystopias express an affinity with 
utopia as a method. Instead of imagining positive possibilities, these dystopias find a 
solution for a better future even in the worst scenario. For this reason, the genre of dystopia 
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can be divided into two subgenres according to their affinity with utopianism, namely 
‘critical dystopia’ and ‘anti-utopian dystopia’. Critical dystopia is a pessimistic portrayal 
of an imaginary society that still contains utopian sensibility. According to Lyman Tower 
Sargent’s definition, cited in Moylan, critical dystopia is a type of utopian texts that 
portray: 
a non-existent society […]  that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to 
view as worse than contemporary society but that normally includes at least one 
eutopia enclave or holds out hope that the dystopia can be overcome and replaced 
with a eutopia.44  
Despite portraying a dystopic scenario, critical dystopia expresses a hopeful possibility. 
There are elements, ‘at least one eutopia enclave’, that maintain a utopian hope for a better 
society. In contrast, an anti-utopian dystopia portrays a dire situation and expresses a 
mistrust of utopian positivity. It ‘refuses all utopian hope and effort’45 as a possible measure 
of mitigation. These dystopias, Moylan writes, ‘look quizzically, sceptically, critically not 
only at the present society but also at the means needed to transform it’.46 Accordingly, it 
is vital to distinguish between these two kinds of dystopia because they serve different 
purposes. A critical dystopia is a critiquing tool that follows the principle of the utopian 
method. However, rather than imagining a more optimistic scenario, it uses a dystopian 
circumstance to offer a critique as a warning and a possible solution that will eventually 
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lead to a better society. The purpose of anti-utopia, on the contrary, is to criticize the 
utopian discourse itself, especially its totalitarian tendency. 
 As a textual representation, critical dystopia and anti-utopian dystopia can also be 
distinguished at the formal level. According to Rafaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan, the 
dystopian form, in general, is ‘built around the construction of a narrative of the hegemonic 
order and a counter-narrative of resistance’.47 A dystopian narrative begins amid a 
nightmarish scenario in which a counter-narrative emerges as a sign of resistance. Moylan 
explains that in a typical dystopian narrative: 
[T]he protagonist (and the reader) is always already in the world in question, 
unreflectively immersed in the society. But the counter-narrative develops as the 
“dystopian citizen” moves from apparent contentment into an experience of alienation 
that is followed by growing awareness and then action that leads to a climatic event 
that does or does not challenge or change the society.48  
The competing narrative structure is crucial in the distinction between critical dystopia and 
anti-utopia. How the narrative conflict is resolved, whether it ‘does or does not challenge 
or change the society,’ marks a difference between the two dystopian subgenres. As 
Moylan further suggests: 
[T]he potential of a dystopian text to achieve an epical, or open, expression lies in the 
way it negotiates the clash of the official narrative and the oppositional counter-
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narrative and eventually is realized in a utopian or anti-utopian stance within its own 
healthy negativity.49 
The negotiation between the narrative clash can determine whether the text ‘holds out 
hope’ that a solution to the narrative conflict is possible. A critical dystopia will offer an 
‘open’ circumstance, suggesting a way to move forward, whereas an anti-utopia will 
remain pessimistic about the negativity. The two possible solutions to the narrative conflict 
that Moylan describes here powerfully resonates with the double movement found in the 
notions of the network and utopianism as outlined earlier. Critical dystopia tends to resolve 
the narrative tension through flexibility and openness. The tension between the two 
narratives does not result in an impasse. Instead, critical dystopia sees the hegemonic 
narrative and the counter-narrative as complementary and imagines a scenario for the third 
option that incorporates aspects from both sides of the argument. Anti-utopian dystopia, on 
the other hand, views the two narratives as incompatible and uncompromising. It is also 
inclined to portray the outcome of the narrative tension by favoring one narrative over 
another.  
 The difference between Super Sad and The Circle as a critical dystopia and an anti-
utopian dystopia is discernible in their use of the parallel narrative structure. Both novels 
represent network subjectivities as a solution to the conflict between hegemonic and 
oppositional narratives. However, their interpretation of the network differs and thus 
reflects their respective critical dystopian and anti-utopian stands. In other words, the 
understanding of the network either as a fixed structure or a dynamic process informs the 
novels’ solution to the narrative conflict and reflects their utopian affinity or animosity. 
 




Accordingly, I contend that Jan Van Djik’s ‘network approach’ is a useful tool to examine 
network subjectivities in the novels’ use of utopian subgenres.  According to Van Djik, the 
network is an open system where individual, closed units are connected. The network 
approach pays attention to these connections; it ‘stresses the importance of the relations as 
compared to the units that are linked’.50 Furthermore, the approach prioritizes how the units 
are linked to what the units are. Van Djik sees that connection, not what is connected, can 
lead to substantive changes and transformations in the system. As he further explains:  
As soon as these closed units are forced, for one reason or another, to interact with 
their environment and to link themselves to other units in a network, they create an 
open system. In an open system, complete determination is lost and replaced by chance 
and random events. That allows change and new opportunities.51 
Changes and new opportunities are possible only through open linkages and interactions 
between entities. Therefore, it is essential to consider how entities are connected and trace 
them if one wishes to understand and imagine a better society. This is the point of departure 
from which I will discuss the difference in how Super Sad and The Circle represent their 
network subjectivities. In the following, I will demonstrate how the network approach 
characterizes network subjectivities in Super Sad as what Moylan calls a ‘new form of 
oppositional agency’. The narrative tension in critical dystopia produces Van Djik’s open 
system in the form of a middle space from which a new agency emerges. For Moylan: 
[T]he critical dystopias resist both hegemonic and oppositional orthodoxies […] 
They consequently inscribe a space for a new form of political opposition, one 
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fundamentally based in difference and multiplicity but wisely and cannily 
organized in a fully democratic alliance politics that can talk back in a larger 
though diverse collective voice.52 
This type of oppositional agency is characteristically hybrid and heterogeneous. It is 
constituted through relations and alliances. Moreover, it does not entirely negate the 
hegemony, nor does it fully capitulate to the oppositional order. Instead, it challenges both 
‘hegemonic formulations as well as oppositional habits’ to find a middle ground. The 
middle space operates as an open system in which flexible connections make ‘chances and 
randomness’ happen and, consequently, create new opportunities. Accordingly, it is 
possible to use Van Djik’s network approach to characterize Super Sad and The Circle as 
respectively a critical dystopia and an anti-utopia. His approach can determine whether 
their network subjectivities represent a new form of oppositional agency. The network 
approach can identify whether these subjects are defeated by or resist the tension between 
the hegemonic narrative and the counter-narrative and whether they embody a utopian 
sensibility by forming relations and alliances and carving out a middle, hybrid space can 
claim as their own. 
Network Subjectivities as Oppositional Agency in Super Sad True Love Story 
Super Sad is a speculative dystopian novel that centers on a second-generation immigrant 
couple – Lenny Abramov, a 39-year-old Jewish-Russian man who works as a salesman of 
life-extension technology, and Eunice Park, a 24-year-old Korean-American woman from 
a middle-class Christian family. The novel follows the development of their relationship 
since they first meet in Italy, where Eunice spends her gap year, and Lenny recruits new 
 




European clients. Shteyngart structures the story by alternating between Lenny’s diaries 
and Eunice’s online correspondence with her family and friends on a Facebook-like 
platform called GlobalTeens. The novel opens with Lenny’s diary, describing the US 
plagued by social, economic, and foreign crises. The reader learns that the country has 
become a hyper-surveillance and narcissistic network society where almost everyone uses 
a highly advanced, smartphone-like device called the äppärät to conduct most social 
activities and day-to-day affairs. The device, whose latest model is called RateMe Plus, 
can access, share, and compare the user’s health and financial data with others. In addition, 
the äppärät can generate ratings and rankings of individual users in wide-ranging categories 
from credit score to level of attractiveness. People become obsessed with improving their 
popularity in social networks to gain a sense of self-worth and self-affirmation. 
Consequently, Shteyngart’s dystopia is also driven by excessive consumption that has 
become a means for people to improve their status and social ranking. 
 The novel also imagines how the US becomes an authoritarian state run by a 
corrupted bipartisan group called the American Restoration Authority, or the ARA. The 
group is liquidating the country to foreign governments and big corporations to pay off 
billions of dollars that it borrows from the Central Bank of China. There is a nationwide 
protest against the government’s authoritarian control and failure that causes severe 
economic and political crises and unprecedented levels of inequality and oppression. When 
Lenny returns to the US, he also discovers that being American has lost its privilege even 
on American soil. Landing at the JFK airport, he sees national guards, armored carriers, 




American identity: ‘I took out my U.S. passport and held it in my hand, fingering its 
embossed golden eagle, still hoping it meant something.’53  
 The struggle of second-generation immigrants such as Lenny and Eunice to uphold 
their American identity against the backdrop of the US on the verge of collapsing is a 
critical element that characterizes the novel as a dystopian narrative. Nonetheless, the 
development of their new subjectivity also represents the utopian sensibility that 
characterizes Shteyngart’s novel as a critical dystopia. The impending loss of American 
sovereignty, coupled with the general sense of insecurity from being part of a hyper-
network society, propels Lenny and Eunice to reassess their immigrant subjectivity and 
respond to the crises. Both characters eventually develop a new subjectivity that is 
grounded in their relationality and embeddedness in a network of alliances. In other words, 
their new subjectivity reflects the new oppositional agency that is characteristic of a critical 
dystopia.  
 When using ANT’s concept of the actor to consider the new political agency, it also 
becomes clear how the new oppositional agency could function as the ‘eutopian conclave’ 
that Sargent ascribes to a critical dystopia. Latour defines actors as ‘what is made to act by 
many others’.54 An actor does not have a fundamental core. Its agency derives from its 
ability to affect and be affected by other entities. Moreover, actors are not limited to 
humans. They can be ‘concrete or abstract, artificial, structural, anything – as long as they 
can be shown to make a difference’.55 Accordingly, ANT contends that everything is made 
up of relations. In other words, it considers actors as relational entities without a 
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fundamental essence that can completely distinguish them from others. Like an actor, 
Moylan’s oppositional agency is also constituted by its relations and alliances. Its strength 
relies on the diversity and multiplicity of ties and associations that it can cultivate. The 
more connected it is, the stronger its ability to ‘talk back’ to its social world. For Moylan, 
the utopian optimism in critical dystopia rests in this kind of agency that can critically 
engage with the world by embracing their relationality as an actor in the network.  
 ANT’s concept of actors can describe Lenny and Eunice as a network subject with 
the alliance-based oppositional agency. Their potential as a network actor is reflected in 
their characterization as a second-generation immigrant who has to produce a new 
immigrant identity that no longer follows the hyphenation model. At the start of the novel, 
both characters experience tension with their parents. They see themselves being a native 
citizen in the country where their parents still feel alienated. In Lenny’s words, they are 
both ‘the offspring of difficult parents from abroad’.56 Here, the novel seems to follow the 
typical trope of the generational conflict of immigrant experiences. Yet, as the US is on the 
verge of collapsing, Lenny and Eunice find that their immigrant subjectivity has to 
transcend the conflict between their ethnic heritage and national identity. They need to find 
a way to forge a new immigrant identity to survive in such a difficult situation. In his 
reading of the novel, Brian Trapp similarly argues that their struggle to overcome the 
consent and descent tension, or the ‘elements of identities that we choose and those that we 
inherit’57 is no longer applicable in Lenny and Eunice’s cases. With the US facing 
existential crises, the two characters find that ‘there is no longer a national identity worth 
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consenting to’.58 Accordingly, Trapp characterizes Super Sad as an inverted diasporic 
American immigrant narrative that aims to express the ‘nostalgia for a lost American 
homeland’ (emphasis in original).59  
 The Rupture is the pivotal event that drives Lenny and Eunice to form a new 
immigrant subjectivity beyond the consent and descent conflict. The Rupture refers to a 
mysterious missile attack on a New York ferry that kills all passengers on board. Watching 
the ferry sink down into the harbor, Lenny describes that he experiences a feeling of 
disillusionment about his life as an American: 
[A]s the John F. Kennedy reared up, split into two, disintegrated into the warm 
waters, as the first part of our lives, the false part, came to an end, the question we 
had forgotten to ask for so many years was finally shouted by one husky voice, 
stage left: “But why?” (emphasis in original)60 
Asking ‘But why?’, Lenny questions his struggle to assimilate and build a life as an 
American. Watching the ferry sinking, he realizes that the battle is futile. Being a second-
generation immigrant is the ‘false’ part of his life that has now come to an end. Symbolized 
by the sinking ferry named after one of the most beloved presidents in history but also 
assassinated, the US is doomed and collapsing in front of Lenny’s eyes. Witnessing the 
Rupture makes him finally denounce his American identity and reclaim the bond with his 
parents: ‘Who was I? […] But basically – at the end of the busted rainbow, at the end of 
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the day, at the end of the empire – little more than my parents’ son.’61 Without America, 
Lenny seeks to re-establish a bond with his Russian heritage and with his foreign parents.  
Similarly, Eunice reacts to the Rupture by seeking comfort in her Korean root. In a 
message she writes to herself, Eunice expresses a new-found sense of self-affirmation in 
light of the loss of her American homeland:  
America might be gone completely soon, but I was never really an American. It 
was all pretending. I was always a Korean girl from a Korean family with a Korean 
way of doing things, and I’m proud of what that means. It means that, unlike so 
many people around me, I know who I am.62  
Eunice echoes Lenny’s lament in that she also sees her American identity as a false part, a 
pretense. She is always a Korean girl as Lenny is his parents’ son. While both characters 
choose to identify with their descent identity in the aftermath of the Rupture, I contend that 
their decision does not limit their agency even after they decide to abandon their American 
identity. Instead, by reclaiming their ethnic heritage, the two characters can explore more 
options for their survival in the post-Rupture US. Trapp explains that, in denouncing their 
American identity, Lenny and Eunice ‘have declined to assimilate and have chosen their 
ethnic identity over their American one, passing up even the multicultural hyphen that 
would tether them to two identities’.63 Yet, I see that, by embracing their ethnic roots, 
Lenny and Eunice can be part of a larger collective, which gives them more opportunities 
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to take meaningful actions against the crisis they are facing. They can use the reestablished 
bond with their family to guide their actions and decisions.  
However, the reclamation of their respective heritage roots also explains why both 
characters begin to drift apart in the post-Rupture. The mutual recognition that they both 
belong to a larger collective allows them to see themselves responsible for greater 
happiness beyond the personal happiness of their relationship. Lenny describes that 
Eunice’s grief after the Rupture makes him realizes for the first time that Eunice is ‘not 
completely ahistorical’.64 She is a relational being with an ability to mourn the loss of her 
historical ties. Experiencing post-Rupture distress, Eunice becomes a woman with more 
substance and no longer simply ‘a nano-sized woman […] who existed as easily on an 
apparat screen as on the street’.65 Now, she is a full historical being representing ‘a place 
so deep […] somewhere across the seas, and from a time when our nations were barely 
formed’.66 However, when Lenny finally sees Eunice as a historical being, he rejects her. 
She comes to represent another network of connections of which he is an outsider. 
Therefore, after witnessing Eunice’s episode, Lenny feels a strong desire to be among his 
close friends and family. Accordingly, he feels even more alienated from Eunice: ‘I want 
to connect with my parents and to Vishnu and Grace, I want to mourn Noah with them. But 
all I have is Eunice and my Wall of Books.’67 Eunice becomes a resentment that cannot 
offer solace and comfort because she does not belong with him.  
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However, while Lenny rejects Eunice because her historicity alienates her, Eunice 
also decides to leave him not long after that. She feels driven by the newly found 
recognition of her embedded subjectivity to do something for the greater good. Her 
decision to leave Lenny for his boss Joshie is collateral to her recognition of ‘something 
powerful in being able to let go and focus on something that’s completely outside of 
yourself’.68Accordingly, she has to claim both ‘common unhappiness’ and ‘common 
responsibility’, which is translated into getting with Joshie who is more suited to help her 
family survive in the post-Rupture America. 
Lenny and Eunice’s decision to reclaim the familial bond also reflects their critical 
response to the neoliberal value that has subsumed them. The revelation after the Rupture 
that they are still their parents’ children and part of the ethnic heritage of their families 
indicates the formation of the alliance-based oppositional agency that will later allow them 
to challenge the neoliberal order. I contend that Lenny and Eunice also turn to their family 
and identify themselves with an ethnic group as a means to ground themselves in a 
symbolic order that neoliberalism has destabilized. That is, I see that Shteyngart further 
problematizes the descent and consent conflict by placing both characters in a neoliberal 
network society where the loss of American national identity is symptomatic of the 
dominance of neoliberal value.  
In other words, the novel is also written in the genre that Sheri-Marie Harrison calls 
‘neoliberal novels of migrancy’ or a type of immigrant fiction that explores the experiences 
of immigrant subjects who also become a form of capital. For Harrison, these novels 
 




explore a circumstance in which immigrants are free from the symbolic order that endows 
an ethnic or national identity. Instead, they can choose and create new identities as they 
freely move across an open, networked space of neoliberal society. Immigrants from older 
generations such as Lenny and Eunice’s parents may only experience the conflict between 
the need to assimilate and the desire to preserve their ethnic roots. However, unlike their 
parents, Lenny and Eunice are also a neoliberal subject. According to Harrison, these 
subjects are ‘a form of capital committed to endless movement across borders and commits 
to enrichment in various spaces’.69 Therefore, the strained relationship with their parents is 
not simply a typical intergenerational conflict but the tension between the traditional 
immigrant subjects that are still firmly attached to their symbolic identities and the 
neoliberal immigrant subjects who are pressured to create new imaginary identities in order 
to enrich and increase their values in the social world that functions as a market.  
 Put differently, Super Sad uses the immigrant trope to highlight the ‘decline of 
symbolic efficiency’ in a neoliberal network society. The novel’s dystopian setting is 
premised on the demise of the US and portrays a society in which advanced information 
technologies create what Jodi Dean calls ‘communicative capitalism’. According to Dean, 
communicative capitalism is a new ideological formation in which democracy and 
networked communication technologies have converged. These technologies make 
excessive consumption and surveillance an essential apparatus of social life. However, the 
same technologies can seemingly promote democratic ideals such as freedom, inclusion, 
and equal access. This convergence creates ‘a new setting of complete openness and 
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freedom – no authority tells the subject what to do, what to desire, how to structure its 
choices’. 70 People are free to become whoever they want through consumption and 
communication. However, the intersection between democratic values and network 
technologies ultimately results in the emergence of a society where the symbolic mode of 
identification such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and gender has lost its purchase. Instead, 
there are only imaginary identities produced through communication and consumption. As 
Dean further explains, in place of symbolic identifications are   
imaginary injunctions to develop our creative potential and cultivate our 
individuality, injunctions supported by capitalism’s provision of the ever new 
experiences and accessories we use to perform this self-fashioning. […] Neoliberal 
subjects are expected to, enjoined to, have a good time, have it all, be happy, fit, 
and fulfilled.71 
The imperative to enjoy life, be happy, healthy, and fulfilled is the cause of anxiety that 
Lenny and Eunice experience throughout the novel. The injunction of communicative 
capitalism leads Lenny’s boss, Joshie, to contend that ‘There will be plenty of time to 
ponder and write and act out later. Right now you’ve got to sell to live’ (emphasis in 
original).72 In other words, Joshie instructs Lenny to ‘sell’ a version of self that fits the 
social standard and expectation. To sell himself effectively, Lenny is told to learn to gauge 
his position against his competitors, ‘Learn to rank people quicker.’73 To socialize in the 
dystopian world of Super Sad is to ‘FAC’ or to’form a community’. However, this version 
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of a community only entails engaging with one another in a kind of market transaction that 
involves preparing and presenting oneself to be rated and ranked and hopefully sold to the 
attracted buyer. 
 Super Sad captures the decline of symbolic efficiency through its focus on how 
network technologies facilitate the transformation of humans into market capital. The novel 
also uses the collapse of the US to illustrate how neoliberalism can affect the relationship 
between the state and its citizens. Neoliberal ideology dictates that both the state and the 
citizen become market actors. The state is no longer obligated to provide social security 
but merely facilitate the transaction in which social services are a product in the market. 
Consequently, citizenship becomes an identitarian category that loses its symbolic 
efficiency. Moreover, Wendy Brown warns that ‘when the domain of the political itself is 
rendered in economic terms, the foundation vanishes for citizenship concerned with public 
things and the common good’.74 The market logic will destabilize the state-citizen 
relationship to the point where it might be impossible to imagine what it means to fulfill 
civic duties or play the part of a good citizen. Eva Cherniavsky also raises a similar concern 
about the condition of citizenship in a neoliberal era. She questions the legitimacy of 
citizenship when the state becomes ‘the non-representing bodies of government that have 
effectively cut themselves loose from any commitment to a general interest.’ 75 In this 
scenario, the citizen becomes an ‘entrepreneur citizen’ who is ‘designed to look after 
herself through responsible self-management and optimization of life prospects […] who 
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forges her own conditions of self-realization’.76 Lenny and Eunice’s anxiety as an 
immigrant subject is also a projection of how the neoliberal order destabilizes their national 
identity. As the US government cannot fulfill its responsibility as a sovereign nation-state, 
Lenny and Eunice can no longer perform the role of a good American citizen. 
 However, as the post-Rupture reclamation of their ethnic heritage demonstrates, 
both characters successfully regain the symbolic efficiency of their identity by insisting on 
grounding themselves in their ethnic roots. Moreover, the novel’s ending implies that both 
characters also eventually become transnational subjects with even more relations that will 
strengthen their subjectivity and ability to survive in the neoliberal world. Eunice moves 
to London and later settles in Scotland while Lenny relocates to Canada before spending 
his final years in Italy. Trapp points out the significance of the novel’s transnational ending 
in his argument, writing that ‘Shteyngart, in effect, stages a speculative American diaspora. 
[…] Without a nation, the next best thing is someplace with the best opportunity. They can 
leave America because the future is no longer exclusively there.’77 Positing the possibility 
of an ‘American diaspora’, Super Sad’s ending demonstrates the epical, open quality of its 
narrative, representing a utopian sensibility in such a bleak dystopian scenario of the novel. 
As Moylan elaborates: 
The epical narrative will look to a more fundamental engagement with the 
contradictions of the moment and open up a range of alternative social possibilities. 
[…] In an epical text, therefore, “choice” shapes the agential relations and the 
ending in “new and better” ways, ones not readily predicted.78 
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The unpredictability allows critical dystopian texts such as Super Sad to end on a hopeful 
note. Even though Lenny and Eunice end up being separated and become ‘ex-American 
citizens’, their future remains unpredictable and hopeful. Because of the unpredictability, 
what is ‘new and better’ will always be possible for them.   
Network Subjectivities as Schizophrenic Networked Individuals in The Circle  
This section will demonstrate that The Circle is an anti-utopian narrative that depicts 
narrative subjectivities as a type of schizophrenia. I will argue that the novel uses the utopia 
genre conventions to interpret the network form in a stricter sense as a fixed and static 
system of connection. With such an interpretation of the network, the novel represents 
network subjects as schizophrenic individuals from a network society that disregards the 
importance of relations and relationality.  
 Eggers’s novel begins with its protagonist Mae Holland’s first day of employment 
at a giant tech company called the Circle. In the opening chapter, Eggers describes Mae’s 
induction day in a typical utopian narrative in which Mae assumes the role of the visitor 
being guided through the Circle campus. The campus appears to her like a utopia and 
prompts her to realize the inferiority of ‘anywhere else’:  
Her hometown, and the rest of California, the rest of America, seemed like some 
chaotic mess in the developing world. Outside the walls of the Circle, all was noise 
and struggle, failure and filth. But here, all had been perfected. The best people had 
made the best systems and the best systems had reaped funds, unlimited funds, that 
made possible this, the best place to work. And it was natural that it was so, Mae 
thought. Who else but utopians could make utopia?79 
 




Unlike Lenny and Eunice, who are placed in a dire situation that pushes them to rethink 
their subjectivities, Mae’s story begins in a utopia where she is surrounded by ‘utopians’ 
and will be living in a society run by the ‘best systems’. Her challenge is to reconstitute 
her subjectivity to fit in the new place she perceives as a utopia. With Mae’s induction, the 
novel thus begins its anti-utopian criticism by exploring how the authoritarian nature of 
utopia, especially its belief in the perfectability of human beings and a version of ideal 
humans, influences Mae’s character development as she strives to fit in and become a 
utopian herself. Throughout the novel, Eggers represents Mae as a victim of a repressive 
and coercive utopian ideology. The exchange between Mae and her friend Annie in the 
opening chapter provides a first clue as to how Mae will be subjected to the authoritarian 
control of the company: 
‘[…] This is what you’re tasked with doing the first day: getting to know the place, the 
people, getting acclimated. You know how when you put new wood floors into your 
house –” 
“No, I don’t” 
“Well, when you do, you first have to let them sit there for ten days, to get the wood 
acclimated. Then you do the installation.” 
“So in this analogy, I’m the wood?” 
“You are the wood.” 
“And then I’ll be installed.” 
“Yes, we will then install you. We’ll hammer you with ten thousand tiny nails. You’ll 
love it.”80 
 




The novel’s plot is then arranged in linear order as it follows Mae’s experiences being 
‘acclimated,’ ‘hammered,’ and finally ‘installed’ into the Circle. From a wide-eyed, 
awestruck new employee to an uncritical advocator and the poster child of the company’s 
vision and ideology, Mae has been molded to the point that she is no longer recognizable 
as a sympathetic, or even realistic, human being.  
 On the one hand, the novel’s representation of network subjectivities is tied to the 
Circle’s vision of a perfect human being. On the other hand, the story also focuses on how 
the company can use the utopian rhetoric to veil its authoritarian goal. The Circle wants to 
build a hyper-surveillance network system in which all human activities, both online and 
offline, will be channeled through the Circle’s network. In the network society envisioned 
by the Circle, every human being will be connected, locatable, and identifiable. People will 
be willing to surrender their right to privacy in exchange for a transparent and accountable 
society. They will subject themselves to various forms of surveillance such as voluntary 
self-tracking and corporate surveillance for the sake of efficiency and convenience. The 
Circle’s vision of human perfectibility rests on the total transparency and accessibility of 
all knowledge and information in the world.  
 In other words, the Circle promotes the idea that humans have a knowable and 
irreducible core to validate its tyrannical vision. This assumption about humans is reflected 
in the ideology of Ty Gospodinov, the company’s founder who invents TruYou, the 
operating system that launches the Company’s success. TruYou allows any online 
transactions to be conducted with only one account tied to the user's real identity. TruYou 
account is ‘unbendable and unmaskable’ just like one’s personal identity that is supposed 




‘the world-striding CEO and self-described Capitalist Prime,’81 to capitalize and monetize 
TruYou. He also hires Eamon Bailey to be the face of the company. Bailey is the most 
accessible and likable among the ‘Three Wise Men’ as the three men are known. Bailey, 
the narrator tells us, has ‘a way of speaking that was both lyrical and grounded, giving his 
audiences wonderful turns of phrase one moment and plainspoken common sense the 
next’.82 The story of the Three Wise Men working behind the success of TruYou is an 
allegory of the novel’s anti-utopian narrative about the danger of utopianism. The Three 
Wise Men represent the marriage of technology, capitalism, and the power of rhetoric in 
propagating and profiting from the utopian ideal of human’s perfectibility and essentialism.  
 Therefore, The Circle’s anti-utopian message questions the belief in human 
perfectability and how the concept of perfection is repressive and manipulatable for 
profitable ends. The novel undermines the idea of human perfectability through its 
portrayal of a network society that functions like Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman’s concept 
of a social system called ‘networked individualism. The term designates the way in which 
‘people become increasingly networked as individuals, rather than embedded in groups’.83 
People connect and communicate with one another as individuals in a network because the 
advanced communication technologies turn individual users into ‘the autonomous center 
just as she is reaching out from her computer’.84 Networked individualism is also founded 
on the belief in human perfectibility that Eggers’s novel critiques. As Rainie and Wellman 
explain, networked individualism views humans as having ‘a networked self, a core being 
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that emphasizes different identities as they connect with each milieu.’85 At the same time, 
being a networked individual provides more options to solve problems and fulfill social 
needs: ‘It offers more freedom […] more room to maneuverer and more capacity to act on 
their own’.86 Rainie and Wellman’s explanation of networked individualism is reminiscent 
of Bailey’s vision of a completely transparent network society in which ‘we can solve any 
problem […] because we won’t be dragged down by all our weaknesses, our petty secrets, 
our hoarding of information and knowledge’.87 It is possible to describe the Circle’s 
ultimate goal, the completion of the networked circle, as a vision inspired by the idea of 
networked individualism. 
 I contend that The Circle’s anti-utopian narrative seeks to portray how the ideal of 
networked individualism can produce a schizophrenic subject. The image of a person being 
an ‘autonomous center’ of a machine in the networked individualism system invites a 
comparison with Jean Baudrillard’s description of a highly advanced network society in 
which humans see themselves ‘at the controls of a hypothetical machine, isolated in a 
position of perfect and remote sovereignty, at an infinite distance from his universe of 
origin.’88 However, according to Baudrillard, how humans will transform into a brain 
connected to a machine as an isolated, free-floating unit is not only obscene but also 
schizophrenic. He writes that: 
Then with communication and information, with the immanent promiscuity of all 
these networks, with their continual connections, we are now in a new form of 
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schizophrenia. No more hysteria, no more projective paranoia, properly speaking, 
but this state of terror proper to the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of 
everything, the unclean promiscuity of everything which touches, invests and 
penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his own 
body, to protect him anymore.89 
Baudrillard’s warning is the underlying message that the novel seeks to express in its 
representation of network subjectivities. Such a warning is most evident in the Book II 
section of the novel that follows Mae’s progression after she agrees to wear a surveillance 
camera on her body and broadcast her life live to the audience around the globe. In addition, 
as the novel progresses, Mae’s workstation at the Circle also expands and has multiple 
screens installed all around her. Mae’s feeling about being surrounded by various screens 
while communicating and connecting with people worldwide also invokes an image not 
dissimilar to Baudrillard’s description of a man being surrounded and enthralled by 
machines. ‘Now she was communicating with clients all over the planet, commanding six 
screens, training a new group of newbies, and altogether feeling more needed, more valued, 
and more intellectually stimulated than she ever thought possible.’90  
Mae’s feeling of empowerment and control at her workstation is also similar to the 
description of networked individuals. As Rainie and Wellman suggest, ‘networked 
individuals have new powers to create media and project their voices to more extended 
audiences that become part of their social worlds.’91 However, as networked individualism 
encourages looser social ties in exchange for having ‘more extended audiences,’ networked 
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individuals risk feeling overly exhausted and insecure. In fact, Rainie and Wellman identify 
exhaustion as one of the negative aspects of networked individualism. They claim that the 
system is ‘both socially liberating and socially taxing’92  because having more social ties 
from having a more extensive network also requires more time and effort to sustain them. 
They also use the word ‘work’ to describe social interactions of networked individuals and 
how ‘the technology that promises to connect people also threatens to overload them with 
extra work’.93 
 It is not surprising that the dissolution of work and play in the networked 
environment is also a proud achievement of the Circle. The company collapses the 
boundary between work and home by introducing the ‘HomeTown’ project. HomeTown is 
an on-campus accommodation facility for employees who want to work overtime. Mae 
uses the HomeTown facility when she feels pressured to increase her ‘PartiRank’, 
indicating the individual’s participation in the Circle’s social network. Mae has to stay on 
campus because she needs to ‘work’ till late so that her PartiRank goes up. By the end of 
her first night at HomeTown, she feels ‘a profound sense of accomplishment and possibility 
that was accompanied, by a near-complete sense of exhaustion’.94 That the feeling of 
accomplishment and exhaustion become associated with social activities is indicative of 
how work life and social life become inseparable. Baudrillard describes that combination 
of feelings as the ‘ecstasy of communication’ that abolishes any division of spaces and 
merges everything into ‘a single dimension of information’. 95  For Baudrillard, this is the 
promiscuity of the communication network in which ‘an extermination of interstitial and 
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protective spaces’ has finally taken place. The novel’s use of the circle symbol also 
effectively illustrates this extermination of spatial distinction. As Bailey says to Mae, the 
circle is the symbol of perfection because of its all-inclusiveness. Yet, without alternative 
spaces to escape to, one feels ultimately trapped, as Mae’s exhaustion demonstrates.  
 Apart from exhaustion, networked individuals also experience disembeddedness, 
insecurity, and uncertainty about who they are. Networked individualism hinges on the 
belief that everyone has ‘a core being’. Networked individuals can move through different 
ties and groups and present different sides of themselves in each scenario because they 
have a firm purchase on who they essentially are. In their argument about networked 
individualism, Rainie and Wellman use the story of Peter and Trudy as a case study of two 
successful networked individuals. Peter and Trudy can adapt in multiple environments 
because ‘they are still Peter and Trudy wherever they participate.’96 Rainie and Wellman’s 
argument again invokes Baudrillard’s use of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ when he 
describes how humans are isolated in orbit as a microsatellite, as a node in the network. 
Baudrillard suggests that individuals in the network era exist in ‘remote sovereignty’ and 
‘far from their origin’ because they can no longer rely on their embedded identity in a group 
to sustain their sense of self. Rainie and Wellman’s argument needs to be rooted in human 
essentialism because being in a network also means being, in their own words, ‘less likely 
to have one sure-fire “home” community’.97 Networked individuals risk feeling insecure 
and unsure about who they are because they do not have a strong sense of belonging in a 
community. Without the belief in the core self, they will risk feeling lost. As they move 
through multiple relations and social ties in the network, these networked individuals are 
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less sure of their place. In other words, they are experiencing the decline of symbolic 
efficiency in the network society. However, while in Super Sad, the loss of symbolic order 
propels its characters to reclaim their symbolic ties, The Circle portrays how it can 
transform the network subject into ‘a whatever being’. Borrowing the term from Giorgio 
Agamben98, Dean explains that whatever beings ‘neither attack nor resist; they are neither 
inside nor outside’.99 It is a form of singularity that does not belong anywhere and only 
moves through the network. This condition of un-belonging creates a sense of self-
disintegration in that the self cannot identify with or feel alienated from anything.  
 A whatever being is, in other words, the schizophrenic stage of Mae’s 
transformation in the novel. A schizophrenic ‘can no longer produce the limits of his own 
being, can no longer play nor stage himself, can no longer produce himself as a mirror. He 
is now only a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks of influence’.100 Mae’s 
camera that broadcasts her life 24/7 essentially turns her into a screen. She ultimately 
becomes a whatever being in the sense that she is ‘open to everything in spite of himself’.101 
Therefore, unlike Super Sad, in which Lenny and Eunice achieve self-realization in the 
end, Mae is stuck in the network as a free-floating, isolated subject, constantly exhausted 
and completely insecure, a human-machine that circuits through the network and never 
belongs to anything.  
 So far, I have discussed how Super Sad and The Circle are written in critical 
dystopia and anti-utopia genres, respectively. In Super Sad, Shteyngart imagines network 
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subjectivities as a type of agency that uses social ties and relations to respond to the crises 
in their social world. Accordingly, the novel becomes a critical dystopian narrative that, 
despite its negative speculation of human society in the future, offers a hopeful solution. 
In The Circle, Eggers takes an opposite stand and portrays the limitation of the utopian 
discourse as a tool to respond to an intrusive and expansive network society. Being an anti-
utopian novel, The Circle also demonstrates that it is utopianism itself that exacerbates the 
conditions of the subjects in the network society. It can create network subjectivities as a 
kind of schizophrenic whose purpose of existence is only to be enthralled by the ecstasy of 
networked communication. In the next section, I will explore the distinction between 
critical dystopia and anti-utopia by considering how the two novels use formal affordances 
to reassess the utopian genre as a new post-critical narrative. 
Network Affordance and Textual Form in Super Sad True Love Story  
Network form has many, and at times contradictory, affordances. As previously discussed, 
a network is both a fixed structure of connection and circulation and a dynamic 
configuration of interconnected and heterogeneous elements. Levine argues that a crucial 
affordance of the network form is in its ability to shed light on other types of forms: ‘As a 
form that first and foremost affords connectedness, the network provides a way to 
understand how many other formal elements […] link up in larger formations.’102 
Consequently, attention to the operation of the network form can bring more clarity to how 
the social world is constituted by the pattern and arrangement in various forms.  
In this section, I will discuss the use of network affordances in Super Sad. I will 
argue that the novel uses network affordances to imagine how a prose narrative can be part 
 




of various relations and contexts, resulting in an inherently ambiguous textual meaning. 
Moreover, I will demonstrate that the ambiguity and relationality of the novel’s narrative 
is also the locus of its post-critical sensibility. It explains how the novel’s speculative and 
dystopia narrative function functions as a (post-) critical representation of human society. 
To illustrate this point, I will first discuss the role of textual production in constituting 
Lenny and Eunice’s network subjectivities. Then, I will examine how Shteyngart formally 
situates the text in Super Sad as a node in the network whose meaning is highly contingent 
upon its movement through various networks of relations with new readers and new 
contexts. 
 Super Sad tells the story of Lenny and Eunice in the first-person voice through 
diaries and personal correspondence, respectively. Both diaries and written communication 
are a form of self-writing. According to Michel Foucault, self-writing is a practice of self-
improvement or ‘a training of the self by oneself’.103 He explains that: ‘Writing constitutes 
an essential stage […] namely, the fashioning of accepted discourses, recognized as true, 
into rational principles of action. As an element of self-training, writing […] is an agent of 
transformation of truth into ēthos.’104 Self-writing is an exercise by which the subject can 
reflect on relations, discourses, and circumstances and accept them into one’s ēthos or a 
sense of self, personal value, and worldview.  
 Foucault divides self-writing into two modes: the hupomnēmata and the 
correspondence. Hupomnēmata refers to individual notebooks containing records of things 
that one reads or hears about and one’s thought about it. The notebook will allow one to 
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revisit those texts or thoughts for the shaping of the self. It is ‘the practice of the self [that] 
involves reading. […] a way of gathering in the reading that was done and of collecting 
one’s thoughts about it’.105 In other words, the hupomnēmata notebook is the record of 
one’s exposure to other texts and discourses. It functions as a space in which those 
discourses are reflected on and used to shape oneself. In his account of hupomnēmata, 
Foucault recognizes one’s self as a crystallized composite of diverse relations and 
discourses, and this mode of self-writing is the tool that produces such a composite. ‘It is 
a matter of unifying these heterogeneous fragments through their subjectivation in the 
exercise of personal writing.’106 Writing in a personal notebook is a process of self-
constitution through a reflection on one’s relation to other texts and discourses. 
 Lenny’s diaries are an example of hupomnēmata writing. They contain fragments 
of other texts and discourses that help him reflect on and reshape his subjectivity. When he 
tries to make sense of his relationship with the much younger and prettier Eunice, he thinks 
of himself as Laptev, a character from Chekhov’s novella Three Years. On reading the 
novella, Lenny writes: ‘I was hoping to find some tips on how to further seduce Eunice and 
to overcome the beauty gap between us.’107 After rereading Chekhov’s text, Lenny finds 
more than a tip to win Eunice over. He achieves a degree of self-understanding, his ēthos: 
‘much like Laptev, I truly was that “honorable, good man who loved her”‘.108 Lenny 
discovers from reading Three Years that he can identify with Laptev more than his love for 
a younger woman. Like Laptev, he is also a good and honorable man. 
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 At first glance, personal correspondence may not seem to reflect the subject’s 
engagement with other texts and discourses. However, Foucault argues that letter writing 
is a more self-reflective practice than personal diaries. Personal communication is a 
complex form of self-introspection and examination produced through the gaze of the 
other. According to Foucault, epistolary writing is ‘a matter of bringing into congruence 
the gaze of the other and that gaze which one aims at oneself when one measures one’s 
everyday actions according to the rules of a technique of living’.109  Writing a letter, one 
needs to consider the targeted audience of the message and one’s relation with that person, 
which will determine how one’s self will be presented in the text. The correspondent self 
is thus the product of a self-reflexive gaze that one imagines through the gaze of the other. 
Penny Summerfield refers to the process of how one gains access to oneself by addressing 
self to another as ‘the paradox of correspondence’.110 The paradox is evidence of one’s 
embeddedness in social relations and one’s susceptibility to the influences of other people. 
Letter writing, for Summerfield, then functions as a self-examination activity beyond self-
reflection. It provides an occasion to reflect on one’s belonging in a larger collective or ‘an 
imaginative space in which to explore new possibilities for seeing and being in the 
world’.111 
 Therefore, while some critics write that Super Sad denies Eunice agency by only 
presenting her epistolary selves and allows Lenny to be more self-reflective through diary 
writing, her correspondence illustrates that Eunice may be a more relational and complex 
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character than the form of the novel lets on.112 By writing letters to her mother, sister, best 
friend, and the men she develops a relationship with, Eunice has a chance to explore the 
possibilities of who she can be. She gets to explore, choose, and accept more than one 
version of herself. Eunice’s letters also demonstrate her reflexivity and ability to adapt and 
adjust to the situation. In Eunice’s case, Shteyngart shows the potential of the epistolary 
form in providing a critical reflection of the social environment. Elizabeth Kovach also 
comments that in updating the epistolary novel to the ‘e-mail novel’, Super Sad ‘does not 
move against the grain’ but ‘stands in symmetry with the contexts that it aims to 
critique’.113 Eunice reflects the complicitous yet critical role of the e-pistolary form by 
using social media, which is part of the social problem, as a tool for her survival. She uses 
online messages and emails to form connections and alliances, especially with Joshie. Her 
relationship with Joshie is developed through the manipulation of personal 
correspondence. She uses certain writing styles and language to present herself in her 
messages to Joshie in a certain way to make him help her. Her flexibility and willingness 
to compromise and form alliances with diverse people is evidence of the novel’s utopian 
sensibility. This is the reason that Chelsea Oei Kern describes Eunice as ‘a figure who 
leverages the reading and writing of unauthorized political feelings and solidarities to form 
counter-political feelings – to talk about politics without talking about them and thus to 
affiliate with different political collectives’.114 In  Eunice’s case, personal correspondence 
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proves to be not only evidence of one’s belonging in a collective but a practice that will 
help one to achieve a greater self-understanding that is no less effective than writing diaries. 
The novel introduces another twist to letter writing. It includes a letter that Eunice 
writes to herself to further complicate the paradox of correspondence. In a letter addressed 
to herself, Eunice fully internalizes the gaze of the other and transforms it into a self-gaze. 
In doing so, she can maintain enough distance for self-reflection. Moreover, when Eunice 
learns to look at herself from the other’s perspective, she also acknowledges her 
embeddedness in a larger social group. That is, she expresses an understanding that there 
is something else greater than her. Accordingly, Eunice’s letter to herself can be said to 
represent the most self-reflexive and the most relational piece of writing in the novel. In 
the letter, she begins by writing, ‘I’m writing this for me. One day I want to look back at 
this day and make peace with what I’m about to do.’115 Addressing herself in this way, 
Eunice uses the letter like a hupomnēmata notebook to record her thoughts and ideas for 
future reflection.  
In the letter, she also describes watching Joshie concentrate on painting and 
comments on his ability to be ‘completely outside yourself.’ That moment teaches her a 
crucial lesson about Joshie – he is a man with a lot of privilege, and ‘he knows what to do 
with it’.116 Here, Eunice arrives at the intersection between self-privilege and self-
abandonment. She learns that they are not exclusive. She can accept her position in the 
world, with privileges and all, while still using it to see herself as part of the world and 
strive to achieve a greater good. Therefore, later in the letter, Eunice expresses such an 
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acknowledgment by reflecting on her commonality and shared responsibility. This 
acknowledgment of her ultimate relationality is also a powerful personal revelation for 
Eunice. It frees her from self-hatred. She understands that she is not solely responsible for 
who she has become. Her family and others all have a part in constituting her subjectivity. 
In the final part of the letter, she thus writes: 
  All I wanted to do was have my parents take complete 
responsibility for how fucked up I am. I wanted them to admit that they did wrong. 
But that doesn’t matter to me now. 
  Common unhappiness, as the doctor said, but also common 
responsibility.  
  I can’t just be an abused little girl anymore. I have to be stronger 
than my father, stronger than Sally, stronger than Mommy.117  
Despite shifting the blame to her parents, it does not alienate Eunice from her family. 
Instead, it is a liberation from the burden of self-hatred. Even though she finally accepts 
that her parents abuse her, she does not resent them. Because the revelation brings relief, 
she can let go of the abuse, contending that it does not matter.  Moreover, the fact that the 
action of others, which in this case is the abuse from her parents, constitutes who she is 
brings another revelation that she is ultimately a relational subject. As her writing indicates, 
the discovery of self-relationality makes her feel stronger as a person. She is ready to take 
on more responsibility greater than her happiness, which explains her decision to leave 
Lenny as a sacrifice of personal happiness for the happiness of a larger collective, that is, 
her family. 
 




 Eunice leaves Lenny not long after she writes the letter to herself. Leaving him is 
the only way she can secure her family’s future in the new America after the Rupture. She 
finds the strength from remaining true to her Korean root and family values. She chooses 
to survive in the new America as a Korean woman with a greater understanding of her self-
embeddedness in a larger social sphere. She allows herself to move with the tides of social 
forces and adapt to the new relations that the waves may lead her to. Her decision might 
appear to be a capitulation or a surrender. Yet, it is also an act of resistance. Eunice’s 
resistance comes from her reconciliation with the fact that she is, in her own words, ‘a 
recycling bin sometimes, with all these things passing through me from one person to 
another, love, hate, seduction, attraction, repulsion, all of it’.118 Yet all these passing affects 
constitute her very self, the fact that she only comes to realize through the act of self-
writing. In realizing so, Eunice ultimately demonstrates her oppositional agency, whose 
strength comes from being part of a larger collective – being an actant in a network of 
relations. As she concludes in her letter: ‘I have to be stronger.’119  
Moreover, by writing the letter, she claims the power of language back for herself 
and utilizes it to achieve self-reflection. According to Moylan, the reappropriation of 
language is also an important aspect of how dystopian subjects develop oppositional 
agency:  
[C]ontrol over the means of language, over representation and interpellation, is a 
crucial weapon and strategy in dystopian resistance.  
 





 An important result of the reappropriation of language by the dystopian 
misfits and revels is the reconstitution of empowering memory. […] [B]y regaining 
language they also recover the ability to draw on the alternative truths of the past 
and “speak back” to hegemonic power.120 
Eunice’s letter is her attempt at reconstructing ‘empowering memory’ about who she is. 
She feels empowered by recalling and reclaiming her Korean root, saying that she is 
‘always a Korean girl’. She then uses that fact about herself to be an alternative mode of 
resistance. She can speak back to the hegemony, insisting that she will be ‘stronger’ than 
the abused girl she used to be. Even though she will let herself be part of the hegemonic 
group, it also allows her to take on common unhappiness and common responsibility. 
 The use of self-writing demonstrates how textual production plays a vital part in the 
constitution of subjectivity and the development of critical awareness. However, Super Sad 
also formally illustrates the fluidity of textual meaning as it forms new relations with 
readers in different contexts. Accordingly, it is possible to characterize the novel as a node 
in a network, which allows it to express a utopian sensibility and a post-critical attitude. In 
the novel’s story-world, the text that the reader is reading is called ‘The Lenny Abramov 
Diaries’. It is a compilation of Lenny’s and Eunice’s texts published in an unspecified time 
in the future after the events in the story have already unfolded.  However, while the reader 
in the real world understands Super Sad as a dystopian text, the exact text presents evidence 
of hope and the possibility for a better future. In other words, the same content that 
expresses a dystopia in the reader’s world is a utopian text in the story-world of the novel. 
In the notes Lenny writes for the publication of ‘The Lenny Abramov Diaries’, he explains 
 




that: ‘when I wrote these diaries so many decades ago, it never occurred to me that any text 
would ever find a new generation of readers’ (emphasis in original).121 That ‘The Lenny 
Abramov Diaries’ manages to be published and read so many years after society has 
become postliterate is a testament to the fact that there is still hope even in the most 
antagonistic condition. Moreover, the fact that the exact text can be either a dystopian to a 
utopian narrative given a change of context demonstrates how texual meaning is highly 
contingent and relational.  
 Super Sad demonstrates the fluidity and relationality of texts on several levels. First, 
by presenting Lenny and Eunice’s voices through diaries and online messages, the novel 
highlights how personal writing can become a historical document containing insight into 
the social world in which the text was produced. Their diaries and letters become proof of 
the characters’ inevitable relation and entanglement with their social circumstances. 
However, the fact that their writing also becomes a public document that is published, 
studied, and even adapted into a movie further proves the ultimate relationality and fluidity 
of both the text and the writer as they continue to exist and evolve with time.  
 On another level, the fact that the novel ends with how personal texts can go on to 
have multiple and transnational public presences (The Lenny Abramov Diaries is published 
both in Beijing and New York while there are movie adaptations of the text in China and 
Italy) reaffirms another critical dystopian characteristic of the novel – its open and epical 
ending. Moylan uses the categories of epic and myth to distinguish between the two 
dystopian modes. Epical narrative, for Moylan, is associated with openness, ambiguity, and 
fluidity, while the mythic narrative is more inclined towards depicting enclosure, 
 




predictability, and stasis. Moylan writes that: ‘In an epical text […] “choice” shapes the 
agential relations and the ending in “new and better” ways, ones not readily predicted. […] 
In a mythological text, there is no clear sequence of narrative choices.’122 Moreover, in 
refusing to have closure, ‘the epical narrative will look to a more fundamental engagement 
with the contradictions of the moment and open up a range of alternative social 
possibilities.’123 The ending of Super Sad is epical and open to the extent that it 
demonstrates such ‘a range of alternative social possibilities’ for the text’s meaning and the 
survival of its characters.  
 Moreover, Shteyngart highlights textual fluidity and relationality Super Sad by 
using the traditions of dystopian and speculative fiction to produce a new kind of realist 
novel grounded in the reader’s affective response to the text. According to Sargisson, three 
key conventions are characteristic of utopian writing: play and excess, the presence of a 
visitor, and the tactic of estrangement.124 According to Sargisson: 
Excess permits radical creativity. Utopians imagine and desire radically different 
worlds but they often work with a light touch. They fool around with reality […] 
And they poke fun, evoking satire and using jokes and wit as strategic weapons to 
show “it doesn’t have to be like this!”125  
Super Sad explicitly uses humor to produce a cognitive estrangement and invite an 
affective engagement from the reader. It is written as a satire and parody – precisely for its 
tendency to ‘poke fun’ – to create both the elements of estrangement and urgency that allow 
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the reader to engage with the text more critically. Michael Shaup also reflects on this aspect 
of Super Sad, writing that:  
The biggest risk for any dystopian novel with a political edge is that it can easily 
become humourless and didactic; Shteyngart deftly avoids this trap by employing 
his disarming and absurd sense of humor […] Combined with the near-future 
setting, the effect is a novel more immediate – thus more frightening, at least for 
contemporary reader.126  
For Shaup, the novel’s humor builds the connection between the reader and the story-
world. The reader can only get the ‘jokes’ as long as they are familiar enough with the 
context to find them humorous. Ruth Franklin makes a similar point that: ‘Shteyngart’s 
often very funny novel derives much of its humor from the fact that the journey from our 
world to his requires only a minor tweak.’127 Terrence Rafferty also suggests that jokes in 
Super Sad produce criticism of the reader’s social reality: ‘[T]he jokes, offhanded as they 
seem, accumulate a certain weight – the volume and suffocating mass of an oppressive, 
inhospitable culture. Who wants to live – even for a normal, “human,” span – inside a 
joke?’128 Therefore, it is possible to see how humor in Super Sad serves two contradictory 
but complementary purposes. First, it produces a sense of immediacy through familiarity. 
Then it causes a cognitive estrangement through the absurdity of the humor. Moreover, 
humor in Super Sad also serves as a critical tool. As Martyna Bryla argues, the use of 
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humor also characterizes the novel as part of the trickster tradition that seeks to produce 
‘an uncomfortable question, a shrewd comment, or a penetrating critique of the status 
quo’.129 Similarly, Sarah Kember points out that Super Sad uses humor in a parodic and 
ironic tone to reflect its efficacy as ‘forms of critique or agents of change’ through its 
undecidability. Specifically, Kember explains that humor in the novel is used to counter 
sexism in a manner that is undecideably sexist.130 The undecidability of the ‘humor on 
humor’ strategy that Kember identifies points to the novel's reliance on the reader’s 
affective response to it as a source of its critical power. 
Moreover, humor makes Super Sad more critically stimulating and also allows the 
novel to avoid the didactic, prescriptive, and totalitarian tendencies of utopian and 
dystopian writings. Humor gives the reader a chance to freely engage with the story in their 
term since one’s sense of humor and how one ‘gets the joke’ is a personal issue. Humor 
leaves room for an emotional and critical engagement with the text. Accordingly, it 
becomes a key factor that makes Super Sad a critical dystopia. Through humor, a dystopian 
story like Super Sad can ‘name a utopian elsewhere that resists becoming filled in by a 
determinate content that would compromise or shut down its own most radical gesture to 
a future that is not yet achieved’.131  
 One of the main devices used in Super Sad to produce humor is the manipulation 
of language. Throughout the novel, Shteyngart emphasizes the importance of language in 
the shaping of the characters’ subjectivities. For example, for Lenny and Eunice, the 
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English language is a marker of their American identity. Their English language ability is 
also a generational marker that separates them from their parents. Eunice’s mother, for 
example, always apologizes for her ‘bad English’, which to her is a sign of complete 
assimilation in the American culture. However, the novel also imagines a society that is on 
the verge of becoming illiterate.  The quality of language in the story is not only inadequate 
but also vulgar and lacks substance. Social media is a factor in the decline of language in 
the story. It directly promotes images instead of written words by telling them to ‘Switch 
to Images today! Less words = more fun!!!’ As social media becomes prevalent, people 
struggle to express their thoughts and ideas coherently. They only know how to ‘verbal’ 
express themselves through vulgarity. Brand names also reflect the bastardization of 
language and the vulgarity of American values by having names like ‘AssLuxury’ or 
‘JuicyPussy’. In other words, the quality of the English language indicates the decline of 
America as a culture and a nation. The language that is once regarded to be a marker of 
American identity is being undermined along with the Americanness it signifies.  
 Shteyngart uses the decay of the English language to instigate an affective response 
from the reader. Poor language is one way that Super Sad produces humor. Yet, it also 
serves as a scary warning. It is part of the novel’s humor because it is ridiculous, but it is 
also frightening because it feels so familiar. Just like the GlobalTeens, real-world social 
media is also controlling our use of language. There are only certain numbers of letters 
allowed in one ‘tweet’. People increasingly use emojis, GIF, and memes to express 
themselves instead of using actual words.  Super Sad hence uses language to ‘poke fun’ of 
the reader’s reality and warn them. If things remain unchanged, this could be the kind of 




and heavy at the same time. It is light-hearted but also uncomfortable. It aims to invoke 
mixed and ambiguous feelings in the reader who need to actively engage with the novel to 
make sense of those feelings.  
 The fact that human feelings are supposed to be complex, ambiguous, and even 
incomprehensible is a crucial motif of Shteyngart’s critical dystopian novel. At the plot 
level, it truly is a sad love story about two incompatible people who love each other but are 
doomed by social conditions to be separated. The writing style and language make the 
novel a satire that does not seem to take itself seriously. Yet, the story contains serious and 
alarming messages about the future of humanity. These mixed emotions are invoked in the 
reader simultaneously. The reader finds themselves constantly engaged with the text on an 
affective term. This is how Super Sad fully becomes a critical dystopia. The novel uses the 
ambiguity of feelings to invite a critical engagement from the reader at the level of affect. 
Through the layers of humor, sadness, hopefulness, and bleakness, there could be hope 
hidden somewhere, which the reader may find as they try to understand myriads of textual 
feelings that they are experiencing all at once. 
Narrative Form and the Utopian Rhetoric in The Circle 
In one regard, The Circle is a story about the power of utopian rhetoric. According to 
Marlana Portolano, utopian rhetoric refers to ‘the use of symbolic communication in an 
attempt to move the actual state of human affairs into alignment with an imagined, better 
state of affairs – that is, a utopia, either one shared by the community or one invented by 
the speaker or both’.132 From the company’s circle logo, the design of its glasshouse campus 
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to the weekly product launch event aptly named ‘Dream Friday’, the Circle is a company 
that is also a masterful rhetorician. Its success comes from its ability to use symbolic 
expression to present a hyper-surveillance network society as a utopia in which ‘all that 
happens must be known’ so that humans will achieve their full potential and become ‘all-
seeing and all-knowing’.133  
 The novel contains many examples of utopian rhetoric in action. The opening 
campus tour is an example of how a utopian discourse performs its rhetorical function. 
During the tour, Mae is exposed to many symbols and expressions intended to convince a 
newcomer that what they are seeing is the embodiment of perfection. Another good 
example is Mae’s conversations with other Circlers, especially Bailey. As one of the three 
wise men, Bailey performs the role of the company’s chief rhetorician who is ‘most likely 
to appear on talk shows representing the Circle’.134 While Ty plays the part of the enigmatic, 
young inventor and Stenton the aloof and ruthless businessman, Bailey is rather commonly 
known as ‘Uncle Eamon’: 
He was wry. He was funny. He had a way of speaking that was both lyrical and 
grounded, giving his audiences wonderful turns of phrase one moment and 
plainspoken common sense the next.135  
His wit, accessibility, and ability to produce ‘turns of phrase’ while provoking ‘common 
sense’ in his audiences cast him as the master rhetorician responsible for selling the Circle’s 
vision as a utopian dream. Mae’s conversations with Bailey can effectively demonstrate the 
power of utopian rhetoric. Their talk discussion about the death of Mae’s ex-boyfriend 
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Mercer, who commits suicide as a final act of resistance against the Circle’s totalizing 
power, provides a particularly chilling example of how the rhetorical power of utopia can 
easily transform personal accountability into self-celebration. Consoling Mae for her loss, 
Bailey says: 
Mae, you were trying to help a very disturbed, antisocial young man. You and the 
other participants were reaching out, trying to bring him into the embrace of 
humanity, and he rejected that. I think it’s self-evident that you were, if anything, 
his only hope.136 
In his remark, Bailey shifts the blame from Mae onto Mercer by first attacking his character 
and then invoking the utopian ideal of ‘reaching out’ to create ‘the embrace of humanity’ 
as a justification for Mae and the Circle’s action that contributes to his death. In this case, 
the utopian discourse is used to acquit the culprits of accountability and even justify the 
cause that forces Mercer to commit suicide in the first place. Even though Mercer drives 
off a cliff as an ultimate rejection of the Circle’s effort to create a fully transparent society, 
Bailey successfully uses Mercer’s death to justify further the need for complete 
transparency which he describes in the utopian terms as a form of ‘communion and unity’:  
You reject the groups, the people, the listeners out there who want to connect, to 
empathize and embrace, and disaster is imminent. Mae, this was clearly a deeply 
depressed and isolated young man who was not able to survive in a world like this, 
a world moving toward communion and unity.137 
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As the example demonstrates, utopian discourse as a form of rhetoric can be a powerfully 
persuasive tool. At the end of the conversation, Mae becomes so convinced by Bailey’s 
reasoning that she is even more committed to the Circle’s cause even after it takes Mercer’s 
life: 
It was not knowing that was the seed of madness, loneliness, suspicion, fear. […] 
Full transparency would bring full access, and there would be no more not-
knowing Mae smiled, thinking about how simple it all was, how pure.138 
The exchange between Mae and Bailey over Mercer’s death is one of many instances that 
the novel demonstrates the manipulating power of the utopian rhetoric that can capitulate 
to any side of an argument.  
Moreover, Eggers also produces a critique of utopianism at the discourse level of 
his narrative. Specifically, he employs several formal affordances that may clash and create 
tension at the novel’s story-discourse relation and affect the reader's experience. The 
reader’s response to the story at the level of discourse is where the novel produces its anti-
utopian criticism most forcefully. A story-discourse relation is a relation between events 
(story) and the representation of events (discourse). According to H. Porter Abbott, a story 
refers to a sequence of events, while discourse is how those events are represented.139 At 
the story level, The Circle highlights the power of utopian rhetoric in Mae’s 
characterization. At the discourse level, Eggers also adopts several conventions of literary 
utopia to tell Mae’s story. However, at this level, he significantly departs from the utopian 
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genre that usually deploys the first-person narrator to recount the story. Instead, Eggers 
uses a limited third-person narrator to tell the story from Mae’s perspective. Consequently, 
he can deploy the gap between the story and the discourse of the narrative form to produce 
a critical representation of utopia. That is, the narrator can expose the hypocrisy and 
inconsistency in Mae’s thinking as she is exposed to the utopian rhetoric.  
In one example, the narrator describes that Mae feels excited that she is now 
working for the Circle because the company only hires ‘gifted young minds’.140 However, 
in the same paragraph, the narrator also reveals that Mae feels grateful to Annie because 
she believes that Annie helps her get the job. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the claim that 
the Circle is the best company that only hires gifted young minds and that Annie uses her 
connection to help Mae. With the third-person narrator, Mae’s oblivion to the contradiction 
in her thought becomes apparent. The narrator is able to follow Mae’s line of thinking from 
feeling indebted to Annie to feeling smug that she is one of the chosen ones:  
And though Annie insisted she pulled no strings, Mae was sure that Annie had, and 
she felt indebted beyond all measure. A million people, a billion, wanted to be where 
Mae was at this moment, entering this atrium […] on her first day working for the only 
company that really mattered at all.141 
The immediate transition from the feelings of indebtedness to smugness in this passage 
undermines Mae’s claim that the Circle is a utopia because it is perfect. What is implied in 
this paragraph is that the Circle is far from being an ideal company simply because it also 
allows the use of personal connections. The third-person narrator can demonstrate that her 
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judgment about the Circle is unreliable. The first-person perspective would have shown 
that she only sees the ‘perfect’ side of the company because she cannot acknowledge the 
flaws that will contradict her utopian assumption about it. Thus, Mae’s belief that the Circle 
is a utopia becomes the very thing that prevents her from having a fair and honest opinion 
about the company. The idea of utopia as perfection becomes a trap in Mae’s logical 
thinking: she cannot acknowledge the company’s flaw if she wants to hold on to the belief 
that the Circle is a utopia. The novel’s anti-utopian criticism is therefore rooted in how the 
idea of perfection obstructs critical thinking ability. Utopian perfection is dangerous 
because it could prevent a fair judgment and limit any chance of further improvement. This 
criticism, however, can only be delivered through the narrative device of the limited third-
person narrator. 
 Apart from deploying the third-person narrator to destabilize the effectiveness of 
the utopian rhetoric, Eggers also use the time-bound, linear, and progressive nature of the 
narrative form to contest the timelessness and wholeness of the utopian form. When the 
story of the utopian rhetoric is presented in the narrative form, the paradox and 
impossibility of utopia become clear. According to Fredric Jameson, the utopian form is 
structurally ambiguous. On the one hand, utopia conveys totality and closure as it posits 
the image of perfection. On the other hand, utopia is used as an impulse that inspires 
changes and progresses. For Jameson, there is ‘the formal dilemma of how works that 
posits the end of history can offer any usable historical impulses, how works which aim to 
resolve all political differences can continue to be in any sense political’.142 Eggers 
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mobilizes such a formal dilemma by revealing how utopia as a form that affords the idea 
of totality and boundedness cannot be sustained when it is represented through the linear, 
time-bound form of narrative. The ending of the novel is a good illustration of the tension 
between the two forms. The idea of utopia representing closure and totality is the novel’s 
main motif. It is most discernible in the centralization of the circle symbol and the theme 
of ‘completion’ associated with the company’s vision, products, and services. The novel 
ends with the Circle on its way to achieve completion with the launch of its ‘demoxie’ 
service which will allow all U.S. citizen to perform their civic duties through the TruYou 
account. Demoxie will make Circle membership mandatory. The company founder Ty 
warns Mae of the danger of completion as ‘a totalitarian nightmare’ and asks Mae to help 
him stop the Circle’s effort. The final Book III section of the novel reveals that Mae sees 
Ty’s warning as ‘bizarre claims and misguided efforts to derail the completion of the 
Circle’143 and proceeds to stop him. However, Mae still finds another thing that manages 
to remain outside the completed Circle. Watching her friend Annie being in a coma from 
over-exhaustion, Mae realizes that Annie’s mind, encapsulated in her physical body, 
remains an enigma:  
Mae reached out to touch her forehead, marvelling at the distance this flesh put 
between them. What was going on in that head of hers? It was exasperating, really, 
Mae thought, not knowing. It was an affront, a deprivation, to herself and to the 
world. […] They need to talk about Annie, the thoughts she was thinking. Why 
shouldn’t they know them? The world deserved nothing less and would not wait.144  
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The paragraph suggests two things. First, the Circle’s completion is not fully realized. 
There is still something else beyond its reach: the embodied human mind. Annie’s body 
and mind represent another bounded whole used to contest the wholeness of the Circle’s 
completion. According to Levine’s concept of the ‘contending wholes,’ one of the main 
affordances of a bounded whole is that ‘it always depends on a “constitutive outside.” It is 
created and maintained by acts of exclusion.’145 To contest wholeness, Levine suggests that 
we use the affordance of the bounded whole against itself: 
While we might want to resist the dominance of unified wholes by crushing them, 
or by rupturing their boundaries, a productive alternative involves not the 
destruction of form but its multiplication. That is, an effective strategy for 
curtailing the power of harmfully totalizing and unifying wholes is nothing other 
than to introduce more wholes. (emphasis in original)146 
The fact that the bounded whole affords the constitute outside means there are bound to be 
more wholes out there. To contest the form of wholeness is to introduce those external 
wholes and undermine its totality. As Mae’s remark about Annie clarifies, the embodied 
human mind remains out of reach of the Circle. It is a testament to the company’s 
incompletion. Annie thus becomes a problem that she needs to resolve quickly.  
 Second, with the remark that the world ‘would not wait’, Eggers also implies that 
utopia’s totality is unsustainable because it cannot resist the passage of time. The world 
will always move with time. Utopian perfection, as Jameson suggests, is also the ‘end of 
history’. The representation of utopia in the narrative form is bound to reveal its 
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impossibility. As the novel’s final paragraph indicates, the Circle’s vision of completion is 
not only unattainable because of the threat of the constitutive outside such as Annie’s body. 
It is also an impossible vision because of the existence of time.  
Moreover, apart from using the narrative form to expose the temporal paradox of 
utopia, Eggers also demonstrates the effect of the utopian form on the narrative form by 
deliberately using the rhetorical style of utopia in the novel’s narrative rhetoric. 
Specifically, Eggers uses utopian rhetoric to warn the reader of the danger of utopian ideals 
promised by media technologies. John Masterson writes that the novel deliberately 
oscillates between utopian and dystopian discourses to explore the fluctuation between 
dream and nightmare in the utopian vision of the Circle.147 Timothy W. Galow points out 
that The Circle uses the argumentative or debate style of writing to ‘help the reader 
understand, and not merely experience, the protagonists’ gradual conversion to the 
supposedly utopian ideology’.148 Characterizing the novel as part of the ‘platonic turn’, 
Magaret-Anne Hutton also argues that The Circle uses the Platonic mirror analogy to 
criticize media technologies and the capacity to misrepresent or distort the truth. However, 
Hutton points out that the novel ends in ambiguity. Despite its didactic and critical tone, 
the novel only ‘invite[s] reflection rather than provide solutions’.149 
While some of these arguments, except for Hutton’s more reserved conclusion, 
point out that Eggers plays with the utopian and dystopian narratives to criticize the 
 
147 John Masterson, ‘Floods, Fortresses, and Cabin Fever: Worlding “Domeland” Security in Dave Eggers’s 
Zeitoun and The Circle, American Literary History, 28 (2016), 721-739 <DOI: 10.1093/alh/ajw041>, p. 
734. 
148 Timothy W. Galow, Understanding Dave Eggers (Columbia, University of South Caroline Press, 2014), 
p. 116. 
149 Margaret-Anne Hutton, ‘Plato, New Media Technologies, and the Contemporary Novel’, Mosaic: an 
Interdisciplinary Critical Journal, 51 (2018), 179-195 <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/688070> [accessed 9 




positive view towards media technologies, Peter C. Herman argues that The Circle 
expresses optimism towards social media nonetheless. He reads Mae’s characterization, 
especially her transformation into a schizophrenic networked individual, as a site that 
contains a utopian possibility. ‘From the dystopia of non-stop rating, tweeting, and 
surveillance comes the utopia of knowing one’s existence made a difference.’150 Contrary 
to Herman’s argument, Frida Beckman sees that Mae’s flat characterization demonstrates 
Eggers’s attempt to use literary forms to criticize how the control society changes 
individuals into ‘nonpersonal and fluid nodulations of desires and affects’.151 Mae’s 
flatness as a character, Beckman argues, projects ‘the very failure to keep up the appearance 
of the importance of the individual bourgeois subject within the dispositive of control’.152 
Despite arriving at different conclusions, these analyses agree that Eggers uses utopian and 
dystopian traditions to produce critical views about media technologies and human 
subjects.  
Because the novel’s form assumes a critical role, it also becomes a criticism for 
many critics. Several critics point to the novel’s dull and didactic tone and the overt use of 
symbolism as its shortcoming. For example, Ellen Ullman writes that Eggers tends to 
‘overexplain’ in his novel because he ‘reframes the discussion as a fable, a tale meant to 
be instructive’.153 Susanna Luthi sees that the novel is ‘disappointing’ but successful as 
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‘commentary on the era of big data and transparency’.154 However, I contend that this is 
another instance in which Eggers uses the novel’s form for a critical end. The dullness and 
is evidence of the novel’s self-reflexivity that aims to use the form of utopia to criticize 
utopia itself. The instructive or commentary tone mirrors the didacticism of the utopian 
narrative. Character flatness or narrative dullness is a deliberate narrative strategy to 
criticize the inefficiency of utopian rhetoric. Hence, while critics may claim that the novel 
falls short of being an engaging piece of writing about online culture, the same formal 
operation that causes such grievance among critics allows the novel to express its anti-
utopian criticism most efficiently. 
 Another important use of the novel’s form to criticize utopia is in the narrative 
voice. The use of the limited third-person narrator that gives the reader access to Mae’s 
inner thoughts and feelings also provides the reader the ability that is also Mae’s ultimate 
utopian dream: to access the human mind. Reading The Circle in the third-person voice, 
the reader gets to experience the utopian scenario that the Circle and Mae envisions. In this 
regard, the novel formally presents itself as the realization of the very utopian dream that 
drives its own plot. In this regard, the novel appears to ask the reader the same question 
that Mercer used to ask Mae about the Circle: ‘you think this is okay?’ The answer, as 
many critics suggest, is not ok. Getting to live in the kind of utopia that the Circle envisions 
feels boring and uninspiring. Moreover, as a criticism of utopia’s totalitarian tendency, 
which manifests in The Circle as a dream to create a totally transparent society that leads 
to the erasure of privacy and inner lives, the novel succeeds in using its form to demonstrate 
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the peril of such a dream. As Betiel Wasihun argues, ‘the storytelling omniscience cannot 
be denied: the text represents transparency at every thinkable level in order to criticize the 
company’s promotion of total surveillance under the guise of security and care.’155 The 
novel’s mode of narration makes the reader experience first-hand the fact that ‘no privacy 
and no shame would mean no individual’.156 In The Circle,  the third-person narration and 
the apparent use of symbolism and didacticism limit the reader’s critical and subjective 
engagement with the text. 
 The affective manipulation that the novel achieves through Mae’s characterization 
and its didacticism expresses a fundamental anti-utopian view that utopia is oppressive. In 
The Circle, utopian oppression occurs at the levels of characterization, rhetorical style, and 
narration that aim to reflect the company’s utopian motto that everyone is ‘a full knowable 
human being of unlimited potential. And a crucial member of community’.157 The flat 
characterization of Mae and the reader’s engagement with the novel are a direct criticism 
of such utopian thinking. Mae’s inability to engage with anyone in her community, and 
even with the reader, speak to the kind of community that will emerge if total transparency 
is achieved. Scott Selisker argues that a transparent society that the Circle tries to achieve 
also changes the dynamics of social life at the level of privacy. Complete transparency, 
according to Selisker, prevents the social form of privacy from emerging: ‘Privacy resides 
in our ability to selectively manage and partition our information within our social 
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networks.’158 Mae’s inability to engage fully with people in her community thus results 
from her inability to exercise her privacy at the social level. 
Moreover, transparency and the idea of human’s full knowability also glosses over 
humans' complex and affective nature. Instead, it only regards humans as an entity that is 
closed, complete, and comprehensible. One of the Circle’s services, called LuvLuv, is an 
excellent example of how the Circle network produces affectless subjectivities and lacks 
substance and appeal. LuvLuv uses data from the individual’s online activities to create a 
set of data about the person. Francis, Mae’s love interest, runs her data through the LuvLuv 
algorithm. She finds the experience curious and disturbing: 
She couldn’t put her finger on it. Was it only the surprise of it? Was it the pinpoint 
accuracy of the algorithms? Maybe. But then again, it wasn’t entirely accurate, so 
was that the problem? Having a matrix of preferences presented as your essence, 
as the whole you? Maybe that was it. It was some kind of mirror, but it was 
incomplete, distorted. And if Francis wanted any or all of that information, why 
couldn’t he just ask her? (emphasis in original)159 
Mae’s feedback to LuvLuv illustrates how a fully transparent network society can 
fundamentally change human relationships. As Mae herself ponders about the need for 
LuvLuv in a relationship: ‘why couldn’t he just ask her?’ Moreover, she realizes that there 
is more to herself than a set of data produced by an algorithm. Even though the data is 
‘accurate’, she cannot pinpoint what makes her uncomfortable. Behind her complete and 
seemingly undistorted representation through an algorithm, she feels it cannot fully express 
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her subjectivity. What Mae finds missing is the affective level of the human condition and 
connection. It is also precisely the lack of affection in the characterization of Mae and in 
the novel’s mode of narration that disengages the reader. Thus, the novel’s ultimate 
criticism of utopia appears to be that the notion of perfectibility can obstruct an opportunity 
to form affective relations, which are crucial to the constitution of human subjectivities. 
The Circle’s utopian vision is an affectless network society, and it has to be so because it 
is founded on the principle of complete transparency and knowability. The novel reflects 
on the state of affectlessness by deliberately forming an affectless relation with the reader. 
Thus, reading The Circle becomes an uncomfortable, disengaging, and uninspiring 
experience in which the reader keeps getting ‘bludgeoned’ by its messages and lessons.160 
However, that is the point of the novel after all. For through the anti-utopia lens, utopianism 
is nothing but an attempt to bludgeon people into agreeing with its view about perfection. 
Conclusion 
As dystopian novels Super Sad and The Circle warn about the emergence of a neoliberal 
network society in which advanced communication technologies and neoliberal values 
produce network subjects who are propelled to consume, connect, and constantly refashion 
their identities to fit in and improve their social status. Both novels are written in the post-
critical tradition that recently emerges as a response to the crisis of representation and 
critique brought about by neoliberalism. The post-critical turn promotes a more 
constructive approach to the critical practice that usually aims to debunk or delegitimize 
oppositional viewpoints. As neoliberalism becomes all-encompassing, the traditional mode 
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of critique appears to be ineffective. Critique is now required to do more than just defending 
or debunking a claim because neoliberalism can co-opt any side of the argument. Post-
critical thinkers such as Latour thus suggest that critics should describe how many 
participants are involved in the unfolding of an event. The new critical practice should try 
to trace relations and associations among as many actors as possible. 
 This chapter discussed how the post-critical turn is closely associated with the new 
formalist approach that relies on the affordances of form to produce a critical discourse. I 
argued that Super Sad and The Circle adopt such a relativist and formalist approach to 
reassess utopia as a critical discourse. They respectively use the traditions of critical 
dystopia and anti-utopia to produce a post-critical narrative that exposes and explores 
limitations and possibilities of utopian discourse in the neoliberal context. I used Latour’s 
argument about the network being a double-movement structure in my analysis of the 
novels’ use of the utopian genres to represent neoliberal network subjects. I argued that 
Super Sad represents network subjects that possess an oppositional agency that is formed 
through relations and alliances. These subjects are able to constructively respond to their 
social circumstances because they can cultivate self-awareness as an embedded member of 
a larger collective. The network subjects in Super Sad thus represent the kind of 
subjectivity with a post-critical attitude. Being part of the network, they constitute and 
enrich themselves through the various relations they are inevitably a part of. As a result, 
they possess a stronger sense of self capable of actively affecting and contributing to 
improving the social circumstances.  
 The Circle takes a different approach to the post-critical turn by highlighting the 




constitution of the network subject in The Circle is grounded on the utopian ideal of human 
perfectability in which humans are believed to have a core self that can be perfected given 
the right circumstances. These network subjects socialize and connect as networked 
individuals who move freely in the network and never belongs to any group. As a result, 
they become schizophrenic subjects which, in Baudrillard’s description, are lost in the 
ecstasy of communication. They are incapable of having a strong and assured sense of self 
despite believing in the idea of self-sovereignty.  
 In the second half of this chapter, I examined how Super Sad and The Circle employ 
formal affordances to produce a text-reader relationship that grants a post-critical 
sensibility to the text. In Super Sad, Shteyngart uses the network form to demonstrate the 
intertwined relationship between texts and human subjects. He does so by telling the story 
of Lenny and Eunice through the self-writing modes of the diaries and the correspondence 
to illustrate their embeddedness in the networked relations with other human subjects and 
other texts. He also emphasizes the fluidity and historical embeddedness of textual meaning 
and genre by presenting the novel as a book in the guise of another book capable of moving 
freely in and out of different genres and producing different meanings as it passes through 
different genres and historical contexts. To further illustrate the fluidity and relationality 
of text, Shteyngart incorporates humor and playfulness in his writing style to form an 
affective relationship with the reader whose understanding of the text is contingent on their 
ability to appreciate the humor and language play in the novel. 
On the other hand, Eggers uses the tension between the enclosed form of utopia and 
the open and progressive narrative form to highlight the paradox and impossibility of utopia 




utopianism that is grounded in the idea of static perfection but dismisses the significance 
of progression and changes. Additionally, Eggers uses the rhetorical style of utopia in the 
narrative to demonstrate the incompatibility of the two forms and how the utopian rhetoric 
is proved to be ineffective and disengaging when the reader is directly exposed to it in the 
novel’s narrative. Therefore, the novel’s anti-utopian criticism is post-critical to the extent 
that it does not produce a counterargument but seeks to engage with the reader at the level 
of form. 
 My discussion of Super Sad and The Circle aims to suggest that the two novels are 
hybrid fiction to the extent that they are written with an awareness of their embeddedness 
and contingency on the conditions that they aim to represent and critique and on the context 
in which they are read and interpreted. These texts respond to the emergence of a neoliberal 
network society in which advanced information technologies and consumer culture have 
converged to produce network subjects. To effectively respond to these conditions and 
represent the experience of these subjects, the novels adopt the post-critical mode of 
writing to explore the possibilities of engaging with neoliberalism. Moreover, the novels 
formally posit themselves as a text that relies on the readers’ contribution to give it 
meanings and values. In this chapter, therefore, the term ‘hybrid’ in ‘hybrid fiction’ is 
interchangeable with the network concept to the extent that it refers to the coming together 
of heterogeneous elements that are constantly morphing and changing according to the 
relations they forge with other elements. Likewise, the novels like Super Sad and The 
Circle are a hybrid text because they seek to build a text and reader relationship that is 
dynamic, contingent, and grounded on the assumption that the text and the reader are both 





In Metamorphoses, Rosi Braidotti writes that amidst rapid changes and developments, we 
need ‘alternative representations and social locations for the kind of hybrid mix we are in 
the process of becoming. Figurations are not figurative ways of thinking, but rather more 
materialistic mappings of situated, or embedded and embodied, positions.’1 Braidotti links 
the new figuration to nomadic subjectivity that is ‘always a collective enterprise, “external” 
to the self’.2 These nomadic subjects are in a larger web of connections with other entities 
that can change and transform them. As a composite kind of being, they require a ‘post-
personal’ style of representation that can make such interconnections comprehensible.3  
This thesis examines how contemporary American literature adopts such post-
personal figurative thinking in its representation of subjectivities. The thesis focused on 
narrative, urban, and network subjectivities as they represent what Braidotti calls 
‘transformations, metamorphoses, mutations, and processes of change’.4 The consideration 
of narrative subjectivities in the first chapter explored how the self is formulated through a 
narrative construction that is a collaborative and interpersonal process. The attention to the 
narrative aspect of the self also leads to the conceptualization of sincerity and self-
authenticity as a form of accountability. The second chapter considered the relation 
between the urban space and subjectivities that calls for an affective form of literacy that 
can render such relations legible. Lastly, the third chapter explored how the attention to 
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network configuration is connected to a new mode of critical thinking that is sensitive to 
the affective relations of the subject with others.  
The undertaking of this thesis is also part of an effort to identify some 
characteristics of contemporary American fiction. Specifically, I posit that a group of 
writing portrays the human conditions and experiences in the twenty-first century in such 
a way that challenges our understanding of human subjectivity and literary texts. I label 
this body of work ‘hybrid fiction’ with a proposition that ‘hybridity’ is a dominant logic 
governing its formal features, subject matters, and representation of human subjects. More 
specifically, in my reading of the six novels, I aim to trace the connection between hybridity 
and affect by examining how hybrid subjectivity and literature can be understood as an 
affective entity. 
 Therefore, on one level, it is possible to define hybrid fiction as affective fiction. 
To an extent, this also means that I see hybrid fiction necessarily being part of what Mark 
McGurl calls the ‘new cultural geology’. The term describes a critical approach that does 
not consider culture solely from the humanistic viewpoint and only within human’s 
historical time. Instead, McGurl points our attention to the cultural, geological thinking 
that operates ‘outside of rather than after the modern and postmodern’ (emphasis in 
original).5 This mode of thinking is ‘exomodern’ because it cannot be incorporated into the 
humanist temporal progression marked by the shifts, ruptures, and transitions from 
modernity, postmodernity, and post-postmodernity. Rather the temporal and spatial scale 
of exomodernism surpasses and encompasses all of the human enterprises, rendering 
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human agency extremely contingent and insignificant. Therefore, the exomodern thinking 
is a strand of posthumanism as it places human existence in such a vast, geological context 
to emphasize the ontological condition of humans. Exomodernism, moreover, pays 
attention to other nonhuman entities that exist alongside humans within this geological 
time and space. Thus, exomodernism does not simply focus on the ontology of humans but 
also considers the contingency and limited agency of humans through the recognition of 
the equal power and agency of the nonhuman others.  
 The new cultural geology influences my conceptualization of hybrid fiction in two 
ways. First, it allows me to consider hybrid fiction outside the modernism/postmodernism 
genealogy but as a group of literary works that reflects the commitment to thinking 
ontologically about the world and itself as a literary object. This leads me to consider hybrid 
fiction as a text that produces and transmits meanings affectively. Second, the ontological 
turn in the new cultural ontology reminds us of the interconnection among humans and 
nonhumans on the level of bodies. Therefore, the relationship between the reader as a 
human and literature as the nonhuman other may be reconceptualized on the basis of their 
ontological, affective relations. Rachel Greenwald Smith’s theorization of impersonal 
feelings is an exemplary work in affective literary criticism. It recognizes that there is an 
emotional relationship between the text and the reader. She sees a transmission of affect in 
the act of reading that potentially constitutes both the text and the reader's subjectivity. 
When Smith invokes the concept of an ecosystem in her argument about textual affectivity, 
she inevitably places her work in the tradition of exomodernism. From the exomodern 
perspective, hybrid fiction may be more than just a literary label but a reflection of a 




 In a way, my study of hybrid fiction belongs to the ontological turn of literary 
criticism that Walter Benn Michaels calls the ‘commitment to the meaningless’.6 Michaels 
argues that attention to the materiality of the text that disregards authorial intention can 
lead to the situation in which subject positions become the only thing that matters. The 
subject’s different experiences of the text substitute what the text means. The primacy of 
the subject that arises from the commitment to textual ontology, Benn warns, could lead to 
the end of ideology and history. Ideologies, beliefs, and values will be reduced to a matter 
of beings and positions. Disagreement about right or wrong is replaced by a debate about 
what is and what is not. Consequently, there will no longer be a possibility for historical 
thinking, critical thinking, and ideological development outside of personal identities, 
subject positions, and identitarian politics. ‘The replacement of the sign by the mark […] 
is foundational for and constitutive of the aesthetics of posthistoricism.’7 
 Michaels imagines a somewhat dystopian scenario that results from the attention to 
the materiality of texts and subject positions. However, this thesis aims to illustrate that the 
emphasis on subject positions does not necessarily abolish the collective awareness that 
Michaels speculates. On the contrary, the recent ontological turn emphasizes relational 
thinking. It demonstrates a mutually constitutive relation between the subject and the 
object. In Without Criteria, Steven Shaviro argues that in this kind of relation, the subject 
is ‘neither active nor quite passive, nor even really self-reflexive but […] in the middle 
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voice’ (emphasis in original).8 By the term middle voice, Shaviro explains how the subject 
is affected by the object and vice versa during the moment of encounter and contemplation: 
The contemplated object perpetuates itself in, and for the contemplating subject; 
the subject subsists only to the extent that it resonates with the feelings inspired by 
that object. […] The feelings cannot be separated from the subject for whom they 
exist; yet the subject itself can only be said to exist by virtue of these feelings, and 
in relation to them.9 
Following Shaviro, paying attention to the materiality of texts is not limited to perceiving 
only their physicality. Reading with an awareness of texts as an object is not the same as 
sensing the ‘sensuous appearance’ of the text and seeing it ‘without reference to the 
maker’s purpose’.10 The text as an object is not void of the agential capability to affect 
changes. Instead, as Shaviro argues, the ontological turn considers reading as a 
contemplative act during an encounter. Textual meaning is a product of a contemplative 
interaction in which the subject’s feeling and judgment of the text is derived from the text 
itself, even though the feeling only belongs to individual subjects.  
 The term hybridity is central to the thesis because it reflects the ontological 
relationality that arises from attention to materiality. Seeing the world through the material 
lens does not result in the subjects being cut loose from beliefs, values, and ideologies 
while floating aimlessly as individuals with no ties or connections. Quite the opposite, the 
ontological turn reinforces the subject’s embeddedness in the social world that endows 
beliefs, values, and ideologies and reflects the subject’s relations with other human and 
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nonhuman entities. In other words, considering the text as an object is part of the 
speculative tradition. Speculative thinking can be traced back to Alfred N. Whitehead 
whose speculative philosophy, Isabel Stengers argues, is a constructivist approach that 
‘raise[s] the question of “how it holds together,” or how it is affect by its environment and 
how it affects it’.11 Stengers thus characterizes Whitehead’s speculative thinking as a ‘leap 
of imagination’ that experiments with and explores possibilities of relations to answer an 
essential question about humans as they experience changes and developments: “what has 
happened to us?”.12 
 A practice of reading that pays attention to the materiality of texts may reveal the 
primacy of the subject but can also answer important questions about ourselves, our place 
in a web of connections, how relations constitute us, and vice versa. It makes us aware of 
what has happened to us in the process of reading, what changes us, and how we affect the 
meaning of the text we are reading. Put differently, by paying attention to the material 
quality of the text, reading becomes less reflective but more diffractive. Karen Barad 
explains that both reflective and diffractive ways of thinking originate from optical 
metaphors. While reflection refers to mirror and sameness, diffraction is sensitive to 
differences. The distinction between reflection and diffraction has a critical ramification in 
critical practice. Reflection contributes to a mode of critique that is reflexive. By contrast, 
Barad writes, ‘diffractions are attuned to differences-differences that our knowledge-
making practices make and the effects they have on the world.’13 All entities involved in 
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the process of diffraction will be affected and become different. Therefore, diffraction as a 
critical method cannot only help one to gain and produce knowledge but, in the process, 
one is bound to affect and be affected by all entities involved. As Melanie Sehgal writes, 
the process of diffraction 
not only forces us to reconsider what an entity “in its essence” is, but brings the 
entire distribution of subject and object, knower and known, words and things, 
words and world under reconsideration. The relation between knower and known 
can no longer be described as on of distant gaze. To engage in a process of knowing 
is to be part of the equation […] Epistemology and ontology can no longer be kept 
apart.14 
Diffractive reading thus does not consider knowledge and meaning as a discovery of 
something that belongs to the object. Instead, it contributes to the becoming of both the 
subject and the object in the process of reading. This leads Sehgal to conclude that ontology 
and epistemology are not necessarily separated – ‘knowing is part of the intra-action’. 
Sehgal’s argument is also echoed in Karin Murris and Vivienne Bozalek’s description of 
reading as ‘response-able methodology’ that is ‘the cultivation of collective knowing, 
desiring, being and making-with so that we render each other capable’.15 In both diffractive 
or response-able reading modes, subject positions may gain primacy but might not be such 
a bad thing. As Sehgal writes, it represents ‘one possible rendering of the world we inhabit, 
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15 Karin Murris and Vivienne Bozalek, ‘Diffraction and Response-able Reading of Texts: The Relational 
Ontologies of Barad and Deleuze’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 32 (2019), 




a possibly interesting and adequate one'.16  And if I may add, it is also a rendition in which 
we are directly implicated and thus reinforces our relational subjectivity.  
Therefore, while Michaels might protest the supposed end of ideology and history 
as a consequence of the ontological turn that lets loose the subjects from their 
embeddedness in the social world, it might be possible to imagine a new kind of politics 
when we are left with only subject positions. The ontological turn allows us to understand 
the subject as a ‘whatever singularity’ in Giorgio Agamben’s argument. ‘Whatever 
singularity has no identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it 
simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an idea, that is, to 
the totality of its possibilities.’17 Because the subject has now gained primacy, it becomes 
free to imagine all the possibilities without limitations. Elizabeth Grosz also writes about 
the inherent futurity in ontological thinking to illustrate its merit: 
Yet an ontology entails a consideration of the future, not only of what we can 
guarantee or be certain but above all what virtualities in the present may enable in 
the future. This is the possibility of the future being otherwise than the present, the 
openness of a future which is nevertheless tied to, based on but not entirely limited 
by, the past and present.18  
Rather than being bereft of possibilities for meaningful actions, the ontological turn might 
be able to provide as many possibilities to engage with the world as we are willing to take 
that leap of imagination. 
 
16 Ibid., p. 198. 
17 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans.by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 67. 
18 Elizabeth Grosz, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and Limits of Materialism (New York: Columbia 




The use of the term hybridity in this thesis reflects such hopefulness and openness 
embedded in speculative and ontological thinking. Hybridity reflects the decentering of 
human subjects and the interconnectedness of all things. It emphasizes the relation between 
the non-human and the human and considers humans an entity in a network of connection 
with others. Moreover, another important resonance of hybridity also lies in its potential as 
a destabilizing force. Being hybrid implies impurity and inauthenticity. As the thesis 
demonstrates, hybrid fiction thus directly challenges ideals such as authenticity, fixity of 
meaning, or rigid criticism. However, and more importantly, hybridity can produce both a 
destabilizing and generative force. Accordingly, I tried to demonstrate in this thesis that 
the attempt to reassess notions such as authenticity, literacy, and criticism also entails a 
new alternative and possibility that hybrid thinking makes possible.   
In other words, hybridity also contains a sense of regeneration and futurity. This 
aspect of hybridity informs the main motifs of hybrid fiction explored in this thesis. The 
trickster trope and the use of signifying practice in The Intuitionist are examples of the 
productive potential of hybridity. The novel incorporates various tropes from African-
American literary traditions and genres such as speculative fiction and detective novels to 
imagine new ways to signify and produce meaning. Therefore, hybrid fiction may be best 
described in the words of Carrie Wexler from Innocents and Others when she compares an 
artist to a gleaner: ‘What is a gleaner? Well, it is a nice word for a thief, except you take 
what no one wants. Not just unusual ideas or things. You look closely at the familiar to 
discover what everyone else overlooks or ignores or discards.’19  
 




 The ontological turn also happens concomitant with the emergence of post-
postmodernism. In asking ‘what was postmodernism?’ Linda Hutcheon points to the end 
of the postmodern era by concluding that ‘electronic technology and globalization, 
respectively, have transformed how we experience the language we use and the social 
world in which we live’.20 This transformation alters the relationship between textuality 
and worldliness – or how the engagement with texts reflects the conditions in the world – 
that can no longer be characterized as postmodern. Post-postmodernism signifies this 
moment of change. Defining post-postmodernism, Robert McLaughlin emphasizes the 
feeling of discontent that postmodern fiction becomes too self-reflexive, co-opted by the 
mainstream that it is ought to subvert, and thus incapable of having a genuine and 
productive connection with the social world. The ‘post-postmodern discontent’ is 
expressed as the ‘aesthetic sea change’ that aims to ‘reenergize literature’s social mission, 
its ability to intervene in the social world, to have an impact on actual people and the actual 
social institutions in which they live their lives.’21 In a more recent essay about post-
postmodernism, McLaughlin is more cautious in declaring the advent of post-
postmodernism. Instead, he describes the new moment as ‘postmodernism in the 21st 
century’ in which the postmodern sensibilities have a change in focus.  
Where the postmodernists represented – celebrated, really – a highly indeterminate 
reality through insistently experimental self-referential means, the post-
postmodernists have tended to deemphasize the self-referentiality in their fiction, 
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at times, […] appearing to return to the conventions of realism, yet still insisting 
on the indeterminacy of reality.22  
McLaughlin’s call for fiction’s renewed engagement with the social world is realized in its 
commitment to reality whose representational transparency is exposed by postmodern self-
reflexivity, parody, and irony. However, while this return to realism can be seen as the 
post-postmodern mission to revive the relationship between the text and the world, post-
postmodern realism is also indicative of the attempt to chart the changing conception of 
human subjectivity and the new relationship between the human and the world. Therefore, 
post-postmodernism is not simply a naïve return to realism. It recognizes that those binaries 
terms such as reality and representation, humans and non-humans, subjects and objects 
need a reconceptualization before any return to realism can be achieved.  
 This is the entry point for hybrid fiction in contemporary American fiction. Hybrid 
fiction is partly a post-postmodern project because of its commitment to realism. It is 
committed to representing humans in the social world in which all entities exist in an 
affective, networked relationship as a hybrid subject and object. However, the focus on 
hybridity and affect in this thesis also separates hybrid fiction from the traditions of 
modernism, postmodernism, and post-postmodernism. Instead, it is possible to characterize 
hybrid fiction as part of what Mark McGurl calls exomodernism. On the one hand, 
exomodernism provides the clarity and rationale behind the use of the term ‘hybridity’ in 
my inquiry. With such clarity, on the other hand, I can begin to establish the link between 
hybrid fiction and the current trend of cultural engagement that could be characterized by 
 
22 Robert L. McLaughlin, ‘After the Revolution: US Postmodernism in the Twenty-First Century’, 




its attention to affect, to the interdependence, or the network, of the human and the 
nonhuman in the formation of both the natural and the cultural worlds.  
 In McGurl’s introduction of exomodernism, however, there is not an explicit 
reference to hybridity. The term only invites a re-examination of humans outside of their 
own history and encourages a recognition of the limit and insignificance of human agency. 
It is a heightened awareness of the ontological condition of humans and a deprivileging of 
the humancentric perspective even within the humanist project such as cultural studies. 
Along the line of the exomodern thinking, therefore, the distinction between the subject 
and the object is blurring. Humans are exposed as just an object while other nonhuman 
objects appear to have gain agency.  
 For McGurl, exomodernism functions as an umbrella term. Any cultural works and 
studies that aim to decenter human subjectivity and recognize the hybrid relations between 
humans and others all belong in the scope of exomodernism. Among the works that McGurl 
posits to have reflected the exomodern sensibility are those of Latour and the speculative 
realists. What he regards to be characteristically exomodern in their works are the attempt 
to ‘take non-human objects as seriously as possible, refusing the philosophical privileges 
long accorded to the human and to human representation and consciousness in particular’.23 
As such, McGurl specifically identifies labels such as “object-oriented ontology”, and 
“speculative realism” in association with exomodern thinking. These strands of philosophy 
provide a theoretical foundation for what hybridity signifies in hybrid fiction. They allow 
the concept of hybridity to be realized not only at the level of contents but also at the formal 
 




and structural levels. With my intention to associate hybrid fiction with exomodernism, it 
is in the works of thinkers such as McGurl and other exomodern theorists that lend 
important critical tools for my study of hybrid fiction in this thesis. 
 As previously stated, what I understand to be the moment of transition from 
postmodernism is the return to realism and the increasing attention to the ontological 
condition of humans. These traits mark the arrival of post-postmodernism for many literary 
scholars.  Hybrid fiction also shares the same emphasis on the indeterminacy of reality and 
the ontology of humans. However, what makes hybrid fiction exomodern is that they do 
not see these emphases as a renewed energy invested in the realist mode of fiction. As 
Madhu Dubey observes, the post-postmodernists regard the return to realism as ‘the 
emergence of a new kind of social novel’, which has a renewed ability to connect with the 
social world.24 However, she does not see the post-postmodern recommitment to realism 
to have solved the problem of the postmodern self-referential impasse. For Dubey, the post-
postmodern return to realism is not a solution to this impasse as long as the division 
between reality and representation is maintained. What will indicate the passing of the 
postmodern moment is the change in the relationship between the textual and the worldly 
as suggested by Hutcheon.25 In exomodernism, this relationship has finally changed 
because we are now confronted with and overwhelmed by the geologic time and space for 
which humanistic representation can never be sufficient and by the fact that both human 
and nonhuman entities are mutually and equally constituted and transformed by affect. The 
textual cannot maintain its representative or critical ability when the scale of the worldly 
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is too large for human imagination to contain, and the anthropocentric conception of the 
human itself is greatly destabilized.  
 Thus, hybrid fiction as a product of exomodern thinking does not naively claim to 
possess a more effective critical and representational function with its investigation on the 
condition of reality and humans. Hybrid fiction functions as a ‘descriptive tool’ that aims 
to ‘detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its 
existence’.26 The meaning that is produced by hybrid fiction is descriptive and thus 
constructive. The writers of hybrid fiction are the ones who have a realist attitude with an 
awareness that they can never claim to know reality; reality can only be affectively felt, 
described, imagined of, and speculated.  
This descriptive form of representation of hybrid fiction carries a realistic undertone 
with a certain sense of humility. They do not claim that reality can be represented in a more 
sincere and productive way. The realistic mode of hybrid fiction is a form of speculative 
realism that acknowledges the inaccessibility to reality. Treating reality as speculation, 
hybrid fiction moves beyond conventional realism. Instead, we often see in hybrid fiction 
the integration of realistic representation and fantastical imagination. The marriage 
between fantasy and realism is the formal acknowledgment of the reality that our mental 
ability can never grasp and comprehend. At best, we can attempt to describe and imagine 
a reality that we are a part of, with a full awareness that there is an externality that exists 
independently from humans, and thus human minds can never be a privileged vantage point 
from which the real can be revealed.  
 
26 Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?’ From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’, 




 The speculative realist attitude of hybrid fiction also creates a narrative mode that 
does not aim to establish a cause-and-effect connection or aspire to arrive at a solution. The 
narrative structure of hybrid fiction leans towards being a descriptive observation of how 
entities are related, affected, and constituted. Often the narrative progression in hybrid 
fiction is dominated by the sense of indeterminacy, irresolution, constant movement. There 
is not an obvious indication of where and when the actions take place or end. There is not 
an endpoint of resolution where a judgment is made, or knowledge is gained. Events are 
not linked in a causative manner; they are described to the reader as an ongoing happening. 
The reader is thus given an invitation to make a free interpretation and assumption of what 
those events could actually mean as they are unfolding and developing. 
 The lack of clear narrative closure, indeterminacy, and irresolution also leads to 
another trait of hybridity discernible in the relationship between the text and the reader. 
Without closure, the text does not contain an absolute and final truth about the story. At 
the same time, the reader needs to be actively involved in the meaning production of the 
text. There is no clear division between a piece of writing as a signifier and the reader as 
the receiving end of what is signified. Reading becomes a collaborative process in which 
the production of meaning comes from both participants in the process. This mutual 
relationship between the text and the reader provides an example of a network in which all 
entities, including both humans and nonhumans, exist interdependently. The reading 
process that hybrid fiction encourages through the use of narrative indeterminacy is the 
process that does not regard the text as a passive object within which the meaning is 
contained and waiting to be revealed, nor the reader as a subject who is able to seek such 




- hybridization between the text and the reader as two equal entities that generate meanings 
and feelings through affective encounters. 
 With the reader being actively involved in the way the text produces its meaning, 
what is understood to be fixed and authentic about a piece of writing or any work of art is 
also challenged. A novel can become different novels for different readers. The fact that a 
single text can be so unstable and fluid testifies to its status as an entity in the network in 
which ‘no one entity is significant in isolation, but instead attains meaning through its 
numerous – and changeable – relation to other entities.’27 While the speculative realist 
mode endows the sense of hybridity in the formal quality of hybrid fiction, the 
indeterminacy in the narrative also reflects the affective nature of the text that allows us to 
see the text itself as a hybrid object.  
 Finally, it may be possible to conclude that hybrid fiction may belong in what 
Francis Halsall calls ‘actor-network aesthetics’ or relational aesthetics that take these 
relations among hybrid entities that populate a network as their subject matter.28 Hybrid 
fiction aims to represent the nature and movement of relations among these entities 
constituted by their affective encounters. Therefore, the narration of events and portrayal 
of humans in hybrid fiction become a description of various relations in a single temporal 
and spatial location, an observation of how the change in time and space may affect those 
relations and thus the human subjectivity which is constituted by those affective relations. 
With these intimate and highly contingent relations that humans can have with other 
 
27 Anders Blok and Togben Elgaard Jensen, Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid World (London: 
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entities, their subjectivity and identity become fluid and constantly shifting. The fluidity 
and relationality of human subjectivity finally lead to the question of what it means to be 
human after the recognition that the distinction between humans and others cannot be made 
at all. While hybrid fiction may share the posthuman sensibility in this regard, it is a strand 
of posthumanism that enriches, instead of diminishing, our understanding of what it means 
to be human. It is the posthuman strand that works as an extended humanism. It recognizes 
humans as being a part of the collective of hybrid and affective entities. With this 
recognition, humans may begin to grasp both their limitations and potentials as members 
of a larger collective in which all entities – humans and nonhumans, signs and things, 
subjects and objects – play a part in a mutually constituting process. With this recognition, 
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